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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates empirical issues in civil military relations. It is comprised of one 
qualitative chapter (chapter 2), one chapter describing the data (chapter 3) and four empirical 
chapters (chapters 4-7). 
 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of coup-proofing strategies available to dictators, before analysing 
how various dictators of the MENA region utilised these strategies to varying degrees. Chapter 
2 is a qualitative study. The purpose of this chapter is to provide context and depth to the 
empirical chapters that follow. 
 
Chapter 4 explores the role of the military in democratisation. It tests the hypothesis that 
countries in which the military was politically powerful before democratic transition occurs are 
less likely to consolidate democracy.  It represents one of the first empirical applications of 
Acemoglu et al.’s (2010) paper “A Theory of Military Dictatorships”. One of the main 
challenges encountered in this chapter is problem of quantifying the political power of the 
military. While this chapter considers a number of possible measures, the main measure used 
for empirical analysis is military burden. Chapter 4 effectively explores the impact of military 
spending on democracy, using a panel of 102 countries over the period 1960-2000. In chapter 
5, this relationship is reversed. 
 
Chapter 5 examines whether democracies spend less on the military that autocracies. While 
papers on the determinants of military spending generally include democracy as a control 
variable, with a few exceptions, it is not the focus of their enquiry. This chapter addresses 
resulting problems in the existing literature concerning data quality and the appropriate 
measurement of key variables. In particular, it addresses the question of causality between 
military spending and democracy, a question which arises but is not resolved in chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 6 delves further into the relationship between military spending and regime type, 
unpacking the category of autocracy into military regimes, single-party states and personalist 
regimes. I develop a theory of authoritarian survival that explains why certain types of 
dictatorships are likely to allocate more resources to the military than others. I test this theory 
empirically using an unbalanced panel 64 countries over the period 1960-2000. 
 
Chapter 7 uses new data on military spending in the MENA region to explore the relationship 
between military expenditures and natural resource rents. While there is abundant anecdotal 
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evidence on the connection between these two variables, this relationship has not been 
systematically tested empirically. I do so using a panel of 16 MENA countries covering the 
period 1960-2010.  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Context 
 
The outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2010 renewed people’s faith in democracy. If dictatorships 
in this region, which have been amongst the longest surviving in history, were breaking down, 
surely it would only be a matter of time before democracy prevailed all around the world. For 
a brief moment in 2011 it seemed like even China might be affected by this wave of 
democratisation.  
 
Nearly four years later, in 2014, people are no longer optimistic. While Tunisia appears to have 
made a relatively smooth transition towards more democratic government, Egypt, after a 
hopeful spell of democratisation, seems to have reverted back to its old ways. In some 
countries, such as Kuwait and Jordan, the revolution never really took off, while in others, such 
as Bahrain, they were brutally repressed. Syria, at the time of writing, is in the grips of full scale 
civil war in its third year. 
 
Thus, the study of democratisation remains as relevant as ever. There is no consensus on what 
causes democracy, and theories of democratisation abound (chapter 4 of this thesis will 
discuss the modernization and the institutional approaches). However, one factor that has 
appeared to play a pivotal role throughout the Arab Spring has been the military. 
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When I first began work on this thesis in October 2010, Egypt was firmly in the hands of 
President Hosni Mubarak, backed by the military. Less than five months later, in February 
2011, anti-government protests and the military’s decision to side with the protestors had 
forced Mubarak to step down and hand power over to a military council.  
 
The military council initially promised to hold elections after six months, but postponed these 
repeatedly. It was not until June 2012 that a new president, Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, was finally elected, and this only after demonstrators took to the streets anew to 
protest the military’s increasingly apparent lack of commitment to democratic change. 
However, in the same month, a Constitutional Court ruling dissolved parliament. Moreover, a 
decree issued by military council gave the generals control over passing laws and prevented 
the next president from overseeing the army's budget and declaring war without the consent 
of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. This called into question what real power the 
new president would have. 
 
One year later, in July 2013, the military removed President Morsi from office and suspended 
the constitution, in what would come to be called a military coup. Over the following months, 
protests in support of Morsi were violently put down by the military. In February 2014, the 
government appointed to rule after the removal of Morsi resigned to clear the way for Field 
Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's to become president, which he did in May 2014. The future of 
democracy in Egypt remains tenuous.  
 
The events in Egypt can be contrasted with other countries’ experiences of the Arab Spring. 
For example, in Tunisia, the military sided with the people but did not get involved in post-
revolution politics, allowing for a relatively smooth transition towards democracy. In Syria and 
Bahrain, the military sided with the government, turning their guns on the protestors. 
Moreover, in Syria, while there have been some defectors, a large part of the military 
continues to support the government in what has turned into a civil war in its third year at the 
time of writing. In Libya and Yemen, the military was split in its support of the countries’ 
leaders from the start.  
 
These examples highlight the importance of the military in determining the outcome of 
revolutions. In fact, Barany (2011, p. 28) argues that “no institution matters more to a states 
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survival than its military, and no revolution within a state can succeed without support or at 
least the acquiescence of its armed forces”. 
 
The study of democratisation and the study of authoritarian survival are in many ways two 
sides of the same coin1. In order to fully understand change, one needs to look at 
counterfactual instances. If one can understand how dictators seek to stay in power, one can 
better identify weaknesses in their power structures. 
 
 
1.2 Civil-military Relations 
 
The military is a key player in any dictatorship’s survival. However, as Acemoglu et al. (2010, 
page 2) put it, “a powerful military is a double-edged sword”. On the one hand, a powerful 
military can help ensure a dictator’s survival; on the other hand, a powerful military can pose 
the main threat. Thus, coup proofing can become an important aspect of a dictator’s survival 
strategy. In the following chapter, I shall discuss coup-proofing strategies in depth. 
 
The relationship between the government and its military is crucial to understanding why a 
military chooses to support the government or not. Civil-military relations may be determined 
by a number of factors, internal and external. The role the military played in bringing the 
current regime to power is an important internal factor: in countries in which the dictator was 
brought to power by a military coup, such as Syria, the military may come to see itself as an 
equal partner in politics. This behaviour is even more pronounced in countries in which the 
military ‘liberated’ the country in an armed struggle, as in Algeria and Egypt. In these cases, the 
military often views itself as the embodiment of the new regime. This position is frequently 
reinforced by the role it played in modernising the country. In contrast, militaries which played 
no role in bringing the regime to power, for example Tunisia, or actively resisted the regime, 
for example Iran, frequently find themselves side-lined. In Iran, the regimes parallel military 
structure, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, came to see itself as the embodiment of the new 
regime in place of the regular armed forces.  
 
Dictators’ coup-proofing strategies might vary substantially depending on this relationship. 
Regimes in which the militaries are organically linked with the government tend to secure the 
                                                          
1
 The breakdown of an authoritarian regime does not necessarily mean a move to more democracy, as 
one dictatorship can be replaced by another. 
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military’s loyalty by ensuring it has a stake in the continuation of the regime. This might, for 
example, involve allowing the military to pursue profitable economic activities. Regimes in 
which the militaries are not linked with the government often take a more repressive 
approach, purging the military of disloyal members, arbitrarily rotating commanding officers, 
controlling the armed forces with parallel military structures, and monitoring logistics. 
 
All dictators will try to surround themselves with people loyal to them. Where possible, they 
will try to exploit family, tribal, or ethnic ties. Thus, one might distinguish between countries 
that are ethnically heterogeneous and can therefore exploit differences within the population, 
and those that cannot, e.g. ethnically homogenous countries. Syria’s Al-Asad relies on 
widening circles of trust comprised first of his family, the Kalbiyya tribe and the Alawite sect, 
and finally other loyal tribes. Tunisia, on the other hand, is ethnically a relatively homogenous 
country, and its leaders cannot exploit such ties. Similarly, one can distinguish between 
monarchies with large Royal Families and those without, for example Saudi Arabia and Jordan, 
respectively. The ability to disseminate members of the Royal Family throughout the ranks of 
the military has important consequences for civil-military relations in these regimes.  
 
Natural resource endowments also play an important role. Oil-rich countries, like Libya and 
Saudi Arabia, can afford to appease the military with modern equipment. On the other hand, 
those countries that use their oil wealth to support large welfare states, i.e. the Gulf 
monarchies, find themselves less dependent on the military to secure internal stability. 
 
Finally, a very important determinant of civil-military relations is the existence of external 
threats. Both Egypt and Iran tried to change their relations with the military after the 
experiences of international conflict highlighted the need for a more professional military with 
an external focus. The consequence of coup-proofing is often the inability of the military to 
perform its most important task – defending the county’s borders.  
 
 
1.3 My approach 
1.3.1 Overview of chapters 
 
This thesis approaches the topic of civil-military relations from a quantitative angle. While less 
wide-spread, this approach is becoming increasingly popular amongst researchers as 
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economists take on issues traditionally confined to political science. Economists have 
contributed to the study of conflict (see work by Tim Besley, Paul Collier, Jack Hirshleifer, and 
others), regime change (see work by Daron Acemoglu and Jim Robinson, amongst others), 
military coups (for example, Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2010), determinants of defence 
spending (see, for example, work by Ron Smith), etc. 
 
One of the main challenges in approaching the study of civil-military relations quantitatively is 
how to measure key variables, in particular military involvement in politics. This thesis uses 
military burden (military expenditure as a percentage of GDP) as a proxy. It takes the view that 
military expenditure is a tool with which a dictator can co-opt the military. Thus, military 
burden reflects the extent to which a dictator prioritises the military. 
 
This thesis is organised in eight chapters (including the introduction). The relevant literature is 
discussed chapter by chapter. In the following paragraphs, I highlight each chapter’s original 
contribution.  
 
Chapter 2 gives an overview of coup-proofing strategies available to dictators, before analysing 
how various dictators of the MENA region utilised these strategies to varying degrees. 
Comparisons are made between military regimes, single-party states, personalist regimes and 
monarchies, a regime categorisation I shall return to in chapter 6. Chapter 2 is a qualitative 
study. The purpose of this chapter is to provide context and depth to the empirical chapters 
that follow. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the data that are used throughout this thesis. In particular, it critically 
discusses the problems associated with the data and what actions have been taken to remedy 
these problems where possible. Chapter 3 also introduces new data on military expenditures 
in the MENA region that I collected for this thesis.  
 
Chapter 4 explores the role of the military in democratisation. This chapter seeks to 
understand why some countries successfully transition to democracy while others do not. It is 
motivated by the recent Egyptian experience, but also historical examples in Latin America. It 
tests the hypothesis that countries in which the military was politically powerful before 
democratic transition occurs are less likely to consolidate democracy.  It represents one of the 
first empirical applications of Acemoglu et al.’s (2010) paper “A Theory of Military 
Dictatorships”. One of the main challenges presented in this chapter is how to quantify the 
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political power of the military. While this chapter considers a number of possible measures, 
the main measure used for empirical analysis is military burden. Chapter 4 effectively explores 
the effect of military spending on democracy. In chapter 5 this relationship is reversed. 
 
Chapter 5 examines whether democracies spend less on the military than autocracies. This 
chapter is motivated by the question whether democracy has a demilitarising effect. While 
papers on the determinants of military spending generally include democracy as a control 
variable, with a few exceptions, it is not the focus of their enquiry. This chapter addresses 
resulting problems in the existing literature concerning data quality and the appropriate 
measurement of key variables. In particular, it addresses the question of causality between 
military spending and democracy, a question which arises but is not resolved in chapter 4.  
 
In addition, chapter 5 explores the question of heterogeneity between regime types and across 
the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. The objective here is to examine whether the standard 
determinants of military expenditure behave in the same way across these sub-groups and 
pooling is therefore justified – an issue largely ignored in the literature. 
 
Chapter 6 delves further into the relationship between military spending and regime type, 
unpacking the category of autocracy into military regimes, single-party states and personalist 
regimes. It revisits issues explored in chapter 2 regarding differences between regime types. I 
develop a theory of authoritarian survival that explains why certain types of dictatorships are 
likely to allocate more resources to the military than others.  
 
My theory is based on ability and necessity of different dictators to co-opt and/or repress the 
military. One aspect it does not consider is the role natural resource rents might play. Chapter 
7 uses new data (collected by myself in collaboration with SIRPI) on military spending in the 
MENA region to explore the relationship between military expenditures and natural resource 
rents. While there is abundant anecdotal evidence on the connection between these two 
variables, this relationship has not been systematically tested empirically.  
 
Finally, chapter 8 concludes this thesis. It discusses possible policy implications of my findings 
and suggests areas for further research. 
 
1.3.2 Econometric Methodology 
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The econometric investigation is undertaken on a sample of N=102 countries covering the 
period 1960-2000, T=40 (or in the case of chapter 7, a sample of 16 MENA countries covering 
the period 1960-2010). The availability of data with both large cross-sectional and time-series 
dimensions raises various questions regarding the choice of econometric model. Large N, large 
T datasets raise three main issues: dynamics, heterogeneity, and cross-section dependence. 
Different treatments of these issues lead to there being a very large number of panel 
estimators and no consensus on which should be used because their relative advantages and 
disadvantages depend on unknown parameters. The main estimator used in this thesis is the 
static fixed effects model, which is the standard model used in the more recent literature, thus 
making comparison with other papers more easy. The issue of dynamics is further examined in 
chapter 5, where the differences between the short and long run are considered using an error 
correction model. 
 
The main explanatory variable of interest to this thesis is regime type, which is a variable that 
does not change much over time and for many countries do not vary at all. Estimation of the 
effect of time invariant variables remains a matter of research, (for example Pesaran and Zhou, 
2014). The regime type data will be discussed in detail in chapter 3.  
 
In this thesis it is assumed that because T is quite large the Nickel (1981) bias, which biases the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable towards zero, is unlikely to be a problem. 
Therefore, GMM estimators have not been used. However, even this is not uncontroversial. 
For instance, since it is the ratio N/T that matters for the bias and since N is large relative to T, 
Tongur et al. (2015), who explain the log of the share of military expenditure by political 
regimes and other variables using a similar sample size, use Arellano-Bond GMM. Gaibulloev et 
al. (2014) also argue for the importance of the Nickell bias even though they have data for 
1970-2009. In addition, the GMM estimators typically used in this situation difference the data 
to remove the fixed effect, further reducing the information in the regime type variable.  
 
With the exception of chapter 7, this thesis uses a large and therefore disparate group of 
countries. Therefore, the Pesaran and Smith (1995) heterogeneity bias, which biases the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable towards one, is likely to be a more important 
problem than the Nickel bias. It is noticeable that in Tongur et al. (2015), which has a similar 
sample size to that used in this thesis, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is close 
to one and as large as 0.869. This makes the long-run effects of other variables implausibly 
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large, e.g. the coefficient on the growth rate lies between -3.5 and -5.8 in various 
specifications.  
 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) argue that this heterogeneity bias can be avoided by using 
heterogeneous dynamic estimators, such as the mean group, which allows every coefficient to 
differ between country, or the pooled mean group of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) which 
allows short run coefficients to differ, but constrains long run coefficients to be the same. 
However, Baltagi and Griffin (1997) and Baltagi, Griffin and Xiong (2000) argue that such 
heterogeneous estimators show quite implausible values and predict less well than traditional 
fixed effect estimators. This large variance of the heterogeneous estimators is likely to be 
exacerbated in the present case by the fact that the crucial explanatory variable, regime type, 
shows so little time series variation. Thus, rather than estimating separate ARDL equations for 
each country, this thesis will rely on pooled estimators which can exploit the cross-country 
variation in regime type. However, some more limited heterogeneity is allowed for in chapter 
5, where I test for equality of the parameters across regime types and across Cold War and 
post-Cold War eras. 
 
Given that dynamic pooled models suffer from heterogeneity bias and that there is not enough 
time series variation in regime type to efficiently estimate its effect from heterogeneous ARDL 
estimators, the static model has some attractions. The data - particularly those on military 
expenditure - are most probably non-stationary and first differencing to make them stationary 
would again remove much of the identifying variation. It has long been argued that the cross-
section levels association can identify long-run effects (see, for example, Baltagi and Griffin, 
1984, or Pesaran and Smith, 1995). More rigorously, Phillips and Moon (1999, 2000) prove that 
the static pooled levels equation can estimate the long run effect, whether the non-stationary 
variables show homogeneous or heterogeneous cointegration or even if they are not 
cointegrated. In the latter case, although the levels regression in each country is spurious, the 
coefficient converging to a random variable for large T, the average over such random 
variables, given by the pooled estimator, consistently estimates a long-run effect.  
 
Cross-sectional dependence occurs because countries respond to similar political, economic 
and geographical factors. For example, countries may respond to similar security threats, an 
important determinant of military expenditure. The problem of cross-sectional dependence is 
discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Cross-section dependence can be thought of in terms of 
common factors which drive both dependent and independent variables. In a homogeneous 
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model where the common factors impact every country equally, they can be allowed for using 
time fixed effects. Such common factors are clearly important in my data. For instance, military 
expenditure fell and democracy increased in many countries after the end of the Cold War. 
However, including year fixed effects by using deviations from the cross-section averages can 
also remove a lot of variation in the country specific variables, since the cross-section averages 
explain a lot of the variation. Gaibulloev et al. (2014) demonstrate that once cross-section 
dependence is allowed for, relationships between variables (they use the example of terrorism 
and economic growth) disappear. Thus, allowing for cross-section dependence is likely to make 
it more difficult to estimate the effect of regime type on military expenditure. 
 
There remains an ongoing debate regarding how best to address the question of dynamics. 
One group of scholars advocate the use of dynamic panel models, and this method is being 
increasingly used in development economics, as well as defence economics (see for example, 
Acemoglu, et al., 2008 and Dunne and Perlo-Freeman 2003). However, other scholars, 
including Gundlach and Paldam (2012) argue that the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable 
removes too much variation in the data (this paper will be discussed in detail in chapter 4).  
 
Like Gundlach and Paldam (2012), Gaibulloev et al. (2014) and many others, I find that allowing 
for dynamics, heterogeneity and common factors can make the variables of interest 
insignificant. Like many others, I interpret this as a consequence of over-controlling and 
removing too much variation from the sample. However, it should be kept in mind that there is 
the alternative interpretation, that they really do have no effect.  
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2 Case Studies in the MENA Region 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to give some context to the empirical issues studied in this thesis by making 
a comparative study of cases. In particular, it explores civil-military relations in the various 
countries of the Middle East and North Africa (the MENA region) and examines the various 
coup-proofing strategies adopted by dictators in order to keep their militaries in check.  
 
The MENA region is a particularly interesting region to study coups because it experienced so 
many of them. Between March 1949 and the end of the 1980s, fifty-five coups were attempted 
in the region – half of them successful (Quinlivan, 1999, p. 133). However, by the 1980s, the 
number of coups declined. Be’eri (1982) argues that this is largely because those who had 
seized power through coups “learned to take preventative measures to forestall their 
recurrence”. Table 2.1 outlines the Polity IV score for countries of the MENA region in 2013. 
With the exception of Tunisia, which at the time of writing was undergoing a transition and 
therefore had not been rated, all countries remain autocracies. 
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Table 2-1 Polity IV scores for MENA countries in 2013 
Country Polity IV in 2013 Country Polity IV in 2013 
Algeria 2 Morocco -4 
Bahrain -10 Oman -8 
Egypt -4 Qatar -10 
Iran -7 Saudi Arabia -10 
Iraq 3 Syria -9 
Jordan -3 Tunisia Transition 
Kuwait -7 UAE -8 
Lebanon 6 Yemen 3 
Libya 0   
Notes: A score of 10 denotes a full democracy; 9 to 6 denote democracies; 5 to 1 denote open autocracies; 0 to -5 
denote closed democracies; -6 to -10 denote autocracies. 
 
This study attempts to cover most of the MENA region. However, it focuses on certain cases 
that have been particularly interesting in light of the Arab Spring. Using a similar categorisation 
as will be used in chapter 6, I distinguish between military regimes, one-party states, 
personalist dictatorships and monarchies2. I compare and contrast the strategies adopted by 
each. In doing so, I seek out patterns that may shed light on, and further the understanding of 
civil-military relations in autocracies. However, these strict categorisations are not always 
easily applied to individual cases. Thus, this chapter yields additional insight into how useful 
this categorisation is. 
 
This chapter contributes to the literature on regime change by exploring one aspect of how it 
is prevented. The study of regime persistence is as important as the study of regime change 
itself, for in order to fully understand change, one needs to look at counterfactual instances. If 
one can understand how dictators seek to stay in power, one can better identify weaknesses in 
their power structures. Regime changes can be caused by popular uprisings, external 
intervention or military coups, and there are studies dedicated to each of these causes (for 
example Snyder, 1992; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Booker, 2009). This chapter focuses 
predominantly on (the prevention of) the latter case – regime change initiated by the military. 
There are good reasons to focus on this case: the majority of dictators have been removed 
from power by a coup rather than by other means. Svolik (2009) finds that of the 316 dictators 
who were removed from power by non-constitutional means between 1945 and 2002, 32 
were removed by a popular uprising and 30 stepped down under public pressure to 
democratize; 20 were assassinated (but not as part of a coup or a popular uprising) and 16 
                                                          
2
 Monarchies are not studied in chapter 6. 
Jennifer Brauner 2014 
 
23 
 
were removed by foreign intervention; 205 dictators - more than two-thirds of the sample - 
were removed by government insiders, either members of the government, the military or the 
security forces.  
 
There are two dimensions to authoritarian survival. Brownlee (2002) distinguishes between 
crisis deterrence and crisis survival. Deterrence refers to the prevention of coup attempts. 
Survival refers to the persistence of a regime in the face of coup attempts. This distinction is 
important because regimes that survived the longest were not necessarily the ones that most 
successfully prevented coup attempts. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi experienced numerous coup 
attempts throughout the four decades he ruled Libya, as did Saddam Hussein in the 25 years 
he ruled Iraq. Both were finally removed by international forces. Thus, ‘successful’ coup-
proofing cannot just be interpreted as the non-occurrence of coups, but also the survival of a 
regime through such crisis. 
 
It must also be noted that the military is by no means the only group a dictator will seek to 
control. Generally, within each society there exists a smaller group of citizens with the ability 
to influence who will lead the government – termed “selectorate” by Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
(2005).  A leader’s survival depends on the creation and maintenance of a winning coalition 
within this selectorate. In a democracy this is the electorate; in a dictatorship the selectorate 
may include members of the royal family, high officials of the ruling party, the officer corps, 
members of the dictator’s ethnic group, tribe, or home region, etc, depending on the nature of 
the state. There are, for example, numerous studies dedicated to dictators’ attempts to co-opt 
its elite (for example, Magaloni, 2007). However, to limit the scope of this chapter, I will focus 
on the relationship between the dictator and the military. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: in section 2, I compile and review various coup-
proofing strategies that have been mentioned in the literature; in section 3, I explore case 
studies by category, starting with military regimes, followed by one-party states, personalist 
dictatorships and monarchies, and finally Syria, which has been categorised as a hybrid regime; 
in the final section I offer up some conclusions. 
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2.2 An Overview of Coup-Proofing Strategies in Dictatorships 
 
If one is to understand civil-military relations in autocracies, it is useful to compare them to a 
benchmark case. Huntington (1957) distinguishes between objective and subjective 
mechanisms of civilian control. Objective civilian control “militarizes the military”, restricting 
its activities to the military realm and emphasising professionalism, while subjective control 
“civilianizes the military”, drawing it into politics (Huntington, 1957, p. 83). Huntington argues 
that objective control mechanisms are likely to produce healthier civil military relations. 
However, when civilian institutions are weak, “politicians often cannot resist the temptation to 
bring the military into the domestic political arena, both to support their particular faction in 
its struggle with rival groups and to ensure their groups control of the armed forces” (Desch, 
1996, p. 14). Autocratic governments often need to involve the military in politics in order to 
enforce their rule. However, a politically active military is more likely to undertake a coup. The 
challenge for the dictator is to subordinate the military while allowing it to play a role in 
politics. 
 
According to Quinlivan (1999, p. 133), the essence of coup-proofing is “the creation of 
structures that minimize the possibilities of small groups leveraging the system to such ends”. 
A survey of the literature yielded the following list of coup-proofing methods: 
 
 Recruitment along family, tribal lines, etc: Key posts in the military (and other 
important offices) are filled with people close to the dictator. For example, in Syria, 
Bashar Al-Asad surrounds himself with members of his own tribe and religion. Often it 
is not just the high ranking officers but also the soldiers who are recruited from 
amongst loyal groups. For example, Jordan’s Arab Legion is traditionally recruited from 
the Bedouin of the East Bank, a tribe that has proven itself loyal over time. 
 
 Promotions, rotations, retirements, mass purges and executions: Promotions are based 
on loyalty, while members of the military of questionable allegiance are purged or 
retired. Iran’s purge tribunals, set up to cleanse the military of Shah loyalist, make a 
good example. Acts of disloyalty are met with imprisonment, exile and not 
infrequently execution. Generals are regularly rotated to prevent them from building 
personal power bases with factions of the military. A particularly interesting episode 
was the purging of war heroes in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war because Saddam 
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Hussein feared that certain officers, by distinguishing themselves in the battlefield, 
had become too popular amongst the armed forces (Hashim, 2003, p. 20). 
 
 Ideological indoctrination: Governments indoctrinate the military with religious or 
party ideology. Iran’s Islamic Commissars are good example.  
 
 The creation of paramilitary forces: New regimes often create their own military 
structures whose loyalty they feel more confident about. The primary task of these 
praetorian parallel military structures it to serve as a counterweight to the regular 
armed forces. Often the paramilitaries will be specifically trained and equipped to deal 
with coups. In some cases, as in Gaddafi’s Libya, paramilitaries are recruited from 
outside the country. 
 
 Logistics control: ‘Logistics control’ refers to “the oversight of and control over the 
garrison and movements of military units, access to ammunition and fuel, and 
supervision of field training exercises”  (Hashim, 2003, p. 21). From an operational 
point of view, a coup will only succeed if coup-makers are capable of providing fuel 
and ammunition to units and are able to move these units from the garrisons into the 
capital without the rulers finding out until it is too late. Thus, dictators will often 
ensure that military units – apart from well-vetted praetorian guards – stationed 
within the vicinity of the capital are not armed with live-fire ammunition. Another 
example is Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Units who “set up their barracks near garrison 
exists to ensure that regular army units did not move without proper authorization” 
(Ward, 2009, p, 227). 
 
 Military Spending: Leaders may try to buy the loyalty of the military by purchasing 
sophisticated weaponry or paying what Acemoglu et al. (2010, p. 2) refer to as an 
“efficiency wage”. If spending per soldier is above a certain level, soldiers are likely to 
prefer the status quo over democratisation. 
 
 Economic incentives: Governments may try to give the military a stake in the 
continuation of their regime by allowing them to pursue profitable economic activities. 
In Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, the Sudan and Iran, the militaries have become 
economic actors in their own right. On the other hand, Mani (2007, p. 592) argues that 
“enclave building in entrepreneurship enhances the political power of the military 
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institution and its officers, making them less dependent on – and therefore less 
accountable to – civil and political society”.  
 
 
2.3 Case Studies 
 
As mentioned above, this chapter attempts to distinguish between military regimes, one-party 
states, personalist dictatorships and monarchies, following a categorisation similar to the one 
employed in chapter 6. However, these strict categorisations are not always easily applied to 
individual cases. Table 2.1 outlines Ezrow and Frantz’s (2011) categorization of MENA 
countries. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Ezrow and Frantz's categorisation of MENA countries by regime type 
Military Monarchies Single-party Personalist Triple Threat
3
 
Algeria Saudi Arabia Iran Iraq Egypt 
(1992-2006) (1932-present) (1979-present) (1979-2003) (1952-present) 
 
Kuwait Lebanon Libya Syria 
 
(1961-present) (1989-2005) (1969-present) (1963-present) 
 
UAE Tunisia Yemen 
 
 
(1971-present) (1957-present) (1978-present) 
 
 
Morocco 
   
 
(1956-present) 
   
 
Jordan 
   
 
(1946-present) 
   
 
Oman 
   
 
(1971-present) 
   
 
 
2.3.1 Military Regimes  
 
Algeria (1954-2011) 
 
Ezrow and Frantz (2011) classify Algeria as a military dictatorship from 1992 onwards. While 
Algeria may not be a military dictatorship in the classic sense4, scholars do argue that the 
                                                          
3 ‘Triple Threat’ regimes face threats from a personalist dictator, a single-party and a politically 
influential military. 
4
 By this I mean that Algeria is not ruled by a military junta. 
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military is, in fact, “the real power in Algeria” (Cook, 2007, p. 27). It derives its legitimacy from 
the central role it played in liberating the country from the French in an ugly, decade-long 
struggle. Addi (2002, p. 181) explains that “the (FLN) movement was in a sense reintegrated or 
absorbed into the army in the form of populist ideology […]; the army thereby came to 
embody the historical heritage of the FLN”. Moreover, “Algeria’s first leaders came from 
military backgrounds and carried the legitimacy of the military into politics, economic 
development and foreign relations” (Sorenson, 2007, p. 104). The image of the military was 
further boosted by its involvement in civil construction projects, such as the Trans-Saharan 
Highway, the Great Green Wall, and various dams, as well as by providing earthquake relief. 
Sorenson (2007, p. 104) notes that “these missions helped the military to burnish the nation-
building legacy that has sustained their position in Algerian political life”.  
 
Civil-military relations in Algeria are anything but objective. Moreover, it is hard to talk of 
coup-proofing strategies in a country where the military has demonstrated no qualms in taking 
control of the government when it deems fit. In 1992, the military stepped in after the Islamic 
Salvation Front’s success in Algeria’s first multi-party national elections threatened the 
position of the FLN. The military pressured President Bendjedid into resigning, cancelled the 
elections, and appointed a five-member High Council of State to act as a collective presidency. 
Violence ensued and a state of emergency was declared under which the military was granted 
certain direct powers, for example, when dealing with insurgents and terrorists. 
 
Nevertheless, excluding this period of civil war, the military has been content to exercise its 
influence from behind the scenes, rather than taking government into its own hands. Since the 
civil war, the military has withdrawn from centre stage, but it continues to exert its influence 
from behind the scenes. For example, although Algeria’s presidents are no longer recruited 
directly from the ranks of the military, a support base within the military high command 
continues to be an informal requirement for the position. As long as the military can trust that 
the president will defend its interests, it has no need to intervene itself. 
 
In addition, it is noteworthy that Algeria has recently launched major efforts to modernize its 
military, entering into a USD7.5 billion arms deal with Russia in 2006, as well as smaller deals 
with China, the US and Europe (Gelfland, 2009, p. 23). These efforts may be motivated by a 
number of factors: on the one hand, Algeria is responding to the continued threat posed by 
Islamic insurgents, albeit diminished since the 1990s. However, the types of equipment 
procured are not best-suited for counterinsurgency operations (Gelfland, 2009p. 24). On the 
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other hand, Algeria seeks to boost its international influence and stay ahead of its neighbours, 
in particular Morocco, as the regional leader. Finally, one might interpret Algeria’s efforts as an 
attempt by the government to appease the military and keep it out of politics. 
 
However, the military’s reputation has been tarnished by the violence it perpetrated in the 
civil war, and Sorenson (2007, p. 105) argues that the role of the military is diminishing, as the 
country takes (cautious) steps towards democracy and engages in (modest) economic 
privatization. 
 
 
Egypt (1952-2011) 
 
Ezrow and Frantz (2011) classify Egypt (before 2011) as a regime that faces a triple threat from 
a personalist dictator, a single-party and a politically influential military. However, Egypt’s civil-
military relations are in many ways comparable to Algeria’s. As in Algeria, Egypt’s military has 
close ties with the government, which were formed when a group of officers, the “Free Officer 
Movement”, overthrew the monarchy in a coup-turned-revolution and embarked on a mission 
to transform Egyptian society. The intention was to bring “greater material well-being, justice 
and freedom within a democratic polity” to the Egyptian people (Vatikiotis, 1991, cited in 
Cook, 2007, p. 368). According to Cook (2007), the Egyptian military derives much of its 
legitimacy and status from this reform programme. 
 
Formally, Egypt was conceived as a liberal polity; in practice it was an authoritarian state ruled 
by autocratic officer politicians (Kamrava, 2000, p. 71). Particularly noteworthy is the 
Emergency Law which was passed in 1958 and has been in force with little interruption since 
1967. It extends military rule throughout Egypt. Cook (2007, p. 71) summarizes the situation:  
 
“Under the Emergency Law, newspapers and periodicals have been subject to censorship and 
closure, workers have been barred from striking, and political organisations may meet only at 
the discretion of the Ministry of Interior. Without the proper permit, opposition groups are 
unable to hold public rallies or demonstrations, leaving private rooms or buildings as the only 
venues in which to gather and organize”. 
 
Moreover, the Emergency Law allowed for the creation of a parallel judicial system, the 
Supreme State Security Court, which Cook (2007, p. 72) describes as a “blunt instrument with 
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which state elites have confronted their opponents”. The Supreme State Security Court 
purposefully employs a vague definition of security. For example, from 1992, the government 
made use of the Emergency law to justify the referral of civilians to Egypt’s military court. This 
measure was originally intended to provide a rapid sentencing in cases related to terrorism. 
However, members of the Muslim brotherhood have consistently been tried and convicted in 
the military courts, even though the organization had not engaged in violence for over three 
decades (Cook 2007, p. 72). 
 
Civil-military relations in Egypt shifted after 1967 when the Egyptian military experienced war 
with Israel. This military setback highlighted the need for a more professional military that 
focused on fighting and was not preoccupied with politics. Thus, in 1968, Nasser made an 
official commitment to reconstruct the armed forces and turn it into effective fighting force. 
The military was to relinquish its day-to-day role in government and concentrate on preparing 
for another round of war with Israel. Nevertheless, Cook (2007, p. 67) notes that “in practice, 
the Israeli presence on the East Bank of the Suez Canal meant that the military remained the 
most privileged group of state organizations as Egyptians prepared for the decisive battle with 
Israel”. 
 
As in Algeria, the Egyptian military continues to exert political influence from behind the 
scenes. This is possible because  
 
“The military and the president share interests and worldviews linking their fortunes [...]. The 
military trusts the president as the steward of the state and political development. Socialized in 
the same manner as the officers through military education, training and experiences, Egypt’s 
head of state maintains a perspective that tracks closely with that of his uniformed colleagues. 
[…] If the officer corps needs to, it can influence political events through the president. The 
mutually reinforcing relationship with the president has allowed the officers to remove 
themselves from day-to-day governance” (Cook, 2007, p. 73). 
 
Cook argues that this development has actually benefited the military because any public 
dissatisfaction is directed at the president, not the military who remains relatively free from 
criticism (Cook, 2007, p. 73). Furthermore, he makes the interesting point that “a potential 
unintended consequence of severing the link between the president and the armed forces 
could, in fact, be a more autonomous military establishment. After all, “without the benefit of 
a fellow officer serving as president, the military establishment would need to ensure its 
interests more actively” (ibid, p. 74). As in Algeria, the Egyptian military appears to be happy to 
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remain behind the scenes as long as they can be confident that the president will defend its 
interests.  
 
Not only does the Egyptian military continue to exert political influence, it also has substantial 
economic interests. “Members of Egypt’s senior officer corps positioned themselves at the 
nexus of the state and private sectors in order to reap the benefits of both” (Cook, 2007, p. 
80). Economic activities range from traditional pursuits, like weapons production and 
procurement, to more development oriented activities, such as the rehabilitation and 
development of infrastructure, agricultural expansion and water purification, to such far 
reaching undertakings as the manufacture of appliances and footwear, agriculture, food 
processing, services related to aviation, engineering, land reclamation, tourism, and 
consultancy for foreign corporations. The military’s activities are rife with corruption and 
Springborg (1987, p. 10) notes that “Egypt’s military enterprises were subsidised to such an 
extent that these business activities were actually a drain on the overall state budget”. The 
Egyptian military also receives substantial financial support from the United States. 
 
The Egyptian military clearly had a stake in the continuation of Mubarak’s regime and for 
several weeks remained undecided about whether to intervene on behalf of the government 
and crush the protests earlier this year. Initially, it stood aside when Mubarak’s security forces 
suppressed protesters. ”Only when it became clear that [his] tactics had failed, did it step in” 
(Henry and Springborg, 2011). Ultimately it has shown itself to be predominantly concerned 
with protecting its own interests. In July 2013, the military removed civilian President Morsi 
from office, suspended the constitution and violently quelled protests. It cleared the way for 
Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's to become president, which he did in May 2014. The future 
of democracy in Egypt remains tenuous.  
 
 
2.3.2 Single-party States 
 
Tunisia (1957-2011) 
 
There is some disagreement concerning Tunisia’s regime type classification. In quantitative 
studies, such as Ezrow and Frantz’s, the country is classified as a one-party state. In qualitative 
research it is often described as a patrimonial regime (see for example Kamrava, 2000). The 
transfer of power from Bourguiba to Ben Ali can be interpreted as a transition from one 
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personalist dictator to another, or as the continuation of one regime under different 
leadership. Pressure from Islamist protestors in 1987 led Bourguiba to appoint Ben Ali as Prime 
Minister in an attempt to ease tension. When the situation did not resolve itself, Ben Ali 
replaced him in a constitutional coup. While both Presidents displayed characteristics of 
personalist dictators, there was a large degree of continuity as the regime reconsolidated 
around a new presidential figure (Brownlee, 2002, p. 47). 
 
Either way, civil-military relations in Tunisia are unique to the MENA region because of the 
approach taken by its leaders of marginalising the military. It makes for a particularly 
interesting comparison with Egypt. Both experienced successful revolutions in 2011, in which 
the military played a decisive role by choosing not to shoot at demonstrators. Yet they differed 
substantially in their political systems and civil-military relations. Unlike the Egyptian military, 
the Tunisian military has been relegated to the political sidelines. Again unlike in Egypt (or 
Algeria), the Tunisian military played no role in the country’s ascension to independence, so it 
does not have the same organic connection with the government. Moreover, Ben Ali, Tunisia’s 
president until 2011, favoured relations with the security and intelligence forces, he himself 
having had a background in the security services (Sorenson, 2007, p. 107).  
 
Distrustful of the military, Ben Ali continued the strategy begun by his predecessor Bourguiba 
of purposefully ensuring the military’s weakness. He denied the military the right of legal 
political association and placed it under the jurisdiction of a civilian defence minister (ibid, p. 
107). He limited the size of the army to 50,000 men, making it the smallest force relative to its 
population in Arab world (Henry and Springborg, 2011). In addition, he kept it undersupplied 
and poorly equipped, in order to render a military coup physically impossible (Ware, 1985, p. 
38). Tunisia’s military budget is also one of the smallest in the MENA region – in 2009 it was 
1.3% of GDP compared with an average of 5.2% for the region (SIPRI Yearbook, 2011).  
 
The Tunisian military receives training as well as limited arms transfers from the US. According 
to Henry and Springborg (2011), Ben Ali “effectively placed it under US tutelage”. This has 
resulted in a relatively high degree of professionalism within the Tunisian military. The 
Tunisian military has been described as “a non-praetorian, highly professional body of officers 
and men” (Ware, 1985, p. 37), dedicated solely to national defence. The majority of its 
missions have been peace-keeping operations, for example in Haiti, Cambodia, Somalia, 
Kosovo and Bosnia (Sorenson, 2007, p. 107). Moreover, in the past, it was not the first force 
called upon to deal with internal dissent: Bourguiba relied on gendarmerie, National Guard 
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and a special paramilitary Brigade of Public Order to suppress the Islamic Tendency Movement 
(Brownlee, 2002, p. 48). 
 
Tunisia’s leaders’ coup-proofing strategies were thus the opposite of those used by Egypt’s 
leaders. They can even be described as objective control mechanisms. Instead of bringing the 
military into his patronage network, Ben Ali, and Bourguiba before him, excluded it. The 
Tunisian military, therefore, had no stake in the continuation of Ben Ali’s rule and did not 
hesitate long before turning on him and supporting the revolution (Bahgat, 2011). This 
suggests that in autocratic governments, objective control mechanisms are not always 
effective. In contrast, Egypt’s military remained indecisive about which side to come down on 
until revolution had gained critical momentum. 
 
 
Iran (1979-2011) 
 
Iran makes for an extremely interesting case study because of the complete political 
transformation the country experienced in the late 1970s: In 1979, the Islamic Revolution, led 
by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, succeeded in replacing the monarchy with an Islamic Republic 
that survives until the time of writing. The new government then faced the task of 
subordinating the Iranian military, which had been politically powerful and loyal to the 
monarchy. There was disagreement among the various revolutionary groups as to how to 
reform the military. Leftist and Marxist groups preferred to dissolve the Iranian military and 
establish a “people’s army” in its place. However, Khomeini and his followers, anticipating 
future challenges to the regime, preferred to keep the military intact. Instead they sought to 
purify and subordinate it.  
 
The government set up purge tribunals to cleanse the military’s ranks of officers disloyal to the 
regime. The tribunals initially targeted Shah Loyalists and officers that had committed war 
crimes, but soon expanded to those who were suspected of disloyalty due to their political 
views and affiliations. Officers were executed or imprisoned, exiled or retired. Others were 
assassinated by leftist groups or became victims of personal vendettas. The purges carried on 
into the second half of the 1980s. By mid-1980s and estimated 12,000 military personnel had 
been removed from service (Ward, 2009, p. 229). 
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On the other hand, officers with family ties to the clergy or who belonged to religious families 
were promoted. Moreover, to ensure the ideological indoctrination of the rank and file, the 
government created the Political-Ideological Directorate (PID) staffed with clerics, the so-called 
“Islamic Commissars”. Ward (2009, p. 230) describes their function: 
 
“These Islamic commissars were assigned to the joint staff down to the platoon level with 
bureaus and subordinate elements attached to divisions down to companies. The PID was 
responsible for the ideological and political education of the troops, evaluated candidates at all 
ranks for promotion, reviewed military school curricula and published text books, and provided 
radio and television programs for the troops. So-called strike groups worked with existing 
Islamic societies, basically IRP cells, in the military to indoctrinate, organize recreational and 
educational activities, hold daily prayers, and enforce Islamic behaviour. Generally, they spied 
on the soldiers and served as snitches”. 
 
The Islamic Commissars continue to play an important role in coup-proofing modern Iran. 
Most importantly, the new government created its own organized armed forces, the Islamic 
Revolutionary Corps. Its main charge was to act as a counterweight to the regular armed 
forces. In addition, it was endowed with law enforcement authority, ran prisons, protected 
government facilities and served as bodyguards for regime leaders. Comprised of men who 
had fought in the revolution, this group came to see itself as the protector of the regime. As 
the role of the Guards expanded, Iran developed into a dual military structure. “The Guard’s 
leadership has become closely intertwined with more hard-line elements of the regime since 
the revolution and has viewed it as their duty to intervene in politics when needed” (ibid, p. 
307). “Influential in politics, bathed in privileges, and an economic force in its own right 
because of its involvement in defence production and public works” (ibid, p. 302), its position 
in Iranian politics is in many ways comparable to those of the Algerian or Egyptian militaries. 
To some extent, the Islamic Revolutionary Corps developed into a force that too needed to be 
contained. For this reason the government established the Basij paramilitary units, Ashura 
Battalions and the (all-female) Al-Zahra Battalions. These forces are manned by poor Iranians 
“still beholden to the regime for subsidies, work, and religious guidance” (ibid, p. 307). They 
are equipped for riot control and containing internal unrest. 
 
As with Egypt’s defeat by Israel, the Iraq-Iran war highlighted the fact that civil-military 
relations had diminished the Iranian military’s ability to function as effective fighting force. The 
military suffered from a deficiency in leadership because of the constant turnover of officers 
and generals, a lack of sufficient equipment, not just for fighting but for training too, and an 
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inability to cooperate with the other fighting forces that had been pitted against them - all part 
of the regime’s attempt to coup-proof the military. However, “the clerical regime could not 
focus on the military because of economic needs and internal political problems following 
Khomeini’s death less than a year later in June 1989. The [military] escaped this period with no 
major changes to its organization and order of battle” ibid, p. 302). 
 
A proposal to merge the military with the Revolutionary Guard was blocked by the Guard itself, 
who were finally formalized as the country’s preeminent service (ibid, p. 302). The military was 
to focus on external defence. In 1992, the government issued official regulations for the armed 
forces. Ward (2009, p. 302) summarizes:  
 
“In addition to stressing Islamic ideology as a basic precept for organizing and equipping the 
armed forces, the principles demanded loyalty to the Supreme Leader, sought self- sufficiency, 
and held defence—deterring, defending against, and ultimately punishing an aggressor against 
Iran—as the armed forces’ primary orientation”.  
 
However, the military remains underequipped and underfunded. “Short of money and facing 
strong competition for government funds, Iran’s military leaders look instead to improving 
discipline and training” (ibid, p. 304), for example, by expanding the military education system, 
creating command and staff colleges and Supreme National Defence University. Moreover, 
turnover among senior military ranks normalised, enabling more coherent leadership.  
 
 
2.3.3 Personalist Dictatorships 
 
Libya (1969-2011) 
 
In spite of Gaddafi attaining power by means of a military coup, the Libyan army cannot be 
regarded as a dominant force. In fact, Gaddafi made conscious efforts to marginalise the army, 
following several coup attempts against him. As a result, one might question Gaddafi‘s coup-
proofing strategies. Nevertheless, he clung to power for over four decades, making him one of 
the longest ruling dictator of the 20th century. While he may not have successfully prevented 
crisis, he did successfully survived them. 
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Gaddafi’s regime was built around circles of trust, which included his family his home tribe, as 
well as certain members of other tribes, including the Qadhadhafa, Maqariah and Warfalla 
tribes (Haddad, 2011). All important tasks were given to members of Gaddafi’s circles of trust. 
Gaddafi was highly distrustful of the military, which had a reputation as colonialist 
collaborators (Sorenson, 2007, p. 109). Thus, he sought to undermine the capacity of the 
military. He reduced the size of its units and “created overlapping chains of command, 
frequently and arbitrarily rotated key commanders, and favoured loyal incompetents over 
capable, independent-minded officers for senior command slots” (Cordesman, 2001, p. 424). 
According to Sorenson, Gaddafi initially did try to buy of the loyalty of the military by 
purchasing modern equipment, and at one point Libya’s tank core was the tenth largest in the 
world. However, this did not equate with an effective fighting force. According to a publication 
by the Afro-Middle East Centre (Haddad, 2011) while the Libyan army “boasts huge resources, 
[it] suffers from a general absence of standards which should apply to its equipment, as well as 
labour problems and poor maintenance services [...], lacks competence and efficiency, [and] is 
incapable of being mobilised”. In fact, Libya’s military was once described as the “world’s 
largest military junkyard” (Sorenson 2007, p. 111).  
 
Furthermore, Gaddafi excluded the military from politics, favouring civilian ministers. Only two 
of the 17 ministers came from the ranks of the military. In the 1970s, when Gaddafi abolished 
ministries altogether in an attempt to achieve his vision of a stateless society, “a potential 
avenue for military influence through the Ministry of Defence disappeared” (Sorenson 2007, p. 
110). In the place of ministries, Gaddafi created a “dizzying system of committees and 
congresses in which Libyans serve[d] and, on paper, govern[ed] their own affairs. In practice, 
Gaddafi constantly shift[ed] networks, ensuring that the participants were ill-prepared to 
address substantive policy issues” (Brownlee, 2002, p. 46).  
 
Gaddafi also created several quasi-military structures to counter-balance the regular armed 
forces. While other dictators have created dual-military structures, Gaddafi took this coup-
proofing strategy to a whole new level. His quasi-military structures included the Revolutionary 
Guard, the Islamic Pan-African Legion (a group of mercenaries recruited from various parts of 
Africa), the Libyan People’s Militia, the People’s Cavalry Force, as well as seven other military 
units, such as the Elite 32 Brigade, specifically designed to protect the heart of the system and 
its leaders. These paramilitary forces were recruited from loyal tribes and heavily 
indoctrinated. The majority of the Revolutionary Guards were recruited from Gaddafi’s own 
tribe. They were headed by those people closest to him. For instance, the Elite 32 Brigade was 
Jennifer Brauner 2014 
 
36 
 
headed by Gaddafi’s son Khamis, who held the rank of captain. Other security bodies were 
headed by two of Gaddafi’s other sons, Mu’tasim-Billah and Saasi. According to the report by 
the Afro-Middle East Centre they were better equipped that the regular armed forces. 
Moreover, in numbers these groups outweighed the military. With 43,000 troops, the Libyan 
People’s Militia alone was almost as large as the 50,000-person Libyan army (Sorenson, 2007, 
p. 103). In addition to the creation of quasi-military structures to balance the regular armed 
forces, Gaddafi also turned various branches of the military against each other. In the 1993 
uprising of a splinter of the Libyan army, he used his air force (who were firmly in the grip of 
the Qadhadhafa tribe) to suppress the ground troops attack.  
 
Similarly to Tunisia, the Libyan military had little invested in the continuation of Gaddafi’s 
regime. When the rebellion kicked off earlier this year, it disbanded. According to some new 
reports Gaddafi was largely using foreign mercenaries to fight the rebellion (see, for example, 
Smith, 2011; Wyatt, 2011).  
 
 
2.3.4 Monarchies 
 
Herb (1999) distinguishes between two types of monarchies: dynastic monarchies “in which 
the royal family forms a ruling institution and those in which the monarch rules alone, without 
the participation of his family in the cabinet” (Herb, 1999, p. 8). He also acknowledges a third 
category, in which “members of the ruling family are allowed by the constitution to occupy 
high posts but not monopolize them” (ibid, p. 9). He points out that “no dynastic monarchy has 
fallen to revolution, while all of the monarchies in which the constitution prohibits royal 
participation in the cabinet have collapsed” (ibid).  
 
 
Dynastic Monarchies  
 
Dynastic monarchies include Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies (Bahrain, Kuwait, Omar, 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates). They have a major advantage over other types of 
monarchies (and, more generally, other types of autocracies): the unity and solidarity of their 
elite, i.e. the ruling family. In dynastic monarchies, “members of the ruling families monopolize 
the highest state offices, including the premiership and portfolios of Interior, Foreign Affairs 
and Defence […]. The ruling families also distribute members throughout lower positions in the 
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state apparatus, especially in key ministries” (Herb, 1999, p. 8). This gives members of the elite 
a vested interest in the continuation of the monarchy. This is clearly demonstrated during 
succession crisis: “members of the ruling family who are not in direct competition for the 
rulership will bandwagon and not balance, when succession disputes grow bitter. This 
bandwagoning ensures that the family does not split down the middle, thus exacerbating 
disputes and threatening the dynastic monopoly of the state power” (ibid, p. 10). This ability of 
the ruling family to regulate disputes internally has been instrumental to their survival. 
 
Moreover, this allows the royal family to keep a tight grip over all major institutions, including 
the military. The royal family keeps a check on the military by filling the key posts with its 
members. Herb points out that “while the governments do not publish comprehensive rosters 
of their members in the armed services, it is well known that the dynasties distribute 
numerous princes and sheikhs throughout the officer corps. In the Saudi military their number 
is estimated to be in the hundreds. In Kuwait, where there are certainly fewer, they 
nonetheless keep a watch out for any signs of disloyalty in the military and man the guard that 
protects the emir. The Al Khalifa of Bahrain dominate the top positions in their military, 
occupying eight of the first ten positions in the Bahraini armed forces in 1994” (Herb, 1999, p. 
34-5). 
 
Kamrava (2000) highlights a further characteristic of dynastic monarchies: The monarchies of 
the Arabian Peninsula “are largely incapable of mobilizing armies whose sizes are sufficient for 
national defence” (Kamrava, 2000, p. 87). This has a number of reasons. With the exception of 
Saudi Arabia, the Gulf monarchies have small populations ranging from 3 million in Kuwait to 
1.5 million in Qatar (Military Balance, 2011). Furthermore, these monarchies share a natural 
resource wealth which enables them to support a massive welfare state apparatus. Kamrava 
argues that the nature of rentier states is such that it does not lend itself to conscription 
(legitimization of rule by provisions of public goods – Brooker (2009) describes this “no 
representation without taxation”). As a result, all oil monarchies, except Kuwait, have 
refrained from introducing compulsory military service. Finally, a career in the military is not 
viewed as a socially prestigious, there being better opportunities in the private sector, and so 
few young men volunteer for the service (Kamrava, 2000, p. 88).  
 
As a result oil monarchies have a tradition of recruiting officers and sometimes even soldiers 
from abroad. They are able to afford this thanks to their natural resource wealth. At officer 
level men are recruited from Britain – though they are never given command positions; at 
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junior level recruits are drawn from Egypt, Pakistan, India or Palestine. Moreover, the Gulf 
monarchies try to make up for their individual shortcomings by cooperating with each other in 
security matters through the Gulf Cooperation Council. When unrests grew in Bahrain earlier 
this year, Saudi Arabia sent troops to aid the Al Kalifa family in restore order. Finally, the Gulf 
monarchies make up for lack of manpower with sophisticated weaponry.  
 
 
Civic myth monarchies 
 
The civic myth monarchies include Morocco and Jordan. Civil-military dynamics in these 
countries differ from the other monarchies of the MENA region. Neither country is endowed 
with natural resources, and therefore do not possess the resources to support rent-based 
welfare states. Nor can they hire officers and soldiers abroad. (In fact, in contrast to the Gulf 
monarchies, both militaries rely heavily on conscription). Nor can they afford expensive, 
sophisticated weaponry, although it must be noted that Morocco has recently engaged in a 
series of weapon procurement programmes. Sorenson (2007, p. 108) suggests that King 
Mohamed VI “appears to understand that one part of his bargain with the FAR is to keep them 
equipped with modern arms”. Moreover, he notes that the King turns a blind eye when senior 
officers take bribes. Such corruption is viewed as “a side payment for the military’s loyalty” 
(ibid, p. 109). 
 
Moreover, the Royal Families are much smaller and are unable to fill the upper ranks of 
military with family members alone. Key posts are still filled with members of the Royal Family, 
but they are not as dispersed. This has contributed to a certain degree of professionalization 
within the militaries, as they have to rely on career officers to run the forces. King Hassan II of 
Morocco did initially try to bring the Forces Armees Royal (FAR) into the royal patronage 
network, but after the 1971 and 1972 coup attempts he changed his strategy. Instead, he tried 
to keep the military busy with security issues. According to, Kamrava “both the Jordanian and 
Moroccan armies appear to benefit from considerable professionalism and discipline” (ibid, p. 
90). 
 
Nevertheless, in both countries the king is the nominal as well as the real commander of the 
armed forces. For example, King Hassan II of Morocco abolished the Ministry of Defence, 
putting the military directly und his command. Now the military reports to the crown through 
the Ministry of the Interior. Moreover, loyalty to the king is the sole criteria for promotion. 
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Interestingly, King Hassan II instituted conscription in order to change the ethnic makeup of 
the armed forces. During the coup years a large proportion of the Moroccan officers had been 
Berbers. By introducing conscription, he hoped to tip the balance in favour of more Arabs. 
However, conscription was ended in 2006 after security authorities discovered that five 
soldiers were members of Ansar al-Mahdi, a Jihadist group. According to one analyst, this 
move “aimed at mitigating the vulnerability of the lower ranks to the influence of radical 
Islam” (Sorenson, 2007, p. 109). These are two particularly interesting examples of targeted 
recruitment as a coup-proofing strategy. 
 
Herb (1999) argues “the best way to keep the military out of politics is to make the monarchy 
popular in public opinion”. In the words of Machiavelli (1950, pp. 67-68), “one of the most 
potent remedies that a prince has against conspiracies it that of not being hated by the mass 
of the people; for whoever conspires always believes that he will satisfy the people by the 
death of the prince; but if he thought to offend them by doing this, he would fear to engage in 
such an undertaking”. Kamrava (2000) observed that Jordan and Morocco have adopted 
“loudly propagated but very limited processes of political liberalization”. These include the 
legalisation of parties and a relaxation of restrictions on the press. Confirmation of this theory 
can be found in Morocco’s willingness to introduce reforms in the face of protests linked with 
the Arab Spring. These included the drafting of a new constitution that was overwhelmingly 
approved in a referendum on July 1st 2011. However, at the time, observers argued that “the 
King has held onto most of his privileges, and critics say he has simply bought time before 
another wave of pressure mounts” (The Economist, July 14th, 2011, p. 49). 
 
2.3.5 Triple Threat 
 
Syria (1970-2011) 
 
Syria experienced 15 successful coups between 1949 and 1970 before consolidating around 
Hafez Al-Asad, who himself attained power by means of a coup in 1970 (Quinlivan, 1999. P. 
134). If anyone knows about the importance of coup-proofing, it should be Syria’s leaders. 
Syria makes for quite a spectacular study of coup-proofing, as it combines the tactics of 
military regimes, one-party states, personalist dictators and monarchies. Syria is usually 
described as a presidential monarchy (for example by Hinnebusch 2011), but both the Ba’th 
party and the military are instrumental to the functioning of the regime. Moreover, since Hafez 
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al-Asad passed power onto his son, Bashar al-Asad, commentators note that the country is 
displaying more monarchical tendencies. 
 
The regime rests on three pillars of power: the party apparatus, the military-police 
establishment and the ministerial bureaucracy. The President is the head of all three 
institutions: He is party secretary in general and commander in chief. The institutions are 
interconnected and overlapping, preventing either from becoming too powerful, as well as 
creating space to settle intra-elite disputes. For example, the Ba’th Party’s Regional Command 
(RC) is roughly divided between senior military commanders, top party members, and the 
most principal cabinet ministers. 
 
However, the military plays an especially important role in Asad’s regime. It was Ba’th officers 
who brought Asad to power, thereby becoming an equal partner in the new state. 
Furthermore, Hinnebusch, (2011, p. 110) argues that “the legitimacy of Asad’s regime was in 
good part based on its relative success in holding Syria’s own against Israel, beginning with the 
1973 Arab-Israeli war”. Thus, the Syrian military, similarly to Algeria and Egypt, views itself as a 
legitimate political actor.   
 
However, Asad was able to establish firm control over the military. As legal commander in 
chief, he controlled appointments and dismissals of senior officers. Appointments were based 
on political loyalty to the president. “A party document described the influx into the military as 
drawing on people recommended on the basis of friendship, family relationship, and 
sometimes mere personal acquaintance" (Quinlivan, 1999, p. 140). Soldiers are predominantly 
recruited from the Alawite  tribe. The Alawites actually represent a minority in the Sunni 
Muslim dominated country and thus have much to gain from Al-Asad’s patronage. In 
particular, Alawite Ba’th officers hold a disproportionate number of top operational 
commands, especially of potentially coup-making armoured units.  
 
According to Hinnebusch, control of the military played a crucial role in enabling him to move 
beyond party ideology. However, it must also be noted the party is more than just a facade. 
Asad normally concentrated on foreign and security policy and left the details of economic 
matters to be decided by the party (ibid, 110). But more importantly, Asad instrumentalised 
the party to control the military. The military exercised is voice in politics through party 
institutions (for example through the regional congress in which about a third of its members 
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represented the military branches). This enabled the party to exercise some oversight of the 
military. Thus, Asad used these two institutions to control each other. 
 
Asad also kept multiple intelligence services, who spied on, amongst others, the military, 
watching for signs of rebellion. These services were themselves tightly controlled: new 
members were thoroughly vetted and files were kept on them throughout their lives; 
promotions were based on loyalty; security chiefs were regularly rotated to prevent them from 
establishing autonomy; and most intriguingly, the services actually spied on each other. “The 
propagation of security agencies with overlapping charters creates a market with multiple 
sellers of security services and a single demanding buyer. This helps ensure that the services 
are both loyal and active” (Quinlivan, 1999, p. 149). 
 
The succession of Hafez’s son, Bashir al-Asad, to the presidency posed new challenges for civil-
military relations in Syria. Trained in medicine, Bashir has no background in party politics or the 
military. The succession was collectively engineered by the regime elite who, holding the top 
party and army positions, closed ranks to preserve regime stability and prevent an intra-elite 
power struggle. Thus they behaved not unlike the Royal Families in the Gulf.  
 
Bashir Al-Asad’s succession was accompanied by a series of dismissals and retirements, as well 
as appointments and promotions. Three-quarters of the 60-odd officials in political, security 
and administrative ranks were replaced by the end of 2002 (Hinnebusch, 2011, p. 114). Old 
generals were replaced with a younger generation of officers who felt beholden to the new 
president. 
 
At the time of writing, Syria is in its third year of a full scale civil war. The international 
community publically condemns Syria’s actions from the side lines, but has not intervened 
directly. UN peace talks, hosted in Geneva in early 2014, failed to reach an agreement, largely 
because Syrian authorities refused to discuss a transitional government. It is unclear how this 
situation will be resolved. However, so far, the military largely remains loyal to Al-Asad. 
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has compared coup-proofing strategies in military regimes, one-party states, 
personalist dictatorships and monarchies, drawing on examples from the MENA region. This 
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categorization has proven somewhat useful in determining patterns in civil-military relations. 
For example, the ideological indoctrination of militaries is more commonly found amongst 
one-party states. This is because one-party states are more likely to actually adhere to a 
coherent ideology. Moreover, the party apparatus provides it with the channels through which 
to disseminate this ideology. Examples include Iran and Syria. Personalist regimes often pursue 
divide-and-conquer strategies, exploiting ethnic and tribal differences where they exist and 
pitting multiple paramilitary forces against each other. In chapter 6, I shall use some of these 
insights to develop a theory to explain differences in military expenditure amongst different 
types of dictatorships.  
 
However, the above comparative study highlights other important differences between 
regimes that may not be so easily captured by a strict regime categorisation.  As discussed in 
chapter 1, an important determinant of civil-military relations is the role the military played in 
bringing the current regime to power. In countries where the military played a positive role, 
such as Syria, in which the dictator was brought to power by a military coup, or Egypt and 
Algeria, in which the military ‘liberated’ the country in an armed struggle, dictators are more 
likely to tend to secure the military’s loyalty by ensuring it has a stake in the continuation of 
the regime. In countries where the military played no role in bring the regime to power, such 
as Tunisia, or actively resisted the regime, e.g. Iran, dictators are more likely to pursue 
repressive strategies.  
 
A country’s ethnic composition is another important determinant of civil-military relations, as 
is its access to natural resources. Both provide dictators with different coup-proofing options. 
The existence of external threats is another significant determinant of civil-military relations. 
Both Egypt and Iran tried to change their relations with the military after going through 
international conflict. Their experiences highlighted the need for a more professional military 
with an external focus. The consequence of coup-proofing is often the inability of the military 
to perform its most important task – defending the county’s borders.  
 
Regime categorisation is useful for the purpose of econometric analysis, as it allows us to 
capture certain characteristics of a regime using dummy variables. This will be my approach in 
the following chapters. The present chapter has given a more nuanced picture of possible 
determinants of civil military relations, too detailed to account for in econometric analysis. By 
combining econometric analysis with a comparative case study, I hope to give a more 
complete view of what determines civil-military relations. 
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3 Data 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis uses data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the World 
Bank, the Correlates of War program, the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme, the Polity IV 
project and individual researchers. In addition, pre-1988 data on military expenditure for the 
MENA region was collected by me in cooperation with the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute. In this chapter, I introduce this data in detail. 
 
This thesis uses a panel of up to 112 countries, in most cases covering the period 1960-20005. 
The sample is based on countries for which sufficient data could be gathered on. Generally, 
more developed countries supply better data, so inevitably my sample is somewhat biased to 
developed countries. This is problematic in the context of this study is so far as the more 
developed countries also tend to be the more democratic ones, and this study is interested in 
dictatorships. A key dictatorships missing in this sample is the USSR. However, it might be 
argued that the USSR is likely to be an outlier, and including it in the sample may skew 
relationships. 
 
My period of analysis is limited by the availability of data for certain key variables. This chapter 
is organised as follows: in section 2, I present the data on military expenditures and describe 
                                                          
5
 Chapter 6 covers the period 1960-2010.  
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my own data collection process; in section 3, I discuss the various measures of regime type; in 
section 4, I present all other data used throughout this thesis.  
 
 
3.2 Military Expenditure 
 
3.2.1 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute  
 
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database on military expenditure 
covers 172 countries and contains consistent data for the period since 1988. SIPRI updates its 
database annually. This thesis uses two versions of SIPRI’s military expenditure: the 2011 
version6 (used in chapters 3 and 5), which was the most recent version available when I began 
my thesis; and the 2012 version7 (used in chapters 4 and 6), which was the latest version 
available when I began work on my final chapter. The 2011 version contains data on military 
expenditures in constant 2009 USD available up to 2010 (2009 for the share of GDP); the 2012 
version contains data on military expenditures in constant 2010 USD available up to 2011 
(2010 for the share of GDP). The change in base year results in some discrepancies between 
the absolute figures of each dataset; however the percentage changes from one year to the 
next remain largely consistent across both datasets (see table 3.A1 in the appendix for a 
comparison of the 2011 and 2012 versions for a randomly selected sample of countries). It 
should be noted that according to SIPRI “the choice of base also has a significant impact on 
cross-country comparisons of military expenditure data because different national currencies 
vary against the dollar in different ways” (SIPRI 2013b)8. SIPRI prioritizes consistency over time 
for each country over comparability between countries. It notes that “while comparability 
between countries is sought as far as possible, this is given lower priority, as consistency over 
time is necessary to be able to assess trends in spending, and as the variations in reporting 
data by different countries is so great as to render full cross-country comparability 
unachievable” (SIPRI 2013a). In addition, data are subject to continuous revisions, which can 
                                                          
6
 SIPRI (2011), SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
[online] latest version available at <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex> [accessed on 
06/05/2011]. 
7
 SIPRI (2012), SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
[online] latest version available at: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database 
[accessed on 14/08/2012]. 
8
 Note: when between 2009 and 2010, the dollar falls (rises) against the currency of country A, military 
expenditure of country A expressed in constant 2010 USD will be higher (lower) than when expressed in 
2009 USD. 
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be extensive, and may result in further discrepancies for individual countries in individual 
years.  
 
 
Definition 
 
SIPRI notes that “the lack of sufficiently detailed data makes it difficult to apply a common 
definition of military expenditure on a worldwide basis”. Nevertheless, SIPRI has adopted a 
definition as a guideline: 
 
Where possible, SIPRI military expenditure data include all current and capital expenditure on: 
(a) the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; (b) defence ministries and other 
government agencies engaged in defence projects; (c) paramilitary forces, when judged to be 
trained and equipped for military operations; and (d) military space activities. Such 
expenditures should include: (a) military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of 
military personnel and social services for personnel; (b) operations and maintenance; (c) 
procurement; (d) military research and development; and (e) military aid (in the military 
expenditure of the donor country). Civil defence and current expenditures on previous military 
activities, such as veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion and weapon destruction are 
excluded.” (SIPRI 2012). 
 
 
Problems 
 
SIPRI relies only on open sources, including official documents and questionnaires. According 
to SIPRI, while the majority of countries publish at least basic military budget information, this 
data may be subject to a number of problems, including the problems of comparability and 
reliability.  
 
As mentioned above, comparisons between countries and over time are complicated by the 
fact that countries employ different definitions of military expenditure. SIPRI state that “while 
SIPRI always seeks data as close as possible to the SIPRI definition, including by finding 
additional sources of data to the main published defence budget where possible, this is not 
always available” (SIPRI 2013a). The problem of comparability is exacerbated by the fact that 
many countries provide only limited information on military expenditure. It is often unclear 
what is or is not included in military expenditure figures (such as spending on paramilitaries, 
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veteran pensions and benefits, etc.), whether definitions have changed over time, whether 
figures are for actual or budgeted expenditure, etc.  
 
The problem of reliability arises because 
 
 In some countries, especially poorer countries with limited state capacity, there may be weak 
systems for financial monitoring and control in the military sector and elsewhere. Actual levels 
of expenditure may be incompletely recorded, or actively falsified due to corruption or 
otherwise. Some governments may also seek to disguise the true level of expenditure, for 
example for the benefit of donor countries and institutions. Poor financial discipline may allow 
ministries or armed services to overspend their budget without sanction. In a number of cases, 
only budgeted expenditure figures for the military may be available, rather than actual 
expenditure, which may be substantially different (SIPRI 2013a). 
 
Moreover, in some cases, military expenditure may be funded from a number of extra-
budgetary or off-budget sources. Military expenditure may be financed from other lines within 
the overall state budget or from outside the regular state budget. For example, arms imports 
and sometimes other military spending are frequently financed from dedicated accounts for 
natural resource revenues – an issue I shall explore in detail in chapter 6.  
 
Finally, a major problem - from the perspective of this thesis in particular – is SIPRI’s lack of 
reliable data prior to 1988. Years prior to 1988 are important for this research, as they yield so 
many more examples of dictatorships. I address this problem in two ways: in chapter 3-5, I 
combine SIPRI data on military expenditure with data from the Correlates of War (COW) 
National Material Capabilities dataset. The precedent for this was set by Nordhaus, Oneal and 
Russet (2012). In chapter 6, which focuses on the MENA region, I used figures from the SIPRI 
archives, which I collected during a one month research visit under the supervision of the head 
of the Military Expenditures Project, Sam Perlo-Freeman. In the next two sections, I shall first 
discuss the COW military expenditure data and then explain the process of backdating SIPRI’s 
military expenditure data. 
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3.2.2 Correlates of War Project 
 
Coverage 
 
The Correlates of War (COW) National Material Capabilities dataset includes data on military 
expenditures from as early as 1816 for some countries and until 2001. Data are available in 
current USD, and I convert them first into constant USD using US CPI (with 2005 as the base 
year), and then to the share in GDP by dividing through constant (2000) GDP in USD taken 
from the World Bank World Development Indicators. 
 
 
Definition 
 
COW defines military expenditure “as the total military budget for a given state for a given 
year”. However, the organization states that its main interest in collecting data on military 
expenditure was “to index all financial resources available to the military in time of war”. Their 
focus, therefore, is on a country’s fighting capacity. COW includes “all resources devoted to 
military forces that could be deployed, irrespective of their active or reserve status” in their 
definition of military expenditure. It excludes “all appropriations of a non-military character 
because some nations have civil ministries under military control (national police forces is the 
most prevalent example), [and] the use of such unadjusted budgets would substantially over-
estimate the military capability of those nations”. Moreover, COW distinguishes which figures 
going for military purposes were destined to enhance capability. Thus they exclude 
expenditures on pensions, superannuation pay, relief, and subsidies to widows and orphans 
from their definition of military expenditure as they “do not contribute to military power”. 
 
 
Problems 
 
COW data on military expenditure is subject to the same problems SIPRI data is. In addition, 
the Correlates of War project is less meticulous about documenting its data collection process 
than the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute is, and is thus generally considered 
less reliable. 
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In addition, the question arises as to whether COW and SIPRI data are compatible and can be 
combined. Although Nordhaus et al (2012) set the precedent for doing so, it is worth 
examining this issue in more depth. To get a picture of the compatibility of SIPRI and COW 
data, I examine their ratio in 1988 and subsequent years in which a reasonable amount of 
overlapping data is available. Table 3.A2 summarizes this information. The mean ratio is close 
to one. One would not expect a ratio exactly equal to one because of SIPRI and COW use 
different base years (see above).  
 
From the histogram (figure 3.A1) one can see that the distribution of the SIPRI/COW ratio in 
1988 is affected by outliers. A closer examination of these outliers gives interesting insights 
into the compatibility of the two sources. For example, Brazil, Columbia, Lebanon, Poland and 
Turkey all have SIPRI/COW ratios greater than 3 in 1988. However, in subsequent years, these 
ratios decrease and roughly converge to one. I suspect that this is because after 1988 data 
collection improves, and data generally become more accessible, thus reducing discrepancies 
between sources that are the result of inaccuracies. Furthermore, after 1988 COW actually 
collects data from SIPRI amongst others, so there is a direct overlap in some instances. 
 
One inconsistency between SIPRI and COW data becomes obvious when examining the 
minimum value, which is 0. This is an unusual number to arrive at when taking ratios. This 
figure corresponds to Costa Rica, which SIPRI sites as having zero military expenditure, while 
COW estimates Costa Rica’s military expenditure as being in the range of ten thousand. This 
divergence may be the result of varying definitions which include/exclude paramilitary 
spending, pensions, spending on R&D, etc. 
 
To account for such discrepancies between SIPRI and COW data, I use a dummy in all my 
regressions, which equals one when the data source is SIRPI. However, this dummy must be 
interpreted carefully. In addition to picking up differences in the sources, it will pick up a “Cold 
War effect” because the SIPRI data corresponds with the post Cold War era. In chapter 4, I 
address this issue, by testing for structural stability. I also run separate regression using only 
COW data (covering the period 1960 to 2000) and only SIPRI data (covering the 1988 to 2000). 
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3.2.3 Backdating SIPRI’s Military Expenditure Data 
 
SIPRI publishes figures on military expenditure from 1988 onwards. While earlier data can be 
found in the SIPRI Yearbooks, “various changes in methodology and an unfortunate loss of 
source material detailing where earlier data was from” render this data inconsistent9. 
Moreover, SIPRI cautions that “military expenditure data from different volumes of the SIPRI 
Yearbook should not be combined because of data revision between volumes”10. However, 
SIPRI is currently engaged in an ongoing project to extend the SIPRI military expenditure 
database back to 1949. I spent a month as a guest researcher with the Military Expenditure 
Project under the supervision of Sam Perlo-Freeman, working on this project. I searched the 
SIPRI archives to uncover information about earlier military expenditure figures, which I then 
verified.  As a result of these research efforts, I am able to present here figures for the MENA 
region from the 1960s (or from independence, if this occurred later) onwards. In the following 
paragraphs, I give a brief account of how we compiled this figures. 
 
Our starting point was SIPRI’s private electronic database, in which is noted for each year from 
198811 to present current military expenditure in local currency units (LCU) and the original 
source for this figure. In addition, SIPRI’s archive contains hardcopies of various statistical 
yearbooks, official government documents, newspaper clippings and handwritten notes dating 
back to as early as the 1950s. 
 
From this archive, we collected data on current military expenditure in local currency units 
(LCU) for each country for years prior to and including 1988 from various sources: the UN 
Statistical Yearbooks (UNSY), the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFSY) of the IMF, 
the European Yearbooks (EUYB), USAID Yearbooks, the German Statistik des Auslandes (SAUS), 
the Arab Report and Record (ARR), as well as various official government documents such as 
Central Bank or Ministry of Finance reports. The aim of this exercise was to collect as many 
data points for each country, ideally with some overlapping years to enable the comparison of 
figures from different sources.  
 
The next step was to try to take the existing SIPRI series backwards by matching the 1988 
figure with one of the above sources. We encountered three scenarios: 
                                                          
9
 http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/copy_of_faqs#4-why-does-the 
10 http://milexdata.sipri.org/ 
11
 In some cases the original series started earlier. 
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1. In some cases, earlier data from the same source as the existing SIPRI series were found, 
making it possible to take the series back directly up to a certain point. For example, the 
existing series for Kuwait dates back to 1984 and the original source is GFSY for 1984 and 
up until 1998. Going through older GFSYs, we were able to locate earlier data covering the 
years 1972-1984 (with a missing year in 1975). Because the source was the same, these 
data points could be added to the existing series without concerns over compatibility. 
 
2. In other cases, while earlier data from the same source could not found, data from an 
alternative source, in which the 1988 figure was identical with the one from the existing 
SIPRI series, were found. In these cases the existing SIPRI series was taken back directly 
using the alternative source. 
 
3. Finally, in some cases, while data prior to 1988 was available, no identical overlapping 
figures could be found. In these cases, we calculated the percentage difference between 
the existing SIPRI figure and the alternative figure and applied this percentage in 
backdating the existing SIPRI series using the alternative data. An example helps to 
illustrate this process: the existing SIPRI series for Bahrain dates back to 1974 and the 
original source is GFSY for 1974 to present. Research in the SIPRI archives uncovered 
earlier data collected by USAID. The latest available USAID figure was for 1974, so we were 
able to compare the two sources. GFSY’s estimated Bahrain’s military expenditure to 9.3 
million Dinar in 1974, whereas USAID approximated it at 7 million. We calculated that 
GFSY’s figure is 132.86% of USAID’s figure (9.3/7*100=132.86). For earlier years, we 
worked out what 132.86% of each USAID data point was, thus backdating the existing SIPRI 
series. 
 
Following the various procedures outlined in these three scenarios, we backdated the existing 
SIPRI series as far as was possible. Having completed this, it was necessary to convert the 
current LCU figures into constant dollars in order to make the series comparable amongst each 
other. Data on CPI and the exchange rates for the base year (usually 199512) were taken from 
the IMF International Finance Statistics, supplemented where necessary with data from the 
IMF World Economic Outlook and the World Bank. SIPRI procedure entails first converting 
each current price local currency series into constant price local currency for the chosen base 
                                                          
12
 For Iraq, Oman and Qatar the base years were 2005, 2000 and 2000, respectively. 
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year, and then converting them into US$ at the market exchange rate for the base year13. It 
must be noted that CPI data was not available for every year for which we collected military 
expenditure data, so the constant dollars military expenditure series is shorter than the 
current LCU one. In addition, we converted fiscal years to calendar years where necessary. 
Table 3.1 outlines the military expenditure data that is now available. 
 
Table 3-1 Overview of military expenditure data for MENA region available as a result of backdating efforts 
Country Existing SIPRI series 
backdated series  
in current LCU 
backdated series  
in constant USD 
Algeria 
 
 
1988-present 
 
1960-2010;  
missing 1962 
1969-2010;  
missing 1962 
Bahrain 1971-present 1971-2011 1971-2011 
Egypt 1988-present 1961-2010 1962-2010 
Iran 1988-2008 1959-2008 1960-2008 
Iraq 
 
2004-present 
 
1960-1981;  
2004-2011 
2004-2011 
 
Israel 1988-present 1959-2010 1960-2010 
Jordan 1988-present 1960-2011 1970-2011 
Kuwait 1984-present 1969-2011 1973-2011 
Lebanon 
 
1987-present;  
missing 1989 
1960-2011;  
missing 1989 
1980-2011;  
missing 1989 
Libya 
 
 
1997-2008 
 
 
1960-1982;  
1997-2008;  
missing 2002 
1965-1982;  
1997-2008;  
missing 2002 
Morocco 1988-present 1960-2010 1960-2010 
Oman 1980-present 1971-2011 1980-2011 
Qatar 
 
 
2002-2008 
 
 
1980-1991; 
missing 1986;  
2002-2008 
1981; 1987-1991;  
2002-2008 
Saudi Arabia 
 
 
1981-present 
 
 
1960-1973;  
1977-2011;  
missing 1986 
1960-1973;  
1977-2011; 
missing 1986 
Syria 1986-present 
1960-2011;  
missing 1963 
1961-2011; missing 1963 
Tunisia 1988-present 1960-2010 1980-2010 
UAE 1997-2010 1997-2010 1997-2010 
Yemen 1988-2008 1972-2008 - 
 
 
Figures for the period 1988-2010 are in constant 2010 USD. It should be noted that as a result 
of the different base years, there are (substantial) differences between the official SIPRI series 
                                                          
13
 See appendix B for a more detailed description.  
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and my backdated series in the years they overlap. Unfortunately it was not possible to simply 
convert all data into the same base year, as CPI data is not available for all countries. However, 
it was possible to verify using a selection of countries for which CPI is available that these 
differences are consistent and disappear when converted into the same base year. Table 3.A3 
shows this for the example of Libya. 
 
 
3.3 Regime Type Data 
 
3.3.1 Polity IV Project 
 
Coverage 
 
The Polity IV dataset covers all major, independent states in the global system (i.e., states with 
total population of 500,000 or more in the most recent year; currently 167 countries) over the 
period 1800-2012. 
 
 
Definition 
 
The Polity scheme is a discrete ordinal scale measure that examines concurrent qualities of 
democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions. It is different from other 
measures of democracy in that it does not categorize countries into mutually exclusive forms 
of governance (e.g. democracy/autocracy). The Polity Score places countries along a spectrum 
of regime authority that spans from fully institutionalized autocracies through mixed, or 
incoherent, authority regimes (termed "anocracies") to fully institutionalized democracies. It 
ranks countries according to a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 
(consolidated democracy).  
 
“The Polity scheme consists of six component measures that record key qualities of executive 
recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. It also records 
changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority. The Polity data include 
information only on the institutions of the central government and on political groups acting, or 
reacting, within the scope of that authority. It does not include consideration of groups and 
territories that are actively removed from that authority (i.e., separatists or "fragments"; these 
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are considered separate, though not independent, polities) or segments of the population that 
are not yet effectively politicized in relation to central state politics” (Polity IV). 
 
 
Problems 
 
Although widely used, discrete ordinal scale measures of democracy, such as Polity IV14 have 
been subject to criticism. Measures like Polity IV capture many aspects of politics with one 
single number. Gleditsch and Ward (1997, p.380) argue that this conflates important 
differences: “vastly different temporal, spatial, and social contexts support the same autocracy 
scale value”. For example, the Chinese communist regime, the Burmese military dictatorship, 
and the monarchy of the United Arab Emirates have all at some point in time held the same 
Polity IV score, yet the institutional differences between these three dictatorships could not be 
more pronounced. Cheibub, Gandhi and Veerland (2010) add that this makes it harder to 
specify the causal mechanisms that link regime and the outcomes of interest. They argue that 
the primary purpose for the categorization of political regimes is the conduct of empirical 
research and that “a measure of democracy based on a minimalist conception is compatible 
with most theoretical issues that motivate empirical research on political regimes” (Cheibub, 
et al. 2010, p. 72). The Polity Score can be converted into regime categories15; however, 
according to Cheibub et al. (2010), this is somewhat arbitrary. Finally, the authors note that 
that information required to update the various component measures can be extremely 
difficult to obtain and is highly subjective. 
 
On the other hand, it can be argued that categorical measures of regime type (such as Cheibub 
et al’s democracy/autocracy dichotomy) equally obscure important information. Categorizing 
countries into either democracies or autocracies implicitly assumes that all 
democracies/autocracies are equal. It seems reasonable to argue that some democracies are 
more democratic than others, etc.  
 
In my thesis, I address this issue by using both a discrete ordinal scale measure (Polity IV) and a 
categorical measure (Reich’s Political Regime Change measure) and compare the results. In 
addition, in chapter 5, I further dissect the category of autocracy into sub-categories 
                                                          
14
 Other examples include the Freedom House Index and Bollen’s (2001) indicator of liberal democracy. 
15 Marshall and Jaggers recommend a three-part categorization of "autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" 
(-5 to +5), and "democracies" (+6 to +10) 
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(military/single-party/personalist) which capture different institutional arrangements within a 
dictatorship. In the following sections, I shall introduce these two measures.  
 
 
3.3.2 Reich’s Political Regime Change Dataset 
 
Coverage 
 
Reich (2002) updates Gasiorowski’s (1995) dataset on political regime changes (PRC) through 
to 1998. The dataset covers "every independent nation-state in the world that had a 
population of at least one million citizens by 1980 and those established after 1980 that had a 
population of more than one million; each country is coded from the date of independence or, 
in cases in which the country had not been colonized, with the date at which a modern nation-
state was established" (Reich 2002, p. 8). Reich provides both the month and year in which the 
regime change takes place. As a result, the PRC dataset records cases in which more than one 
regime change occurred within the same year. As I require my data to be annual, I code these 
cases as the regime type that the country was for the longest part of that year.  
 
 
Definition 
 
Reich (2002) dataset on political regime changes categorizes regimes as democratic, semi-
democratic and authoritarian according to the definitions outlined by Diamond, Linz and Lipset 
(1990).  
 
Democracy: A regime in which (i) meaningful and extensive competition exists among 
individuals and organized groups for all effective positions of government power, at regular 
intervals and excluding the use of force; (ii) a highly inclusive level of political participation 
exists in the selection of leaders and policies, such that no major (adult) social group is 
excluded; and (iii) a sufficient level of civil and political liberties exists to ensure the integrity of 
political competition and participation. 
 
Semi-democracy: A regime in which a substantial degree of political completion and freedom 
exists, but where the effective power of elected officials is so limited, or political party 
competition is so restricted, or the freedom and fairness of elections are so compromised that 
electoral outcomes, while competitive, still deviate significantly from popular preferences; 
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and/or civil and political liberties are so limited that some political orientations and interests 
are unable to organize and express themselves. 
 
Authoritarian: A regime in which little or no meanlingful political competion or freedom exists 
(Reich 2002, pp. 6-7). 
 
 
Problems 
 
One drawback of the PRC data is its limited coverage – 102 countries, 1960-1998. However, 
this dataset represents one of the most rigorous attempts at classifying regimes, relying on 
extensive analysis of primary sources in cooperation with regional and country experts. A 
strength of this dataset lies in the fact that it is designed "specifically for the purpose of 
classifying regimes, providing a single, categorical measure of regime type, instead of leaving 
the researcher the task of designing such a variable from the data that may not be easily or 
meaningfully transformed into a categorical measure" (Reich, 2002, p. 18). Therefore, I use this 
dataset in spite of the fact that it limits the time period I am able to study. 
 
Reich assesses the empirical validity of his dataset by comparing the PRC codings to other 
datasets commonly used to classify regimes. Amongst others, he finds that the PRC regime 
score and the Polity IV democracy-autocracy score show a positive correlation of r=0.86 (Reich, 
2002, p. 14). More generally he finds that his codings are consistent with those from existing 
datasets that also measure regime characteristics. However, he concedes that “correlations 
can also conceal important differences. Because all regimes tend to be relatively stable from 
year to year, rank correlations are typically quite high among regime datasets: the vast 
majority of codings register no change, inflating measures of association” (ibid, p. 17). He 
therefore also compares regime transitions in the PRC dataset with other datasets (in 
particular the ACLP dataset compiled by Alvarez et al (1999) and the Freedom House score), 
and finds some differences.  
 
Similarly, I compare regime transitions in the PRC dataset with the Polity IV dataset. To do this, 
Polity IV is transformed into a categorical variable according to the guidelines set out by the 
Polity IV project: countries that score –10 to –6 are coded as autocracies; countries that score 
–5 to +5 are coded as semi-democracies; countries that score +6 to +10 are coded as 
democracies. Table 3.A4 summarises the information on transitions in each dataset.  
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PRC contains a total of 2052 observations, whereas Polity IV only codes 1629. Of these 
observations the majority represent so-called “non-transitions”, i.e. no transition between 
regime categories takes place. As a percentage of total observations, non-transitions in the 
PRC and Polity IV datasets are similar. However, there are some notable differences between 
the two datasets regarding the coding of actual transitions. These relate mainly to the middle 
category, semi-democracy. 
 
As a percentage of total observations, Polity IV codes nearly twice as many transitions from 
autocracy to semi-democracy (4.54%) compared with (2.14%), and only one third of transitions 
from autocracy to democracy (0.55%) compared with (1.71%) as PRC does. As a percentage of 
total observations, Polity IV codes nearly twice as many transitions from semi-democracy to 
democracy (5.09%) compared with (2.34%), as well as twice as many transition from 
democracy to semi-democracy (1.38%) compared with (0.37%).  These differences are likely to 
be linked to the definition of semi-democracies. Whereas Reich codes countries on a case by 
case basis, Polity IV uses more or less arbitrary cut-off points to define semi-democracies. This 
comparison supports the point made above that one of the strengths of Reich’s dataset is the 
fact that it is designed specifically for the purpose of classifying regimes. Reich (ibid, p. 18) 
notes that “these differences are likely to be most important precisely in the area of most 
interest to researchers: the measurement of regime change”. This point is particularly 
important for chapter 4, which studies regime change.  
 
Finally, in addition to the general question regarding whether to use a continuous or a 
categorical measure of democracy discussed above, there is the more specific issue of how 
many categories regimes should be classified into. Cheibub, Gandhi and Veerland’s (2010) 
Democracy-Dicatorship (DD) advocate a dichotomous measure. However, research on 
democracies and dictatorships has found that so-called anocracies/hybrid regimes/semi-
democracies behave differently from both full democracies and autocracies. Moreover, 
empirical studies have found that the inclusion of a third middle category makes a significant 
difference for results (see, for example, Epstein et al 2006). 
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3.3.3 Ezrow and Frantz’s Tyrants Dataset 
 
Coverage  
 
Ezrow and Frantz (2011)16 identify 208 autocratic regimes during the period 1946 to 2010. 
They categorise each regime as personalist, single-party, military, monarchic or hybrid. Figure 
3.1 shows the number of countries that fall into each regime type by year. Single-party states 
are the most prevalent form of autocracy through the whole period, followed by the other 
pure form autocracies - personal dictatorships, military regimes and monarchies, respectively. 
There are fewer cases of mixed regime types than pure form autocracies. Because the number 
of observations by year for each mixed regime type is low, I only study pure form autocracies 
in this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Distribution of autocratic regime types in Ezrow and Frantz’s Tyrants dataset 
 
                                                          
16
 Ezrow and Frantz’s (2011) dataset is a precursor to Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2012), which, at the 
time of analysis was not publicly available, but generously shared with me by Natasha Ezrow. There may 
be slight differences between the version provided to me and the version now publicly available (for 
example, single-party regimes are later referred to as dominant party regimes, and there are additional 
regime types), but these differences should not affect the results of my analysis. 
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Definition 
 
Ezrow and Frantz’s (2011) definitions are based on Geddes (2003), who categorizes autocracies 
according to whether “control over policy, leadership selection, and the security apparatus is 
in the hands of one-party (single-party dictatorships), […] the military (military dictatorships), 
or a narrower group centred around an individual dictator (personalist dictatorship)” (Geddes, 
Wright and Frantz (2012, p. 8). The emphasis is on the set of formal and informal rules for 
choosing leaders and policies. “These rules determine the group from which leaders can be 
drawn and who influence policy” (ibid, p. 2).  
 
 
Problems 
 
There are a number of alternative categorizations of autocracies, and thus a problem arises as 
to which measure to choose. To the best of my knowledge there exist three alternative 
categorizations of autocracies.  
 
Lai and Slater (2006) break down autocratic regimes along two dimensions: despotic power 
and infrastructural power. Despotic power refers to the question of who makes decisions. 
Despotic power can be autocratic or oligarchic, i.e. decisions can be made by a single person or 
a group. Infrastructural power concerns the issue of who executes decisions. Decisions can be 
executed by a party or the military. Thus, the authors sort autocratic regimes into one of four 
categories: machine, bossism, junta and strongman. Machines and juntas are comparable to 
Geddes single-party states and military regimes, respectively. However, Geddes final category, 
personalist regimes, is broken down according to whether the personalist dictator relies on a 
party or the military to execute his decisions. Lai and Slater’s approach of further breaking 
down personalist regimes is helpful in that it avoids Geddes’s problem of having to categorize 
some regimes as hybrids. However, I disagree with the authors’ notion that “a regime 
ultimately depends on a party or a military apparatus to maintain political control” (Lai and 
Slater 2006, p. 115). I argue that there is, in fact, such a thing as a purely personalist regime, in 
which parties and militaries are so constrained in their power that they are reduced to 
meaningless fronts. 
 
Hadenius and Teorell (2007, p. 146) identify regimes based on what they call “modes of 
maintaining power”, distinguishing between: 1) hereditary succession, or lineage; 2) the actual 
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or threatened use of military force; and 3) popular election, which, in turn, correspond to 
three generic types of regime: monarchy, the military regime, and the electoral regime. 
Electoral regimes are broken down into no-party regimes, one-party regimes and limited 
multiparty regimes, thus, allowing the authors to identify five main autocratic regime types. In 
addition, the authors identify a number of minor types of authoritarian regimes, including 
rebel regimes, theocracies, transitional regimes, etc. Overall, they identify 13 minor regime 
types. While this is very detailed, from the perspective of regression analysis this is not 
practical, as having too many categories results in too few observations per category. 
Moreover, like Lai and Slater (2006), Hadenius and Teorell (2007) reject personalism as distinct 
category. They argue that personalism is “a continuous trait that may be more or less present 
in a regime” (Hadenius and Teorell, p. 145). The degree of personalisation characterising a 
regime is measured by the frequency with which the head of government is replaced. As 
mentioned above, I argue that personalism is a distinct category. 
 
Finally, Cheibub, Gandhi and Veerland (2010, p. 87) distinguish dictatorships according to the 
“nature of executive office”. They differentiate between monarchies, military regimes and a 
residual category, which they refer to as “civilian regimes”. This categorisation is based on 
characteristics of the ruling elite: “Monarchs rely on family and kin networks along with 
consultative councils; military rulers confine key potential rivals from the armed forces within 
juntas; and, civilian dictators usually create a smaller body within a regime party—a political 
bureau—to coopt potential rivals” (Cheibub et al. 2010, p. 84). I argue that grouping all non-
monarchic and non-military regimes into one category conflates important differences 
between regimes, in particular the way they deal with the military - a point I shall elaborate on 
in chapter 5.  
 
In addition, Geddes et al (2012) point out a number of problems with the Cheibub et al.’s 
dataset. For example, while Ezrow and Frantz code regimes as military when dictators govern 
in collaboration, Cheibub et al. code as military all autocracies led by men who have ever been 
officers. Why this may be problematic for our research is illustrated by an example cited by 
Geddes et al (2012): “This means that the Ugandan dictatorship led by Idi Amin from 1971 to 
1979 is coded as military by Cheibub et al. but personalist in our data set because Amin 
marginalized the military from highest level decision making”17. Given that the theory 
developed in chapter 6 specifically mentions the marginalisation of the military in personalist 
                                                          
17
 Ibid, 17-18. 
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regimes, this is example suggests that Cheibub et al.’s dataset is let suited to the purpose of 
this research. 
 
I believe that Ezrow and Frantz’s dataset is most suited to my research. In particular, it is based 
on Geddes’s (1999) categorization. Geddes’s research is about authoritarian breakdown, and 
she created this categorization with that in mind. Because my research is also ultimately about 
authoritarian survival, I think it is appropriate to use the same categorization. 
 
Finally, it must be noted that there are some discrepancies between Ezrow and Frantz’s and 
Polity IV’s categorisation of dictatorships: there are a number of examples in which countries 
are coded as dictatorships by Ezrow and Frantz, but score 7 or above (at which point countries 
can be classified as democracies) on Polity IV. Table 3.A5 lists all examples of countries that a 
categorised as either a military, single-party of personalist dictatorship by Ezrow and Frantz, 
but score 7 or above on Polity IV. These differences highlight the difficulties involved in 
categorizing countries. 
 
 
3.4 Other Data 
 
3.4.1 Military Involvement in Politics 
 
The International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) measures, amongst others, political risk. The aim 
of the political risk rating is to provide a means of assessing the political stability. The Political 
Risk Rating comprises twelve components, one of which measures the military’s involvement 
in politics. According to the ICRG’s methodology “the military is not elected by anyone. 
Therefore, it’s involvement in politics, even at a peripheral level, is a diminution of democratic 
accountability”. 
 
Countries are rated on a continuous scale from 1-6, with lower numbers indicating a greater 
degree of military participation in politics. Unfortunately, the ICRG does not provide a detailed 
outline of the methodology by which these ratings are arrived at on its website. However, 
factors that are considered are military involvement as a result of internal or external threat; 
the threat of military take-over; and the existence of a full-scale military regime.  Finally, the 
ICRG explains that “in some cases, military participation in government may be the symptom 
rather than a cause of underlying difficulties”. 
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Data dates back to 1984. For this reason, as well as the lack of methodological transparency, 
the ICRG dataset is used only for robustness checks.  
 
 
3.4.2 Wars and Threats 
 
Dummy variables on wars - internal and external - are from the Correlates of War Project. 
COW defines war as sustained combat, involving organized armed forces, resulting in a 
minimum of 1000 battle-related deaths per year (Sarkees, 2011). Intra-state (civil) wars refer 
to those that predominantly take place within the recognized territory of a state. Inter-state 
wars refer to those that take place between states.  
 
Data on wars from the Correlates of War project are available up until 2007. In chapter 7, I 
study the linkages between military expenditure and natural resource revenues in the MENA 
region over the period 1988-2010. It was therefore necessary to enhance COW data on wars 
with data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) for the last three years. UCDP 
similarly defines war as resulting in a minimum of 1000 battle-related deaths in one calendar 
year.  
 
In chapter 7, I use an additional variable, called “tension”, which captures factors where a 
country is not at war but faces major threats or perceived threats from hostile neighbours, 
wars in neighbouring countries, or the threat of renewed conflict following a war. This variable 
was created by Perlo-Freeman specifically for the paper Brauner and Perlo-Freeman (2014), a 
working paper on which chapter 7 is based. It attempts to give a rough qualitative indication of 
the rising or falling level of threat coming from such factors.  The tension variable is not 
intended to be comparable between countries, but is intended to capture changes over time.  
Some of the factors taken into account for different countries include: 
 
• Various minor conflicts short of war (including Algeria, Israel/Palestinian 
territories, Lebanon, Morocco/Western Sahara when these countries were not in a 
state of 'war' according to the 1000 BRD criterion); 
 
• Tensions between Algeria and Morocco following the Moroccan invasion of 
Western Sahara; 
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• Tensions in the Gulf region resulting from hostility between Iran and Gulf states 
following Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979; 
 
• Ongoing tensions in neighbouring countries following the Gulf War of 1991; 
 
• Tensions following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003; the latter of particular 
significance for Iran and Syria due to fears that they might become future target 
for US forces; 
 
• The Arab-Israeli conflict, in particular for Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and 
Syria; 
 
• Libya’s engagement in Chad, and the US bombing of Tripoli in 1986. 
 
For each of the situations listed above, countries were given a value between 0-5, with a 
higher number indicated a greater potential threat. Each country’s overall threat score is the 
sum of the threat scores from each individual situation18. The tension variable was assigned a 
value of zero when the ‘war’ variable is set to 1, as the latter should be capturing the security 
threat posed by such extreme events. The variable is a subjective judgment based on 
considerable familiarity with the region. Though admittedly ad hoc, given the lack of an 
alternative measure of latent threat, it must suffice. 
 
 
3.4.3 Economics Data 
 
In chapter 7, I use three measures of natural resource rents, taken from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators: total natural resource rents, oil rents and natural gas rents. 
The World Bank defines oil rents as “the difference between the value of crude oil production 
at world prices and total costs of production”; natural gas rents are “the difference between 
the value of natural gas production at world prices and total costs of production”; and total 
natural resources rents are “the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), 
mineral rents, and forest rents”. All figures are expressed in percentages of GDP. 
                                                          
18
 Theoretically there is no upper limit on the value the overall threat score can take. In practice, the 
highest value any country takes is 8 (Israel 1988-1990). 
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Finally, data on GDP per capita (in 2000 constant US Dollars) and total population are from the 
World Bank World Development Indicators; and data on openness, defined as exports plus 
imports divided by GDP (in 2005 constant US Dollars) are from the Penn World Table. 
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3.5 Appendix to Chapter 3 
 
3.5.1 Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 3-A1 Histogram of ratio of SIPRI to COW data in 1988 
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Table 3-A1 Comparison of 2011 and 2012 versions of SIPRI military expenditure datasets 
  Algeria Angola Belize 
Year 
Milex 2010 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2012 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2010 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2012 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2010 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2012 
version 
Change 
(%) 
1988 662 
 
672   . . 
 
. .   4.9 
 
4.9   
1989 647 -2.27 657 -2.23 
  
. .   6.8 38.78 6.8 38.78 
1990 691 6.8 702 6.85 . . 
 
. .   7.2 5.88 7.3 7.35 
1991 708 2.46 718 2.28 147 
 
152   7 -2.78 7.1 -2.74 
1992 1184 67.23 1202 67.41 128 -12.93 133 -12.5 7.6 8.57 7.7 8.45 
1993 1274 7.6 1292 7.49 2055 1505.47 2133 1503.76 8.7 14.47 8.8 14.29 
1994 1549 21.59 1572 21.67 . . 
 
. .   11 26.44 11.1 26.14 
1995 1501 -3.1 1523 -3.12 963 
 
1000   10.9 -0.91 10.9 -1.8 
1996 1709 13.86 1734 13.85 721 -25.13 749 -25.1 10.1 -7.34 10.2 -6.42 
1997 2056 20.3 2086 20.3 1156 60.33 1200 60.21 11.8 16.83 11.9 16.67 
1998 2174 5.74 2206 5.75 357 -69.12 370 -69.17 . . 
 
. .   
1999 2295 5.57 2329 5.58 4558 1176.75 4732 1178.92 7.7 
 
7.8   
2000 2663 16.03 2702 16.02 2111 -53.69 2192 -53.68 9.1 18.18 9.1 16.67 
2001 2914 9.43 2958 9.47 1272 -39.74 1321 -39.74 9.4 3.3 9.5 4.4 
2002 2978 2.2 3022 2.16 1304 2.52 1354 2.5 9.6 2.13 9.7 2.11 
2003 2914 -2.15 2957 -2.15 1722 32.06 1788 32.05 10.3 7.29 10.3 6.19 
2004 3314 13.73 3364 13.76 1639 -4.82 1702 -4.81 11 6.8 11.1 7.77 
2005 3470 4.71 3521 4.67 2322 41.67 2411 41.66 12 9.09 12.1 9.01 
2006 3557 2.51 3609 2.5 2728 17.48 2832 17.46 13.2 10 13.3 9.92 
2007 4173 17.32 4235 17.35 2393 -12.28 2484 -12.29 14.5 9.85 14.6 9.77 
2008 4862 16.51 4934 16.51 2479 3.59 3363 35.39 18.5 27.59 18.7 28.08 
2009 5281 8.62 5359 8.61 3165 27.67 3272 -2.71 16.9 -8.65 17.4 -6.95 
2010 5586 5.78 5671 5.82 3774 19.24 3501 7 14.9 -11.83 15.3 -12.07 
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  Canada Argentina Kazakhstan 
Year 
Milex 2010 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2012 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2010 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2012 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2010 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2012 
version 
Change 
(%) 
1988 17123 
 
19339   2923 
 
4397   . . 
 
. .   
1989 17037 -0.5 19242 -0.5 2702 -7.56 3580 -18.58 . . 
 
. .   
1990 17021 -0.09 19224 -0.09 1831 -32.24 2428 -32.18 . . 
 
. .   
1991 15719 -7.65 17753 -7.65 2142 16.99 2436 0.33 . . 
 
. .   
1992 15546 -1.1 17557 -1.1 2021 -5.65 2306 -5.34 . . 
 
. .   
1993 15506 -0.26 17513 -0.25 2131 5.44 2175 -5.68 506 
 
542   
1994 15278 -1.47 17255 -1.47 2342 9.9 2471 13.61 324 -35.97 348 -35.79 
1995 14403 -5.73 16267 -5.73 2296 -1.96 2422 -1.98 334 3.09 359 3.16 
1996 13223 -8.19 14934 -8.19 2037 -11.28 2149 -11.27 361 8.08 387 7.8 
1997 12190 -7.81 13768 -7.81 2003 -1.67 2113 -1.68 338 -6.37 362 -6.46 
1998 12615 3.49 14248 3.49 2019 0.8 2130 0.8 335 -0.89 359 -0.83 
1999 13155 4.28 14857 4.27 2081 3.07 2195 3.05 280 -16.42 300 -16.43 
2000 12943 -1.61 14618 -1.61 1982 -4.76 2091 -4.74 294 5 315 5 
2001 13280 2.6 14999 2.61 1953 -1.46 2060 -1.48 432 46.94 463 46.98 
2002 13350 0.53 15078 0.53 1664 -14.8 1756 -14.76 473 9.49 507 9.5 
2003 13595 1.84 15354 1.83 1714 3 1808 2.96 560 18.39 600 18.34 
2004 14110 3.79 15935 3.78 1764 2.92 1861 2.93 640 14.29 686 14.33 
2005 14730 4.39 16636 4.4 1853 5.05 1955 5.05 806 25.94 865 26.09 
2006 15415 4.65 17410 4.65 1910 3.08 2015 3.07 944 17.12 1012 16.99 
2007 16806 9.02 18980 9.02 2211 15.76 2333 15.78 1420 50.42 1523 50.49 
2008 18111 7.77 20454 7.77 2512 13.61 2650 13.59 1349 -5 1446 -5.06 
2009 19518 7.77 21389 4.57 2982 18.71 3146 18.72 1272 -5.71 1364 -5.67 
2010 20164 3.31 23109 8.04 3179 6.61 3476 10.49 1227 -3.54 1502 10.12 
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  Brunei Bangladesh Australia 
Year 
Milex 2010 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2012 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2010 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2012 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2010 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2012 
version 
Change 
(%) 
1988 326 
 
349   432 
 
456   10936 
 
13228   
1989 325 -0.31 348 -0.29 472 9.26 499 9.43 10844 -0.84 13117 -0.84 
1990 368 13.23 394 13.22 470 -0.42 496 -0.6 10897 0.49 13181 0.49 
1991 366 -0.54 392 -0.51 478 1.7 505 1.81 11083 1.71 13406 1.71 
1992 350 -4.37 374 -4.59 551 15.27 581 15.05 11406 2.91 13797 2.92 
1993 309 -11.71 331 -11.5 598 8.53 631 8.61 11839 3.8 14320 3.79 
1994 319 3.24 342 3.32 670 12.04 708 12.2 11971 1.11 14481 1.12 
1995 305 -4.39 327 -4.39 690 2.99 729 2.97 11596 -3.13 14026 -3.14 
1996 342 12.13 366 11.93 721 4.49 761 4.39 11454 -1.22 13855 -1.22 
1997 398 16.37 426 16.39 767 6.38 811 6.57 11657 1.77 14100 1.77 
1998 359 -9.8 384 -9.86 778 1.43 823 1.48 12228 4.9 14791 4.9 
1999 321 -10.58 343 -10.68 806 3.6 852 3.52 12829 4.91 15518 4.92 
2000 304 -5.3 325 -5.25 842 4.47 888 4.23 12791 -0.3 15473 -0.29 
2001 280 -7.89 299 -8 841 -0.12 888 0 13301 3.99 16089 3.98 
2002 297 6.07 318 6.35 816 -2.97 861 -3.04 13870 4.28 16777 4.28 
2003 310 4.38 332 4.4 818 0.25 864 0.35 14123 1.82 17083 1.82 
2004 245 -20.97 262 -21.08 822 0.49 881 1.97 14705 4.12 17788 4.13 
2005 297 21.22 318 21.37 833 1.34 893 1.36 15222 3.52 18413 3.51 
2006 334 12.46 357 12.26 897 7.68 961 7.61 16038 5.36 19400 5.36 
2007 345 3.29 370 3.64 944 5.24 1011 5.2 17023 6.14 20591 6.14 
2008 336 -2.61 381 2.97 932 -1.27 999 -1.19 17643 3.64 21341 3.64 
2009 331 -1.49 374 -1.84 1024 9.87 1166 16.72 18963 7.48 22938 7.48 
2010 327 -1.21 391 4.55 1137 11.04 1298 11.32 19799 4.41 23221 1.23 
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  Albania Bahrain 
Year 
Milex 2010 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2012 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2010 
version 
Change 
(%) 
Milex 2012 
version 
Change 
(%) 
1988 . . 
 
. .   238 
 
243   
1989 . . 
 
. .   248 4.2 253 4.12 
1990 265 
 
251   271 9.27 276 9.09 
1991 . . 
 
. .   294 8.49 300 8.7 
1992 151 
 
143   313 6.46 319 6.33 
1993 132 -12.58 125 -12.59 304 -2.88 310 -2.82 
1994 126 -4.55 119 -4.8 308 1.32 314 1.29 
1995 118 -6.35 111 -6.72 319 3.57 325 3.5 
1996 106 -10.17 100 -9.91 339 6.27 346 6.46 
1997 73.8 -30.38 69.8 -30.2 333 -1.77 339 -2.02 
1998 69.7 -5.56 66 -5.44 341 2.4 347 2.36 
1999 80.8 15.93 76.5 15.91 381 11.73 389 12.1 
2000 89.3 10.52 84.6 10.59 378 -0.79 386 -0.77 
2001 102 14.22 96.1 13.59 398 5.29 406 5.18 
2002 101 -0.98 96 -0.1 475 19.35 485 19.46 
2003 114 12.87 108 12.5 546 14.95 557 14.85 
2004 124 8.77 118 9.26 550 0.73 561 0.72 
2005 129 4.03 122 3.39 544 -1.09 555 -1.07 
2006 158 22.48 150 22.95 592 8.82 604 8.83 
2007 196 24.05 186 24 627 5.91 639 5.79 
2008 231 17.86 219 17.74 677 7.97 691 8.14 
2009 249 7.79 235 7.31 762 12.56 777 12.45 
2010 201 -19.28 190 -19.15 731 -4.07 776 -0.13 
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Table 3-A2 Ratio of SIPRI to COW data in selected years 
 
 
 
Table 3-A3 Comparison of military expenditure in Libya in LCU, constant 1995 US$, constant 2010 US$ and official 
SIPRI Yearbook figure 
Year current LCU m. constant (1995) US$ m. constant (2010) US$ m. SIPRI YB constant (2010) US$ m. 
1996 
    1997 577 1280.994 474.866 475 
1998 675 1444.965 535.6504 536 
1999 535 1115.718 413.5979 414 
2000 556 1194.142 442.67 443 
2001 496 1168.247 433.0704 433 
2002 575 
 
0 557 
2003 700 1868.766 692.7537 693 
2004 894 2440.308 904.6252 905 
2005 904 2403.897 891.1274 892 
2006 807.000 2115.091 784.067 785 
2007 807.000 1990.656 737.9385 738 
2008 1346.000 3008.522 1115.263 1116 
 
Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
1988 89 1.32 1.19 0 7.69 
1989 95 1.19 0.65 0 4.70 
1990 98 1.29 0.89 0 6.92 
1991 99 1.18 0.60 0 3.28 
1992 93 1.14 0.64 0 3.57 
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Table 3-A4 Comparison of transitions in PRC and Polity IV dataset 
PRC 
 
After Transition   
0 1 2 Total 
Before 
Transition 
 
 
0 1,973 44 35 2,052 
  96.15% 2.14% 1.71% 100% 
1 29 346 9 384 
  7.55% 90.1% 2.34% 100% 
2 24 5 1,309 1,338 
  1.79% 0.37% 97.83% 100% 
  Total 2,026 395 1,353 3,774 
    53.68% 10.47% 35.85% 100% 
Polity IV 
 
After Transition   
0 1 2 Total 
Before 
Transition 
 
 
0 1,546 74 9 1,629 
  94.9% 4.54% 0.55% 100% 
1 43 740 42 825 
  5.21% 89.7% 5.09% 100% 
2 17 21 1,486 1,524 
  1.12% 1.38% 97.51% 100% 
  Total 1,606 835 1,537 3,978 
    40.37% 20.99% 38.64% 100% 
Note: 0=autocracy, 1=semi-democracy, 2=democracy 
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3-A5 Comparison of Ezrow and Frantz's and Polity IV's categorisation of dictatorships 
Country Years Ezrow and Frantz's categorisation Polity IV Score 
Argentina  1983 Military 8 
Botswana  1987-96 Single-party 7 
Botswana  1987-2000 Single-party 8 
Brazil 1985 Military 7 
Bulgaria  1990 Single-party 8 
Dominican Republic 1962 Personalist 8 
Ecuador 1979 Military 9 
Hungary 1990 Single-party 10 
Lesotho 1966-69 Single-party 9 
Madagascar 1992-93 Personalist 9 
Malaysia 1960-68 Single-party 10 
Mexico 2000 Single-party 8 
Nigeria 1979 Military 7 
 
1983 Military 7 
Pakistan 1973-76 Personalist 8 
Peru 1980 Military 7 
Senegal 2000 Single-party 8 
South Africa 1993-94 Single-party 8 
Spain 1978-79 Personalist 9 
Turkey 1960 Military 7 
Turkey 1961 Military 9 
Turkey 1983 Military 7 
 
 3.5.2 Conversion of Current LCU Military Expenditure into Constant USD 
 
In this section, I discuss issues regarding the conversion of military expenditure figures from 
current local currency units (LCU) into constant US dollars (USD). There are two possible 
methods: the first, used by SIPRI, involves converting current LCU into constant LCU into USD; 
the alternative procedure involves converting current LCU into current USD and then into 
constant USD. For any country, I define  
 
     military expenditure in current LCU in year t; 
   and     local price index in year t and in the base year, b; 
   and    exchange rate against the USD; 
    and  
 
  US CPI in year t and in the base year, b. 
 
According to the procedure SIPRI follows, denoted   
 ,   is converted into constant LCU 
using the local price index in year t,   : 
 
    
  
  
  (3.1) 
 
and then converted into USD using the exchange rate in the base year,   : 
 
  
  
  
     
  (3.2) 
 
According to the alternative procedure, denoted  
 ,   is converted into current USD using 
the exchange rate in year t,   : 
 
  
    
  
  
  (3.3) 
 
and then converted into constant USD using the US CPI in year t,    : 
 
  
  
  
      
  (3.4) 
 
 
The two methods are equivalent, i.e. purchasing power parity holds, when  
Jennifer Brauner 2014 
 
74 
 
 
  
      
  
  
      
   (3.5) 
 
And 
 
     
      
    (3.6) 
 
The first method, i.e. the one SIPRI uses, ensures consistency over time in country X. However, 
cross-country comparisons are distorted by the fact that exchange rates may not have changed 
in the same way as relative prices. The alternative method ensures consistent cross-country 
comparisons in year t. Nonetheless, according to SIPRI “constant price conversions still allow a 
rough cross-country comparison, except where exchange rates have seriously diverged from 
relative price movements between the year of interest and the base year” (SIPRI 2013a). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 The Military and Democratisation 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The events sweeping the Arab world since late 2010 have once again highlighted the 
importance of understanding the process of democratisation. It is not only important to 
understand the forces that bring about the transition to democracy; understanding the factors 
that enable the consolidation of democracies is paramount. According to Reich (2002), the 20th 
century witnessed 58 transitions towards more authoritarian forms of government (40% of all 
transitions). One important factor that remains largely under-investigated in the economic 
literature on democratisation is the military. The military is a force that has the power to 
severely undermine democracy. This was most recently illustrated in Egypt, discussed in 
chapter 1: After president Mubarak was ousted, the Egyptian military formed an interim 
government, promising to hand power to a civilian government in due course. However, keen 
to protect its privileged position in society, it proved reluctant to hand over power to civilians 
and repeatedly postponed elections. In July 2013, only a year after it finally did, the military 
removed President Morsi from office, suspended the constitution and violently quelled 
protests. In February 2014, the government appointed to rule after the removal of Morsi 
resigned to clear the way for Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's to become president, which 
he did in May 2014. The future of democracy in Egypt remains tenuous. Latin America yields 
numerous examples of countries that fluctuated between democracy and military regimes. 
Overall, according to Huntington (1995), there have been “somewhere between 30 and 40 
coup attempts against newly democratic governments”. A better understanding of the role of 
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the military in transitions to democracy will yield important lessons for new democracies, 
decreasing the likelihood that they revert back to authoritarian rule. 
 
This chapter examines the role militaries play in new democracies. It hypothesizes that 
countries in which the military was politically powerful before democratic transition occurred, 
are less likely to consolidate democracy. Political power of the military is proxied through 
military expenditure, which, it is assumed, gives some indication as to what extent the 
government prioritises the military. This is far from being a perfect proxy, but is the closest 
indicator for which comprehensive data is available. As a robustness check, I also use the 
International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) measure of the military’s involvement in politics and 
compare results.  This chapter proceeds as follows: section 2 introduces the theoretical 
framework underpinning this analysis; section 3 reviews the relevant literature; section 4 
discusses the data; section 5 outlines the methodology and discusses the results; an 
alternative measure of military political power is considered in a subsection of section 5; and 
the final section offers a conclusion. 
 
 
4.2 Theory 
 
This chapter hypothesises that countries, in which the military was powerful before 
democratic transition occurs, are less likely to consolidate democracy. This hypothesis is based 
on the paper by Acemoglu, et al. (2010, p. 2), entitled “A Theory of Military Dictatorships”, in 
which they arrive at the same conclusion that “societies in which nondemocratic regimes in 
the past have chosen large militaries may have difficulty consolidating democracy and may 
instead end up with military dictatorships”. Their reasoning is as follows: 
 
"If the elite create a powerful military to prevent democratization, then the military 
also plays an important role in democratic politics until it is reformed, and such 
reform is not instantaneous. In particular, we show that faced with a powerful 
military, a newly-emerging democratic regime will either need to make costly 
concessions or face a high probability of a coup. This coup threat disappears once 
the military is reformed. Interestingly however, it is the anticipation that the 
military will be reformed as soon as the opportunity arises that makes it difficult to 
control the military during the early phases of a democratic regime - because this 
creates a commitment problem, making it impossible for democratic governments 
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to make credible promises to compensate soldiers for not taking actions against 
democracy" (Acemoglu et al. 2010, p. 2). 
 
They set up a multi-period model, in which society starts as a so-called oligarchy (a non-
military dictatorship) with no military; the elite can decide whether to create a military (for 
repression) or not. If the elite do choose to form a military, but for some reason transition to 
democracy occurs, the newly-emerging democratic regime will want to reform the military. 
However, the military knows that once it is reformed, it will no longer have any say in politics. 
In order to prevent this, the military may choose to attempt a coup and take over the 
government. This moral hazard problem leads to states with powerful militaries reverting back 
to autocracies in the form of military dictatorship. 
 
 
4.3 Literature Review 
 
Acemoglu et al. (2010) do not test their hypothesis empirically, and so far few empirical 
applications have been attempted by other researchers. Research on the role of the military in 
democratisation has largely been confined to the qualitative arena (see for example, Colletta 
et al. 1996; Akkoyunlu 2007). 
 
A notable exception is Svolik’s (2008) paper, which studies authoritarian reversals and 
democratic consolidation. Using Cheibub and Gandhi’s (2005) dataset (a precursor to Cheibub 
et al., 2010, discussed in chapter 3), which codes dictatorships as military, civilian and 
monarchy, he finds that a military past has a large negative effect on democracy’s 
susceptibility to authoritarian reversals. Svolik’s paper yields extremely interesting insights and 
is especially interesting because he used innovative statistical methods (e.g. survival analysis). 
However, I argue that by only considering the effect of outright military regimes, he 
underestimates the influence the military might have in non-military regimes. In this chapter, I 
try to take a broader approach by attempting to quantify political power of the military in 
general. My results might be viewed as complementing Svolik’s findings. 
 
In addition, relevant studies include Collier and Hoeffler (2006), who investigate the related 
question of military expenditure in post-conflict societies. They theorise that in post-conflict 
societies, power asymmetries between the government and rebel organisations create a time-
inconsistency problem which incentivises the government to renege on a peace agreement. 
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Lowering military spending acts as a signal from the government that it intends to adhere to 
the terms of the peace agreement. Using global data for the period 1960-1999, they find 
empirical evidence that higher military spending post-conflict increases the risk of renewed 
conflict. Furthermore, Leon (2010) investigates the effect of military spending on the risk of 
coup d’états. Like Acemoglu et al. (2010), he argues that governments can use military 
spending to prevent their militaries from overthrowing them. Using a panel of 153 countries 
for the period 1963-1999, he finds that military spending has a negative effect on the 
likelihood of coups. While these papers study related issues, they do not deal directly with 
democratic reversal. They are, however, particularly relevant for this chapter because they 
employ military expenditure and an explanatory variable. 
 
From a methodological point of view, the analysis in this chapter draws on the modernisation 
hypothesis literature. There are a number of empirical issues encountered in the present 
analysis that crop up in modernisation literature, which I shall discuss later. The so-called 
modernisation hypothesis literature dates back to Lipset (1959), who argued that democracy 
was the result of rising prosperity. Barro (1999) was the first to systematically analyse this 
hypothesis. In a panel study of over 100 countries from 1960 to 1995, he finds that GDP per 
capita, primary schooling, a smaller gap between male and female primary attainment, and 
the middle-class share of income are positively associated with an increase in democracy.  
 
Przeworski et al (2000) challenge the modernisation hypothesis. They argue that while higher 
income per capita entrenches already democratic countries, it does not promote transitions to 
democracy itself. However, Epstein et al (2006) contest their findings. They re-test the 
modernisation hypothesis using a three-way rather than a dichotomous measure of 
democracy, treating semi-democracies as a separate category. Using tobit regressions, Markov 
analysis and duration models on a panel of 169 countries from 1960 to 2000 they find 
evidence that higher income per capita not only furthers the consolidation of existing 
democracies, but also promotes transitions to democracy. Moreover, they highlight the 
importance of so-called “fragile”, “unconsolidated” semi-democracies in understanding the 
dynamics of regime transitions. 
 
A stronger challenge to the modernisation hypothesis comes from Acemoglu et al (2008, 
2014). They propose that the correlation between income and democracy found in cross-
sectional analysis stems from the fact that 500 years ago most societies were nondemocratic 
and had broadly similar income levels but since then have embarked on divergent 
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development paths, "some leading to relative prosperity and democracy and others to relative 
poverty and dictatorship" (Acemoglu et al., p. 812). They refer to their previous studies on 
European colonization strategies (Acemoglu, et al, 2001) in support of this hypothesis. In a 
panel of countries between 1960 and 2000, Acemoglu et al demonstrate that the link between 
income and democracy disappears when country fixed-effects, time-effects and instrumental 
variables are introduced into the regression19.  
 
However, Gundlach and Paldam (2012) question the findings of Acemoglu, at al. (2008). They 
replicate the ARJY model, but point out that it requires the inclusion of the lagged endogenous 
variable, country-fixed effects, and time-fixed effects to make the income effect disappear. 
Leaving out one of these three controls always results in a significant relationship between 
Polity IV and the log of GDP per capita. Moreover, most of the variation in Polity IV is explained 
by income, by the lag of itself, or by country fixed effects, and little is added in terms of 
explanatory power of the model by the inclusion of time-fixed effects. Gundlach and Paldam 
do a similar analysis on five further transition variables (share of agriculture, population 
growth, the corruption perception index from Transparency International, religiousity, and the 
score for the aggregate preferences for capitalism or socialism) and find similar patterns. They 
argue that the ARJY model "removes all systematic components from the dependent transition 
variable and leaves only short-run shocks in the series" (Gundlach and Paldam, 2012 , p. 168). 
They point out that short-run shocks in income are rarely claimed to be a crucial factor in 
explaining transition variables. Nevertheless, they concede that in the case of the democratic 
transition, it may be difficult to determine whether the long run patterns or short run shocks 
matter more because regime change is often triggered by a sudden event. 
 
Triesman (2011) argues that economic development is not translated into more democracy 
until the incumbent leader falls from power. He distinguishes between the short run and what 
he defines as the medium run (10 to 20 years) effect of income on democracy. He argues that 
in the short run growth boosts the incumbent’s popularity and finds evidence that it improves 
his odds of survival. However, when leadership turnover does eventually occur, countries with 
higher income are more likely to move towards democracy. In this way “for years, a society 
may evolve under the surface, growing more complex, bourgeois, literate, interconnected, 
media savvy, tolerant, and difficult to control, without any corresponding alteration in the 
political superstructure – until a crisis occurs and the latent demand for participation combines 
with the new potential for social organisation” (Triesman, 2011, p.10). Triesman’s logic 
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explains why “modernisation theory often seems at odds with current events, and why 
breakthroughs to more accountable government frequently come as a surprise” (ibid, p. 28). 
 
Finally, Hoeffler et al. (2012) separate income per capita into its resource and non-resource 
components. Using dynamic and heterogeneous panel data estimation techniques they find 
that the non-resource component of income is positively linked to democracy, while the 
resource component is negatively linked. I will revisit link between natural resources and 
regime type in chapter 7. 
 
While the pattern of causality between income and democracy remains an open question, I 
take the modernisation approach, using GDP per capita as an independent variable explaining 
democracy, rather than the institutional approach, which uses democracy as an independent 
variable explaining GDP per capita. 
 
 
4.4 Data and Empirical Analysis 
 
This chapter forms a first step towards dissecting empirically the complicated relationship 
between the military and democratisation. A major challenge is measuring the political power 
of the military. I approach this problem by using military burden as a proxy for the military’s 
political power because it gives some indication as to what extent the government prioritises 
it. This is far from being a perfect proxy because military burden is also determined by other 
factors, internal and external, and in particular threats from enemies. However, it is the closest 
indicator for which comprehensive data is available. As an alternative, I also use the 
International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) measure of the military’s involvement in politics. 
However, data for this is much less comprehensive, covering only the period 1984 to present, 
thus missing out the two extremely interesting decades in terms of regime transition.  
 
This chapter uses a panel of up to 102 countries over the period 1960-1998. Data on military 
spending is combined from the Correlates of War (COW) National Material Capabilities 
database and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) military expenditure 
database. Following Nordhaus, Oneal and Russet (2012), I use COW data from 1960 to 1987 
and SIPRI data from 1988 to 200020. I transform all data into percentages of GDP using GDP 
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 In later chapters I control for potential differences between the two data sources using a dummy, but 
find that this does not change the results. 
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figures (in constant 2000 USD) from the World Bank World Development Indicators to get a 
measure of military burden. 
 
This chapter uses two measures of democracy: Marshall and Jaggers (2002) Polity IV and 
Reich’s (2002) dataset of political regime change (PRC). As described in the previous chapter, 
Polity IV is a discrete ordinal variable which ranks countries on a scale from -10 to +10, with 
higher values indicating more democracy. PRC is a categorical measure, which groups 
countries into autocracies (PRC=0), semi-democracies (PRC=1) and democracies (PRC=2). 
 
A closer look at the PRC data gives some interesting insights. Tables 4.1-3 show the overall 
frequency and percentage of each regime type and of transitions by country-year, as well as 
the frequency of transitions by country that took place between 1960 and 1998. Autocracy is 
the most common form of government throughout the sample period, with more than half of 
all observations falling in this category (table 4.1). However, democracy has been on the rise: 
Of the 146 transitions that took place within this period 60.3% were towards a more 
democratic form of government (table 4.2). Nevertheless, regime types are persistent: the 
probability that a regime will persist is greater than 90% for all regime types (Table 4.2). 
However, comparing tables 4.2 with 4.3 illustrates the fact that if countries do transition they 
can end up fluctuating back and forth between regime types (the number of overall transitions 
is higher than the number of transitions by country, indicating that some countries must have 
experienced multiple transitions). 
 
Table 4-1 Summary statistics for PRC dataset, 1960-1998 
PRC 
 
Overall 
Between Within  
variation variation 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Percent 
Autocratic 2075 53.55 76 74.51 71.96 
Semi 408 10.53 44 43.14 25.99 
Democratic 1392 35.92 70 68.63 51.26 
Total 3875 100 190 186.27 53.68 
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Table 4-2 PRC regime transitions by country-year 
  
After 
 
  
Authoritarian Semi Democratic Total 
  
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
 
Authoritarian 1973 96.15 44 2.15 35 1.71 2052 100 
 
Semi 29 7.55 346 90.1 9 2.34 384 100 
Before Democratic 24 1.79 5 0.37 1309 97.83 1338 100 
 
total 2026 53.67 395 10.47 1353 35.86 3773 100 
 
 
Table 4-3 PRC regime transitions by country 
Type of transition Number of countries 
Always authoritarian 15 
Always democratic 21 
Always semi-democratic 0 
Countries experience at least one transition 66 
At least one transition from democracy to autocracy 21 
At least one transition from semi-democracy to autocracy 20 
At least one transition from democracy to semi-democracy 5 
At least one transition from autocracy to semi-democracy 34 
At least one transition from semi-democracy to democracy 9 
At least one transition from autocracy to democracy 30 
 
 
Before proceeding with estimation, it is worthwhile doing some more basic analysis. Table 4.4 
sets out the mean and standard deviation of military burden by political regime type. The 
average military burden is substantially lower in democracies than in authoritarian regimes. 
Figure 4.1 charts the annual averages of Polity IV and military burden across time. This plot 
shows Polity IV and military burden clearly moving in opposing directions. In particular, in the 
early 1980s, i.e. around the time the Cold War began to thaw, there seems to have been a shift 
in both variables: while average military burden had been growing up until this point, in began 
to decrease thereafter; at the same time Polity IV began in increase, having previously been on 
the decline. Figure 4.1 and table 4.4 suggest that there may be a relationship between military 
spending and regime type. The fact that the shift occurred in both variables around the same 
time is noteworthy. It is possible that this pattern is being driven by a third exogenous factor, 
the end of the Cold War, which caused both worldwide democracy levels to rise and 
worldwide military expenditure to drop. At this level of aggregation, it is not possible to 
establish the direction of causation, but it motivates further investigation. 
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Table 4-4 Summary statistics for military burden by regime type 
PRC Obs Mean Std Dev 
Autocracy 1,763 8.202043 14.06533 
Semi 389 4.631678 3.472358 
Democracy 1,357 3.595313 3.33132 
 
 
Figure 4-1 Polity IV and military spending as a percentage of GDP averaged over countries by year 
 
 
A major problem in analysing the relationship between military expenditures and democracy is 
the potential endogeneity of democracy. That authoritarian regimes spend more on the 
military than democracies has been documented in the literature on military expenditures (see 
for example Nordhaus, Oneal and Russet, 2012; Yildrim and Sezgin, 2005; Dunne and Perlo-
Freeman, 2003; Goldsmith, 2003; Hewitt, 1992). While this literature treats democracy as a 
determinant of military expenditure, it does not establish causality nor does it investigate 
potential endogeneity21. In this chapter, military expenditure is treated as predetermined.  
Estimation techniques are modelled on the modernisation literature which encounters a 
similar problem – growth may in fact be the result of good institutions. Chapter 5 delves 
further into the matter of reverse causality. 
 
Estimation techniques must be adapted to how democracy is measured. Using Polity IV as an 
dependent variable, I estimated a fixed effects model, an ECM and a VAR. Using PRC as the 
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dependent variable, I estimate an ordered probit and a fixed effects model. As mentioned 
above, GDP per capita22 is included as a control variable in all regressions. Military burden and 
GDP per capita are logged to scale down the variance and reduce the effect of outliers. Table 
4.A1 in the appendix outlines the summary statistics for the relevant variables. 
 
 
4.5 Methodology and Results 
 
4.5.1 Polity IV 
 
I begin with a simple model of the democratic transition. Following Gundlach and Paldam 
(2012), Polity IV (labelled       in the equations below) is regressed on the lagged log of 
military burden and the lagged log of GDP per capita. Military burden and GDP are logged to 
reduce the effect of outliers, but also to enable a more straightforward interpretation of 
results. I use lags of the explanatory variables to partially deal with the problem of 
endogeneity. As mentioned above, this issue shall be explored in more depth in the next 
chapter. I first estimate the model using pooled OLS (equation 1), then enhance the model 
with country fixed effects (equation 2) and time fixed effects (equation 3) to control for time-
invariant country specific characteristic and time trends, respectively. 
 
                                        (4.1) 
 
                                           (4.2) 
 
                                             (4.3) 
 
Table 4.5 summarizes these estimation results. Pooled OLS yields significant results for log 
military burden and log GDP. A 10% increase in the last period’s military burden is associated 
with a 0.08723 unit decrease in Polity IV. The effect is quite small: the coefficient on log military 
burden implies that a reduction in military burden from, for example, 10% to 5% of GDP is 
associated with a 0.6 unit increase in Polity IV. A 10% increase in the lagged log of GDP per 
capita is associated with a 0.2867 unit increase in Polity IV. The latter is in keeping with the 
                                                          
22
 The data on GDP per capita is from the World Bank World Development Indicators and is in constant 
(2000) USD.  
23
 In a linear-log model, a 1% increase in the explanatory variable is associated with a β/100 unit change 
in the explained variable. 
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modernisation hypothesis. The coefficient on the lag of GDP per capita is comparable to 
Gundlach and Paldam’s findings (β2=3.33). 
 
Table 4-5 Estimation results: static model using military burden as a proxy for military political power 
Dependent variable  
is Polity IV 
(1) (2) (3) 
Pooled OLS 
One-way  
Fixed Effects 
Two-way  
Fixed Effects 
Log military burdent-1 
 
-.8700267** -.774753** -.3638741 
(.3792644) (.3602042) (.304044) 
Log GDP per capitat-1 
 
2.867411*** 1.454207 -1.13584 
(.2419076) (.977842) (.9096871) 
Constant 
 
-19.45061*** -9.145012 7.880659 
(1.918854) (7.126586) (6.504634) 
Fixed effects no yes yes 
Year dummies no no yes 
Obs 3387 3387 3387 
Groups 102 102 102 
R² within  0.0218 0.2167 
R² between  0.5166 0.3641 
R² overall 0.3834 0.3760 0.0456 
robust standard errors in (),*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Adding country effects renders the log of GDP per capita insignificant, while the log of military 
burden continues to have a significant negative effect on Polity IV. A 10% increase in last 
period’s military burden is associated with a 0.077 unit decease in Polity IV. Gundlach and 
Paldam (2012) find that it requires the inclusion of not only country fixed effects, but also the 
inclusion of the lagged endogenous variable and time-fixed effects to make the income effect 
disappear. Clearly the inclusion of log military burden in the analysis makes a difference.  
 
Finally, adding time fixed effects renders all parameters insignificant. It is perhaps noteworthy 
that GDP per capita switches signs in the two-way fixed effects model. A dynamic model may 
shed some light on this result. 
 
I test for dynamics using an ARDL (1,1) of the form 
 
                                                                
                       (4.4) 
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The adjustment parameter, λ, and the long-run equilibrium values, θ1 and θ2, can be 
recovered from the following calculations: λ=-γ1; θ1=γ2/-γ1; θ2=γ3/-γ1.  
 
 
Table 4-6 Estimation results: ECM  
Dependent variable  
is Δ.Polity IV 
(1) (2) (3) 
Pooled OLS One-way Fixed Effects Two-way Fixed Effects 
Δ.log military burden -0.3358024*** -0.3396909*** -0.2650571** 
 (0.1099032) (0.1229838 ) (0.1115515) 
Δ.log GDP per capita -1.830771*** -1.913841** -1.550788* 
 (0.7358606) (0.8521507) (0.8407329) 
Polity IVt-1 -.0509492*** -0.1031674*** -0.1329156*** 
 (0.0065885) (0.0124677) (0.0137859) 
Log military burdent-1 -0.0396526 -0.1136064 -0.1195782 
 (0.035852) (0.086592 ) (0.0775714) 
Log GDP per capitat-1 
 
0.1436725*** 0.3709243** -0.2596793 
(0.0316583) (0.1713859 ) (0.1748132) 
Constant -0.8423177*** -2.398595* 1.705422 
 (0.2437426) (1.263288 ) (1.393555) 
Fixed effects no yes yes 
Year dummies no no yes 
Obs 3369 3369 3369 
Groups n/a 101 101 
R² within  0.0538 0.0952 
R² between  0 0.0722 
R² overall 0.0302 0.0273 0.0246 
robust standard errors in (), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 4.6 summarises these results. The short run effects are captured by the first differenced 
variables. In the short run, both the log of military burden and the log of GDP per capita have 
significant negative effects on Polity IV in all models.  In the one-way fixed effects model, a 
10% increase in the change in military burden is associated with a 0.034 unit decrease in Polity 
IV. The short run effect is smaller than the effect in the static model. This is not surprising, as 
both democracy and military spending are variables that experience a considerable amount of 
inertia. 
 
Interestingly, the effect of GDP per capita is negative in the short run throughout all 
specifications (whereas without the inclusion of dynamics it switches signs – see above). This 
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result suggests that in the short-run, growth might help sustain a dictator – a finding that is in 
keeping with Triesman’s (2011) paper. 
 
The speed of adjustment and long-run coefficients are calculated in table 4.7. In the one-way 
fixed effects model, the long-run effect of military expenditure on democracy is -1.1008 (θ1=-
0.1136/0.1032). As might be expected, military expenditure has a substantially bigger effect on 
democracy when observed over a longer horizon. The long run effect of GDP per capita on 
democracy is 3.594 (θ2=0.3709/0.1032). It would appear that the modernisation hypothesis 
only holds in the long-run, whereas the immediate effect of an increase in GDP per capita, as 
mentioned above, is to decrease democracy. Again, this result is in keeping with Triesman’s 
(2011) argument that in the short run growth boosts the incumbent’s popularity. Finally, the 
speed of adjustment tells us that democracy converges to its equilibrium level at a rate of 
10.32% per year. 
 
Table 4-7 Speed of Adjustment and long-run coefficients of the ECM 
 Pooled OLS One-way Fixed Effects Two-way Fixed Effects 
Speed of Adjustment (λ) 0.0509 0.1032 0.1329 
Long-run effect of burden (θ1) -0.778 -1.1007 -0.8999 
Long-run effect of GDP pc (θ2) 2.8232 3.594 -1.9541 
 
 
 
4.5.2 Political Regime Change 
 
Following Epstein et al (2006), I employ what they refer to as a Markov setup24 to estimate the 
probability of moving from one regime type to another in a single period, given certain 
characteristics, i.e. military burden and GDP per capita, present in that period.  
 
                                        (4.5) 
 
where a and b are possible regime types and F(.) is a function from the [0,1] interval, such as 
the logit or probit. 
                                                          
24
 Note that this is different from a Markov switching model. A Markov switching model means that the 
present can be explained entirely by the previous period. Epstein et al (2006) do not necessarily assume 
this. 
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Using an ordered probit, I estimate the following equation: 
 
             
 
   
       
 
                                  
 
   
                  
 
                                
 
   
               
 
        
           (4.6) 
  
where PRC=0,1,2 for autocracy, partial democracy and democracy, respectively. PRC0* and 
PRC1* are defined as set out in table 4.8: PRC0* equals 1 when a regime is an autocracy and 0 
otherwise, thus capturing all fully autocratic regimes. PRC1* equals 1 when a country is either 
an autocracy or a semi-democracy, thus capturing all non-democracies. Defining PRC0* and 
PRC1* and interacting them with the explanatory variables, makes it possible to test whether 
the effect of the explanatory variables on democracy depends on whether the country was 
initially an autocracy, semi-democracy or democracy. If, for example, the interaction between 
PRC0* and military burden is significant, this means that military burden has a different effect 
on the level of democracy if the regime is autocratic in the previous period, as opposed to 
partially or fully democratic.  
 
Table 4-8 Definition of dummy variables for ordered probit estimation 
 Autocracy Semi-democracy Democracy 
PRC0* 1 0 0 
PRC1* 1 1 0 
 
 
I initially test all interaction terms, and then test down to a more specific model. Table 4.9 
summarises the results. In an ordered probit, care is required when interpreting the 
coefficients. According to Greene (2012, p. 830), “without a fair amount of extra calculation, it 
is quite unclear how the coefficients in the ordered probit model should be interpreted”. 
However, it is possible to comment on the sign of the coefficients. The coefficient on PRC0*t-1 
is negative. If a country switched from semi-democratic or democratic to autocratic at time t-1, 
the effect on PRC at time t is to decrease it. This implies that if a country was autocratic at time 
t-1, it is likely to be autocratic at time t. The coefficient on PRC1*t-1, on the other hand, is 
positive. A possible interpretation is that semi-democracies are subject to less inertia. A semi-
democracy at time t-1 has a greater chance being democratic at time t that a full autocracy. 
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The effect of military burden on regime type in autocracies vs. semi-democracies can be 
calculated by adding the coefficients on log military burdent-1 and the appropriate interaction 
Table 4-9 Estimation results: ordered probit 
Dependent variable is PRC (1) (2) 
PRC0*t-1 -2.271157*** -2.2356*** 
 (0.4596298) (0.0812) 
PRC1*t-1 1.178199** 1.1495** 
 (0.5685541) (0.5099) 
Log military burdent-1 
 
0.0875135 0.0875 
(0.0816755) (0.0817) 
Log military burdent-1 *PRC0*t-1 
 
-0.0687499  
(0.0634705)  
Log military burdent-1 *PRC1*t-1 
 
-0.1092603 -0.152* 
(0.0957813) (0.0874) 
Log GDP  
per capitat-1 
0.5317526*** 0.5318*** 
(0.0653119) (0.0653) 
Log GDP  
per capita t-1*PRC0*t-1 
0.0175953  
(0.0655847)  
Log GDP  
per capitat-1*PRC1*t-1 
-0.4945226*** -0.4831*** 
(0.0814674) (0.0729) 
Cut1 0.7629806 0.7625 
 (0.4530765) (0.4531) 
Cut2 2.20789 2.2083 
  (0.4524896) (0.4525) 
Obs 3376 3376 
cluster-robust standard errors in (),*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
terms (see table 4.10 for calculations). For autocracies the effect of military burden on regime 
type is negative. In autocracies, an increase in military burden decreases the probability of 
democracy. The effect for semi-democracies is also negative. If these coefficients were 
significant, one might be able to interpret this as evidence the military political power 
entrenches autocracy. However, they are not. Nevertheless, in the parsimonious model, the 
interaction between log military burdent-1 and PRC1*t-1 is significant. This implies that military 
burden does have a different effect on the level of democracy if the regime was autocratic or 
semi-democratic in the previous year, as opposed to fully democratic. 
 
The effect of GDP per capita can be calculated in a similar way: In autocracies, the effect of 
GDP per capita on regime type in positive (0.53+0.02-0.49=0.06). In semi-democracies the 
effect is also positive (0.53-0.49=0.04). These results might suggest that and increase in GDP 
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has a democratising effect. Interestingly the effect of GDP per capita on regime type appears 
to non-monotonic and U-shaped: As a country moves from autocracy to semi-democracy, 
regime type is decreasing with GDP per capita (0.06>0.04), but as it moves to semi-democracy 
Table 4-10 The effect of military burden on regime type in autocracies, semi-democracies and democracies 
Variable Coefficient 
Log military burden(t-1) 0.0875 
Log military burden(t-1)*PRCO*(t-1) -0.0687 
Log military burden(t-1)*PRC1*(t-1) -0.1092 
Regime Type Calculation of Effect 
Autocracy 0.09-0.07-0.11=-0.09 
Semi-democracy 0.09-0.11=-0.02 
 
 
to democracy, regime type is increasing in GDP per capita (0.04<0.53). This result suggests that 
an increase in GDP per capita encourages the formation/consolidation of both autocracies and 
democracies. Finally, the fact that the interaction between log GDP per capitat-1 and PRC1*t-1 is 
significant implies that GDP per capita has a different effect on the level of democracy if the 
regime was autocratic or semi-democratic in the previous year, as opposed to fully democratic. 
 
 
4.5.3 International Country Risk Guide 
 
I have acknowledged that military burden is a problematic proxy for military power. 
Unfortunately, there are few plausible alternatives. Options that were considered for this 
thesis include number of soldiers as a percentage of total population and military expenditure 
per soldier. Soldiers as a percentage of total population tells us what proportion of the country 
is employed by the military and may be indicative of the level of support the military might 
enjoy, as well as the degree of militarisation in a country. The World Bank World Development 
Indicators supply data on armed forces personnel as a percentage of the total labour force; 
however coverage is extremely limited, with data generally only available from 1990 onwards 
and entirely missing for numerous countries.  
 
Military expenditure per soldier might capture to some degree the idea of the so-called 
“efficiency wage”. If spending per soldier is above a certain level, soldiers are likely to prefer 
the status quo over democratisation. Data on military spending per soldier is not readily 
available, but might be back out of available date on military spending, armed forces personnel 
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as a percentage of the total labour force and total population. However, as mention about, 
data on armed forces personnel as a percentage of the total labour force is limited. In addition, 
backing out data on expenditure per soldier in this way obscures important differences across 
countries regarding capital-labour substitution: simply dividing military spending by number of 
soldiers does not give an accurate account of whether soldiers are being paid an efficiency 
wage, as a large proportion of military expenditure may go to arms purchases, which soldiers 
may care less about.   
 
A more plausible alternative is the International Country Risk Guide’s Political Risk Rating, 
which includes a measure of military involvement in politics (henceforth referred to as ICRG), 
which is available from 1984 onwards. Initially, I examine the relationship between ICRG and 
military burden, by regressing 
 
                                   (4.7) 
 
Note that a lower ICRG score indicates more military involvement in politics, whereas a higher 
military burden suggests more political power. One would therefore expect the coefficient on 
log burden to have a negative sign if these two proxies are closely related. Table 4.11 outlines 
these results. The coefficient on log burden does in fact have a negative sign, but is only 
significant in the one-way fixed effects model. This result suggests that while military burden 
is, as was suspected, a weak proxy for military political power, its effect runs in the expected 
direction. 
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Table 4-11 Estimation results: relationship between ICRG and military burden 
Dependent variable  
is ICRG 
(1) (2) 
One-way Fixed Effects Two-way Fixed Effects 
Log Burden -0.168** -0.083 
 
(0.085)  (0.09) 
Constant 3.839*** 3.780*** 
 
(0.101)  (0.109) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes 
Time effects No Yes 
Obs 1424 1424 
Groups 93 93 
R² within 0.0111 0.048 
R² between 0.0001 0.0014 
R² overall 0.0002 0.0047 
AIC 3269.181 3244.873 
cluster-robust standard errors in (); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4-12 Estimation results: static model using ICRG as proxy for military political power 
Dependent variable  
is Polity IV 
(1) (2) (3) 
Pooled OLS 
One-way  
Fixed Effects 
Two-way  
Fixed Effects 
ICRGt-1 0.749** 0.872*** 0.422 
 
(0.310) (0.319) (0.274) 
Log GDP pct-1 2.052*** -1.552 -3.970** 
 
(0.367) (1.135) (1.586) 
Constant -15.123*** 12.009 33.784*** 
 
(2.106) (8.799) (12.259) 
Fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Time effects No No Yes 
Obs 1355 1355 1355 
Groups N/A 93 93 
R² within N/A 0.0316 0.2491 
R² between N/A 0.2444 0.4007 
R² overall 0.3511 0.1682 0.2426 
AIC 8551.274 6931.127 6614.453 
cluster-robust standard errors in (); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Next I re-run models (1) - (3) on the period 1984-2000, replacing military burden with ICRG. 
Again note that a lower ICRG score indicates more military involvement in politics, so based on 
my hypothesis one would expect a positive relationship between ICRG and democracy. Table 
4.12 summarises these results. The results appear to confirm out hypothesis: In the one-way 
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fixed model, the effect of ICRG is positive and significant. A one unit increase in ICRG is 
associated with a 0.872 unit increase in Polity IV. 
 
Finally, I re-run models (1) – (3), using both military burden and ICRG as explanatory variables. 
Table 4.13 summarizes the results. Both measures take on the appropriate sign and are 
significant in the one-way fixed effects model. Interestingly, military burden is also significant 
in the two-way fixed effects model, while in the previous estimations, using only military 
burden and not ICRG, it was not. Moreover, the size of the coefficients for military burden 
more than double in size. A 10% increase in military burden is now associated with a 0.1517 
decrease in Polity IV (compared with a 0.087 decrease – see table 4.13). This may be explained 
by the fact that military burden measures more than one dimension of military power: it not 
only measures political power, but also military capability. 
 
Table 4-13 Estimation results: static model using both military burden and ICRG as proxy for military political 
power 
Dependent variable  
is PRC 
(1) (2) (3) 
Pooled OLS 
One-way  
Fixed Effects 
Two-way  
Fixed Effects 
Log Burdent-1 -0.969* -1.517*** -0.774* 
 
(0.526)   (0.518) (0.401) 
ICRGt-1 0.582* 0.665** 0.396 
 
(0.315) (0.323) (0.278) 
Log GDP pct-1 2.127*** -1.968 -4.000*** 
 
(0.373) (1.318) (1.338) 
Constant -14.326*** 17.267* 34.863*** 
 
(2.380) (10.377) (10.492) 
Fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Time effects No No Yes 
Obs 1325 1325 1325 
Groups N/A 93 93 
R² within 
 
0.0838 0.2631 
R² between 0.1697 0.372 
R² overall 0.3748 0.1097 0.2247 
AIC 8318.191 6728.867 6468.321 
cluster-robust standard errors in (); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter investigated the role of the military in democratisation. It tested empirically the 
hypothesis, first put forward by Acemoglu et al (2010) that countries in which the military was 
politically powerful before democratic transition occurred are less likely to consolidate 
democracy. This analysis represents one of the first empirical applications of Acemoglu et al.’s 
(2008) theory of military dictatorships.  
 
One of the reasons why this topic remains largely under-investigated in the economic 
literature may be the lack of data for measuring military political power. In this chapter, I 
proxied military political power with military burden. In addition, I used the International 
Country Risk Guide’s measure of military involvement in politics, which, on the one hand, is a 
closer proxy for military political power, but, on the other hand, is a shorter dataset. I found 
evidence that a politically powerful military is detrimental for democracy: both a higher 
military burden and a higher level of military political involvement (as indicated by a lower 
ICRG score) are negatively associated with democracy.  
 
The inclusion of time effects often reduces the significance of the explanatory variables. 
However, using two measures of military political power and two measures of democracy, I get 
results consistent with the idea that increased military political power tends to inhibit 
democratisation. 
 
It must be noted, however, that these results must be interpreted with caution, as they are 
subject to a number of empirical problems. Firstly, there may be a problem of reverse causality 
between democracy and military burden: the literature on the determinants of military burden 
suggests that democracy is a determinant of military spending. This implies a potential 
endogeneity problem, resulting in biased coefficients. In this chapter, military burden was 
treated as pre-determined. I link my investigation to the modernisation literature, which 
encounters a similar endogeneity problem. In the next chapter, I shall investigate this issue of 
reverse causality in more depth. Finally, my estimations are limited to standard panel data 
techniques. An interesting expansion of this analysis may be the estimation of a duration 
model. 
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4.7 Appendix to Chapter 4 
4.7.1 Figures and Tables 
 
Table 4-A1 Summary statistics for regression variables 
 
 
4.8 List of Countries Included in Sample 
 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burki Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Rep., Chad, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, Cuba, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Rep., 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Kenya, Korea, South, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia 
Turkey, UK, USA, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
  
Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Polity IV overall N=3888 0.125257 7.566292 -10 10 
 
between n=102 
 
6.355135 
  
 
within T=38.1176 
 
4.093274 
  
PRC overall N=3875 0.8237419 0.9294438 1 2 
 
between n=102 
 
0.7539691 
  
 
within T=37.9902 
 
0.5423517 
  
Log military burden 
Mixed 
 
overall N=3502 1.248215 1.088681 -6.28815 4.940395 
between n=102 
 
0.986025 
  
within T=34.3333 
 
0.56847 
  
Log military burden 
SIPRI 
 
overall N=965 1.151661 1.009376 -6.28815 3.533662 
between n=96 
 
0.969989 
  
within T=10.0521 
 
0.252934 
  
Log military burden 
COW 
 
overall N=3488 1.233788 1.09539 -6.23354 4.940395 
between n=101 
 
0.980626 
  
within T=34.5347 
 
0.57096 
  
Log GDP per capita 
 
 
overall N=3640 7.331062 1.621833 -3.8512 10.51303 
between n=102 
 
1.563136 
  
within T=35.6863  0.431076 
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5 Military Spending and Democracy 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The 1990s saw the spread of democracy to many countries, particularly in the former 
Communist bloc, but also throughout the rest of the developing world. It brought with it an 
easing of tension in international relations and ended history’s greatest arms race. It has been 
argued in the political science literature that democratic rule has a demilitarising effect. This 
idea dates back to the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1795, p. 94), who argued in his essay 
Perpetual Peace that “standing armies (miles perpetuus) shall be abolished in course of time", 
as countries increasingly embrace the ideas of liberalism.  
 
This implies that democracies should spend less on the military than autocracies do. The 
objective of this paper is to examine this hypothesis. I model my investigation on the empirical 
literature on the demand for military expenditure. While papers in this genre generally include 
democracy as a control variable, with a few exceptions, it is not the focus of their enquiry. 
Hence, problems in empirically assessing the effect of democracy on military expenditures 
have been overlooked. In particular, problems concerning data quality and the appropriate 
measurement of the key variables, as well as the question of causality have not been 
addressed systematically.  
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This paper investigates empirically whether democracies have lower military expenditures 
than autocracies. It employs an unbalanced panel of 112 countries over the period 1960-2000 
to estimate a standard demand for military spending, controlling for a number of economic 
and strategic variables including democracy, which is examined in depth. In particular, it 
attempts to address the above mentioned problems in the existing literature. This chapter is 
structures as follow. First, I introduce the theoretical reasons for expecting democracies to 
allocate fewer resources to the military than autocracies. Subsequently, I review the literature 
on the demand for military spending, focusing in particular on findings regarding the effect of 
democracy. Next, I briefly introduce the data and methodology employed in this chapter, 
before turning to the empirical results.  
 
Initially, I estimate a standard demand for military expenditure model to capture the effect of 
democracy. However, as was shown in chapter 4, there are reasons to believe that causality 
between military spending and democracy may run the other way. Thus, I also estimate a 2SLS 
model and follow up with a Granger causality test. Finally, I explore whether there are 
structural differences in the standard determinants of military expenditure across autocracies 
and democracies. 
 
 
5.2 Theory 
 
There are several reasons why one might expect democracies to spend less on the military 
than autocracies. One line of reasoning suggests that democratic leaders are accountable to 
the broader public which tends to prioritize social spending over spending on the military. 
Rosh (1988, pp. 676-681) argues that this is because “the degree of openness of the political 
process with regard to debates on resource extraction and allocations serves to limit both the 
public economy and the military burden of a given state”.  He hypothesizes that “the greater 
the extent a country is governed by the rule of law, where decisions as to allocations are 
debated openly by elected representatives and alternative priorities are able to compete in 
this open arena, the smaller may be a state's military burden”. Hewitt (1992, p. 131) also 
argues that “the policies of democracies are closer to the desires of the public, in which case 
the higher military spending in countries dominated by other forms of government would 
reflect a greater preference for military expenditure by the leadership relative to the 
population”.  
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Nordhaus, Russet and Oneal (2012, p. 498) restate this argument: “Autocrats are able to 
extract private goods from rents associated with a successful use of military force 
internationally and impose much of the cost of fighting, and the price of any failures, on the 
general population”. Kimenyi and Mbaku (1995) make a similar argument: in dictatorships, 
competition for rents is dominated by groups who have a comparative advantage in violence, 
whereas in democracies, where rent-seeking by the military is confined to political lobbying, 
military expenditures will be lower.  
 
Another reason why democracies might be expected to have lower military spending is that 
they are less likely to go to war. The so-called “Democratic Peace Theory”, dating back to the 
Philosopher Immanuel Kant (1795), argues that democracies do not go to war with other 
democracies (see also, Doyle, 1986; Russet, 1993). In addition, scholars have presented 
evidence that democratic leaders are more risk-averse towards war in general than dictators 
are. Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith (1999) argue that because they risk 
being voted out of office if they lose, democratic leaders are more careful to enter a war. 
Jackson and Morelli (2007, p 1354) suggest that while in democracies leaders face the same 
costs and benefits from war as the average citizen does, dictators gain disproportionately 
more from war. They reason that “in an authoritarian regime, it may be that a leader can keep 
a disproportionate share of the gains from a war. It may also be that the leader sees other 
gains from war, in personal recognition or power”. Dictatorships’ higher propensity for war will 
be reflected in their higher defence budgets.  
 
Finally, military spending may be higher in dictatorships because the dictators often lack 
popular legitimacy and rely instead (at least in part) on the military to maintain power. Not 
only are autocracies more likely to experience violent uprising, they are also more incline than 
democracies to meet it with large-scale force (see, for example, Goldsmith, 2003). However, 
Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010, p. 2) argue that a powerful military is a “double edged 
sword”. On the one hand, a more powerful military is more effective in putting down uprisings. 
On the other hand, a more powerful military is better positioned to orchestrate a military 
coup.  Thus, to ensure its loyalty, a dictator must make greater concessions to the military, 
which will be reflected in a higher defence budget. 
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5.3 Literature Review 
 
The research on the determinants of military expenditure is substantial, dating back to before 
the 1980s. While a number of studies consider the effect of regime type, barring a few 
exceptions, this has not been the focus. Moreover, with the development of more 
sophisticated econometric techniques and availability of more reliable data, many studies are 
now outdated. In this section, I review some of the more recent papers. 
 
Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003) investigate the demand for military spending in developing 
countries using a panel of 98 countries from 1981 to 1997. While regime type is not the focus 
of this study, they do control for the effect of democracy using the POLITY98 index. Estimating 
a static fixed effects model, the authors find that a small, negative, significant effect of 
democracy on military burden. Using a dynamic panel, however, they find that democracy is 
insignificant. Similarly, Goldsmith (2003) investigates the determinant of military spending, but 
studies a wider sample: he assembles “an extensive dataset, covering all states in the 
international system (as listed by COW) for just over a century, from 1886-1989” (Goldsmith 
2003, p. 560). He finds that regime type has a significant negative effect on the defense 
burden. This result is robust across all models (including fixed effects). Collier and Hoeffler 
(2007) focus on the effect of arms races on military spending. Nevertheless, they also find that 
democracy, as measured by the Polity III index, has a significant negative effect on military 
spending. Using global data for the period 1960–99, they find that “a dictatorial society will 
spend 2% of GDP more on the military, controlling for other characteristics, than a fully 
democratic society” (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, p. 10). Most recently, Nordhaus, Oneal, and 
Russett (2012), in considering the effects of the international security environment on national 
military expenditures, find a small, negative semi-elasticity of military expenditures with 
respect to democracy. “These results were less robust than [their] estimates of the impact of 
the threat environment, but they indicate clearly that democracies spend substantially less on 
the military than do autocracies” (Nordhaus, et al 2012, p. 505). 
 
To the best of my knowledge, only a handful of studies focus explicitly on the effect of 
democracy on military expenditure. Yildrim and Sezgin (2005) use a panel of 92 countries for 
the period 1987 – 1997 and find that in a random effects model an increase in democracy 
decreases military. However, once fixed effects are included, the effect of democracy is no 
longer significant. Fordham and Walker (2005) use data “a wide a range of states since 1816” 
Jennifer Brauner 2014 
 
100 
 
(Fordham and Walker 2005, p. 141) and find support for the liberal argument that democracy 
has a demilitarizing effect. 
 
Moreover, the paper by Kimenyi and Mbaku (1995) is the only paper that accounts for the 
possibility of reverse causality between military expenditure and democracy. Focusing on a 
cross-section of 87 developing countries in the year 1980 and using an instrumental variable 
approach, they find a negative relationship between military expenditures as a percentage of 
government expenditure and Bollen’s Political Democracy Index.  
 
Beyond the determinants of military expenditure literature, other scholars have studied 
military expenditure and democracy. Lebovic (2001) studying Latin America over the period 
1974-1995, examines whether democracy shifts budget priorities from military spending to 
civilian spending.  However, his dependent variable is change in budget shares rather than 
military expenditure itself. Nevertheless, he finds evidence that “democratization can bring 
changes in national priorities” (Lebovic 2001, p. 450). Garfinkel (1994) models military 
spending under electoral uncertainty associated with political competition, and finds that 
democratic governments are biased against military spending. This, she argues, has the effect 
of reducing arms races and, ultimately, the severity of conflict. 
 
The above review of the literature evidences that democracy appears to have a negative effect 
on military spending. This chapter attempts to update and expand, as well as address a 
number of shortcomings in these studies. Firstly, the quality of the military expenditure data in 
some of the above studies is questionable. Currently, the most comprehensive data on military 
expenditure publicly available is that published by SIPRI. However, as explained in chapter 3, 
SIPRI itself states that the data found in yearbooks prior to 1988 should not be used. While 
some studies (for example, Collier and Hoeffler, 2007) simply ignore this advice, other studies 
avoid this problem by focusing their analysis on the period after 1988 (for example, Dunne and 
Perlo-Freeman, 2003). Doing so disregards information prior to 1988. Studies focusing on 
longer time spans tend to employ COW data, which is generally considered less reliable. 
Clearly there is a trade-off between quality of data and richness of analysis that comes from 
studying a longer time-period. Nordhaus et al (2012) suggest that the most reasonable 
approach is to focus on the period 1960 to present and combine COW data with SIPRI data. 
The present analysis follows the example set by these authors.  
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Secondly, largely because the effect of regime type was not the primary focus of the majority 
of the studies review above, the question of how democracy is best measured is not addressed 
in this literature. As discussed at length in chapter 3, the choice of measure is important. 
Moreover, the Freedom House and Polity indices, which have been the preferred measures in 
this literature, have been widely criticized (see, for example, Gleditsch and Ward 1997; 
Cheibub, Gandhi and Veerland 2010). In this chapter, I address the question of choice of 
measure by using two types of measures: a discrete ordinal variable (Polity IV) and a 
categorical measure (PRC). 
 
Finally, as mentioned above, with the exception of Kimenyi and Mbaku (1995), none consider 
the possibility of reverse causality. The reasons for suspecting that military expenditures may, 
in fact, be influencing democracy have been extensively described in the previous chapter. To 
summarize, military spending may reflect the degree of political power of the military, and a 
politically powerful military may, in turn, hinder the transition to and consolidation of 
democracy.  Kimenyi and Mbaku’s investigation is limited to cross-sectional study of the year 
1980, and can thus hardly be considered definitive. This chapter investigates this issue in more 
depth. 
 
 
5.4 Data and Methodology 
 
5.4.1 Data 
 
This chapter uses a panel of up to 112 countries over the period 1960-2000. Data on military 
spending is combined from the Correlates of War (COW) National Material Capabilities 
database and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) military expenditure 
database. Following Nordhaus, Oneal and Russet (2012), I use COW data from 1960 to 1987 
and SIPRI data from 1988 to 2000. I control for differences in the datasets with a dummy that 
equals one when the data source is SIRPI. I also run separate regression using only COW data 
(covering the period 1960 to 2000) and only SIPRI data (covering the 1988 to 2000). I transform 
all data into percentages of GDP using GDP figures (in constant 2000 USD) from the World 
Bank World Development Indicators to get a measure of military burden. 
 
I use two measures of democracy: Marshall and Jaggers (2002) Polity IV and Reich’s (2002) 
dataset of political regime change (PRC). As described in the chapter 2, Polity IV is a discrete 
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ordinal variable which ranks countries on a scale from -10 to +10, with higher values indicating 
more democracy. PRC is a categorical measure, which groups countries into autocracies 
(PRC=0), semi-democracies (PRC=1) and democracies (PRC=2). 
 
Dummy variables on wars - internal and external - are from the Correlates of War Project. Data 
on GDP per capita (in constant 2000 USD) and total population are taken from the World Bank 
World Development Indicators; and data on openness, defined as exports plus imports divided 
by GDP (in 2005 constant US Dollars) are from the Penn World Table.  
 
I transform military burden, GDP per capita, population, and openness into logs to scale down 
the variance and reduce the effect of outliers. Table 5.A1 in the appendix outlines the 
summary statistics for all variables. 
 
 
5.4.2 Methodology 
 
I estimated a standard demand for military expenditure model (see for example Dunne and 
Perlo-Freeman, 2003). I regress the log of military burden on democracy (Polity IV or Reich), 
intrastate war, interstate war, log GDP per capita, log population and log openness.  
 
                                                                
                                                    
(5.1) 
 
Internal and external wars pick up immediate threats. A country engaged in war will not only 
give greater priority to military spending as a matter of urgency, but will also need to restock 
arms and ammunition used in fighting (see, for example, Hewitt, 1992). 
 
GDP per capita is a measure of wealth, while population is a measure of size. While the former 
is expected to have a positive effect on military spending, the literature is divided on what 
effect the latter should have. While Kimenyi and Mbaku (1995) argue that larger countries 
require bigger defence forces, and Hewitt (1992) maintains that larger countries tend to be 
major regional or global military powers, Dunne and Perlo-Freeman (2003, p. 468) contend 
that “a large population is considered to offer some autonomous security in itself”. Moreover, 
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countries with large populations may be more likely to rely on manpower, while small 
countries turn instead to high-tech weaponry, which is relatively more expensive.  
 
Openness is a proxy for economic integration. The rationale behind the inclusion of this 
variable is that the more open a country is, the more peaceful will be its relationships with 
other countries, and therefore the less need it has for defence spending. However, the 
opposite has been argued for developing countries: the level of economic integration may, in 
fact, be a source of discontent, as dependence on the world market renders their economies 
more vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices. In addition, the benefits of trade only accrue 
to certain groups (i.e. the elites). In anticipation of resulting internal dissent developing 
countries may become more militarized with increasing openness (Rosh, 1988). It is worth 
pointing out that while it could be argued that the fact that arms trade is included by definition 
in total trade could lead to problems of simultaneity, it makes up such a small proportion of 
that this is unlikely to pose a problem. 
 
It is worth noting that the model was chosen in this particular form for its ease of interpreting 
the coefficients. It is also possible to reparameterise the model to express it in terms of 
absolute military expenditure. Let m be log military expenditure, y be log GDP and p be log 
population. Then equation 1 one can be written as 
 
                           (5.2) 
 
and reparameterised as  
 
                             (5.3) 
 
The baseline model is a one-way fixed effects model estimated with the combined data from 
SIPRI and COW. I include a dummy in this regression to control for any differences between 
the two data sets. In addition, I control for time effects in a two-way fixed effects model. As 
mentioned above, I also run separate regressions on the SIPRI and COW datasets alone as 
additional robustness checks. I control for group-wise serial correlation and 
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heteroscedasticity25 by reporting robust standard errors. I run two sets of regressions, first 
using Polity IV and second PRC as the measure of democracy. 
 
It is also worth pointing out that in spite of it being a prevalent methodology in the 
international relations and international political economy literature, I do not do a dynamic 
panel analysis. In the demand for military expenditure literature, one might argue in favour of 
the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable to measure, for example, budgetary inertia. 
Whitten and Williams (2001) use dynamic panel analysis to measure the effect of government 
ideology on military spending, while Lake (2007) estimates the influence of a dominant state 
on the military burdens of subordinate state. However, as discussed extensively in the 
introduction to this thesis, dynamic panel models problematic. Gaibulloev et al. (2014) argue 
that dynamic panel estimates suffer from inconsistency and invalid statistical inference. 
Inconsistency is caused by Nickell bias, which occurs in fixed-effects estimation with N>T 
(which is the case in this chapter and others). In addition, another source of inconsistency is 
cross-sectional dependence, which occurs because countries respond to similar political, 
economic and geographical factors. For example, countries may respond to similar security 
threats, an important determinant of military expenditure. The problem of cross-sectional 
dependence shall be discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Gaibulloev et al. demonstrate that 
once these problems are corrected for, relationships between variables (they use the example 
of terrorism and economic growth) disappear. Finally, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
Gundlach and Paldam (2012) argue that including a lagged dependent variable in addition to 
country and time fixed effects strips out too much variation in the data. 
 
 
5.5 Results 
 
5.5.1 Polity IV 
 
Table 5.1 summarizes the results for regressions using Polity IV as the measure of democracy. 
Polity IV is significant and negatively correlated with military burden throughout all 
regressions, with the exception of regression 4, the two-way fixed effects model using SIPRI 
                                                          
25
 The presence of serial correlation is likely because the model under consideration is static. The 
presence of heteroscedasticity can be explained by the fact that the variability of military expenditures 
differs between countries. 
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data only. In the baseline model, a one unit increase in Polity IV leads to a 2%26 decrease in 
military burden. The transformation of an absolute dictatorship into a perfect democracy 
results in a 40%27 decrease in military burden.  
 
Intrastate war has a positive effect on military burden, which is significant in both the mixed  
 
5-1 Estimation results: FE using Polity IV as measure of democracy 
 
Regression/Estimation Method 
Dependent  
variable is log 
military burden 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
One-way  
Fixed Effects 
Two-way  
Fixed Effects 
One-way  
Fixed Effects 
Two-way  
Fixed Effects 
One-way  
Fixed Effects 
Two-way  
Fixed Effects 
Mixed sources Mixed Sources SIPRI SIPRI COW COW 
Polity IV -0.02*** -0.015** -0.012* -0.010 -0.029*** -0.017*** 
 
(-0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Interstate war 
0.15 0.165 0.059 0.044 0.122 0.143 
(0.113) (0.112) (0.068) (0.070) (0.124) (0.115) 
Intrastate war 
0.486*** 0.373*** 0.094 0.093 0.532*** 0.405*** 
(0.096) (0.083) (0.081) (0.084) (0.094) (0.082) 
Log GDP pc -0.164 -0.464* -0.518** -0.393 -0.241 -0.429* 
 
(0.235) (0.253) (0.246) (0.262) (0.214) (0.239) 
Log population 
0.346*** -0.373 -0.415 0.135 0.129 -0.088 
(0.13) (0.240) (0.310) (0.526) (0.124) (0.241) 
Log Openness 
0.360*** 0.235** -0.031 0.034 0.183 0.165 
(0.112) (0.107) (0.139) (0.155) (0.111) (0.110) 
Source -0.294*** 0.0219 - - - - 
 
-0.078 (.1363) - - - - 
Constant -4.468** 8.961* 11.981*** 1.847 0.182 4.523 
 
(2.154) (4.94) (4.293) (8.858) (1.848) (4.842) 
Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 3891 3891 1248 1248 3874 3874 
Groups 112 112 107 107 111 111 
R-Sq within 0.1117 0.2108 0.119 0.1459 0.0918 0.2144 
R-Sq btw 0.049 0.0023 0.0055 0.0067 0.062 0.0235 
R-Sq overall 0.0654 0.0078 0.004 0.0078 0.0732 0.0432 
AIC 6309.724 5929.125 126.257 111.605 6494.388 6012.679 
RMSE 0.535 0.515 0.23 0.251 0.535 0.523 
Notes: Robust standard errors in ();*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                          
26
 Treating Polity IV as a continuous regressor, the interpretation of its coefficient, b, is that it is the 
partial derivative of ln(Y) with respect to X. So, 100*b (or 100*(-0.02)=-2) is the percentage change in Y 
for a 1 unit change in X, other things held equal. 
27 A transformation of an absolute dictatorship into a perfect democracy is represented by a change in 
Polity IV from -10 to 10, or a 20 unit increase. The effect of Polity IV on the log of military burden is thus 
calculated by multiplying the effect of a one unit increase (as shown in footnote 26) by 20. 
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sources and COW only regressions. In the baseline model, the presence of intrastate war raises 
the military burden of a country by a 62.58 %28 . The lack of significance in the SIPRI only 
regressions is likely due to the shorter time period under study, a time period during which 
there were substantially fewer intrastate wars29. Interstate war, on the other hand, though 
positive, is insignificant. This is likely to be the case because interstate wars are less prevalent 
in the dataset. Whereas there we 400 instances (country-years) of intrastate war between 
1960 and 2000, there were only 96 instances of interstate war.   
 
Log GDP per capita is consistently negative, but significant only in regressions 2, 3 and 6. Log 
population switches signs. This could be explained by population picking up trends in the one-
way fixed effects model that are captured by the time fixed effects in the two-way fixed effects 
model.  Moreover, this variable is insignificant (with the exception of regression 1). Trade 
appears to have a positive impact on military burden and is significant in the mixed sources 
regressions. However, in the SIPRI only and COW only regressions the significance disappears. 
This may be due to the problem of simultaneity, which, as mentioned above, is the result of 
the definition of data on imports and exports including arms trade. 
 
Generally, the presence of year dummies does not change the results beyond a loss in 
statistical precision. However, in the mixed sources regressions some problems do appear: in 
addition to log population changing sign, the sign and size of the source dummy and the 
constant change too. Again this might be explained by trends, which are otherwise captured 
by the time fixed effects, being captured by the source dummy in the one-way fixed effects 
model. In particular, because the source dummy equals one when the data sources is SIPRI, 
and SIPRI data roughly corresponds with the post-Cold War period (1988-2000), it may be 
picking up post-Cold War effects. 
 
 
5.5.2 Political Regime Change 
 
Table 5.2 summarizes the results for regressions using Political Regime Change as the measure 
of democracy. The results are comparable in sign, size and significance to the results with 
Polity IV. PRC is significant and negatively correlated with military burden throughout all  
                                                          
28
 If the intrastate war dummy switches from 0 to 1, the % impact of intrastate war on military burden is 
100[exp(0.486) – 1]=62.58. 
29
 Between 1960 and 1988 the COW dataset contains 296 country years of war, whereas between 1988 
and 2000, in contains 104. 
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5-2 Estimation results: FE using PRC as measure of democracy 
  Regression/Estimation Method 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent  
variable is log  
military burden 
 
One-way  
Fixed Effects 
Two-way  
Fixed Effects 
One-way  
Fixed Effects 
Two-way  
Fixed Effects 
One-way  
Fixed Effects 
Two-way  
Fixed Effects 
Mixed sources Mixed Sources SIPRI SIPRI COW COW 
PRC -0.096** -0.074 -0.135*** -0.124*** -0.177*** -0.068 
 
(0.046) (0.051) (0.044) (0.042) (0.047) (0.049) 
Interstate war 
0.134 0.139 0.042 0.039 0.107 0.116 
(0.119) (0.119) (0.061) (0.064) (0.129) (0.121) 
Intrastate war 
0.46*** 0.364*** 0.103 0.108 0.484*** 0.378*** 
(0.096) (0.086) (0.081) (0.084) (0.096) (0.084) 
Log GDP  
per capita 
-0.157 -0.505* -0.428 -0.307 -0.218 -0.486* 
(0.25) (0.265) (0.266) (0.278) (0.223) (0.249) 
Log population 
0.395*** -0.46* -0.58* -0.175 0.138 -0.13 
(0.133) (0.252) (0.364) (0.538) (0.126) (0.262) 
Log openness 
0.389*** 0.247** -0.069 -0.022 0.195 0.172 
(0.114) (0.109) (0.151) (0.172) (0.119) (0.113) 
Source -0.330*** -0.06 - - - - 
 
(0.079) (0.153) - - - - 
Constant -5.504** 10.817** 16.125*** 6.534 0.019 5.592 
 
(2.248) (5.361) (5.188) (9.371) (1.944) (5.435) 
Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 3446 3446 966 966 3433 3433 
Groups 102 102 95 95 101 101 
R-Sq within 0.1154 0.2136 0.1748 0.1926 0.078 0.2086 
R-Sq between 0.0535 0.0018 0.002 0.0036 0.0738 0.0252 
R-Sq overall 0.0707 0.0057 0.0012 0.0027 0.0758 0.0369 
AIC 5477.466 5149.676 -91.143 -90.18 5624.69 5178.471 
RMSE 0.535 0.508 0.23 0.229 0.535 0.511 
Notes: Robust standard errors in ();*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
regressions, with the exception of regressions 2 and 6, the two-way fixed effects models using 
mixed sources and COW data only, respectively. In the baseline model, a change from 
autocracy to semi-democracy, or from semi-democracy to democracy leads to an 
approximately 9%30 decrease in military burden. 
 
 
                                                          
30
 If PRC switches from 0 to 1, the % impact of democracy on military burden is 100[exp(-0.096) – 1]=-
9.15. 
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5.6 Robustness 
 
5.6.1 Causality 
 
In order to address the issue, raised above, of endogeneity or reverse causality of democracy, I 
estimate the model using two-stage least squares estimation (2SLS). Endogeneity biases the 
coefficient estimates. By applying the weak exogeneity assumption, which assumes that 
current and past values of the instruments are uncorrelated with the current period error, one 
can instrument democracy with a lag of itself (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, ch. 22). It is 
reasonable to assume that, in the absence of shocks, the level of democracy last year is 
correlated with the level of democracy this year. Furthermore, it is logical that the military 
burden this year does not affect democracy last year, so that the lagged level of democracy is 
uncorrelated with the error. However, this requires that military burden is not serially 
correlated, which is not likely. Thus, this appropriateness of this instrument should not be 
overstated.  
 
If endogeneity is, indeed, a problem, one should expect the results from the 2SLS regressions 
to differ considerably from the results of the fixed effects model. Table 5.3 compares the 
results from the baseline model to those using 2SLS. The results are, in fact, very similar, 
suggesting that endogeneity is not a problem. 
 
Nevertheless, the results from the 2SLS estimation should not be overstated not only because 
the instrument is not perfect, but also because the model is only just-identified. It is more 
efficient to over-identify the model (Baum 2006, p. 191). Theoretically this could be done by 
including more instruments, particularly those that can be excluded from the right-hand side 
of the equation (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p. 757). Acemoglu et al (2001) use settler 
mortality and Beck and Levine (2000) use legal origin. These instruments have been used in 
cross-section growth studies. However, they do not show the variation over time that 
is required for an instrument in a panel study such as mine.  In addition, one might test 
for endogeneity using a Hausman test. However, this test is likely to have low power as the 
differences between OLS and 2SLS are very small. 
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Table 5-3 Estimation results: comparison of one-way FE and 2SLS using Polity IV or PRC 
 
Regression/Estimation Method 
Dependent  
variable is log  
military burden 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
One-way  
Fixed Effects 
2SLS 
One-way  
Fixed Effects 
2SLS 
Polity IV Polity IV PRC PRC 
Democracy -0.02*** -0.023*** -0.096** -0.145*** 
 
(-0.006) (0.006) (0.046) (0.045) 
Interstate war 0.15 0.134 0.134 0.116 
 
(0.113) (0.113) (0.119) (0.127) 
Intrastate war 0.486*** 0.495*** 0.46*** 0.474*** 
 
(0.096) (0.099) (0.096) (0.098) 
Log GDP  
Per capita 
-0.164 -0.223 -0.157 -0.216 
(0.235) (0.240) (0.25) (0.231) 
Log population 
0.346*** 0.275** 0.395*** 0.325*** 
(0.13) (0.131) (0.133) (0.118) 
Log openness 0.360*** 0.369*** 0.389*** 0.396*** 
 
(0.112) (0.105) (0.114) (0.104) 
Source -0.294*** -0.260*** -0.330*** -0.301*** 
 
-0.078 (0.077) (0.079) (0.070) 
Constant -4.468** -2.929 -5.504** -3.774** 
  (2.154) (2.145) (2.248) (1.806) 
N 3891 3821 3446 3379 
Groups 112 112 102 102 
R-Sq within 0.1117 0.1168 0.1154 0.1196 
R-Sq between 0.049 0.0461 0.0535 0.0498 
R-Sq overall 0.0654 0.0596 0.0707 0.0652 
AIC 6309.724 - 5477.466 - 
RMSE 0.544 - 0.535 - 
Notes: Robust standard errors in ();*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Instead, I test the direction of the relationship by testing for Granger causality (see Granger, 
1969; Greene, 2012, ch. 20). This is done by estimating the equation:  
 
                                                   (5.4) 
 
where ∆ indicates the first difference. The specification is a fixed effects model and 
differencing removes any time trends and reduces serial correlation. X is said to Granger 
‘cause’ y, if, using an F-test, one can reject the hypothesis that the βs are jointly equal to zero. 
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By switching the dependent and independent variables in the above equation one can then 
test whether y also Granger ‘causes’ x. 
 
Table 5.4 summarizes the results from this test using Polity IV as the measure of democracy. In 
the regression with the first difference of military burden as the dependent variable, the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the lags of differenced democracy are jointly insignificant is 
rejected. Democracy can therefore be said to Granger ‘cause’ military burden. In the reversed 
regression, in which the first difference of democracy is the dependent variable, the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the lags of differenced military burden are jointly 
insignificant cannot be rejected. Military burden does not Granger ‘cause’ democracy. These 
results are consistent with those from the panel IV estimation. Therefore, it seems safe to 
conclude that the direction of causality flows from democracy to military burden. 
 
Table 5-4 Granger causality test 
Polity IV→Military burden Military burden → Polity IV 
(F-test)¹ (F-test)² 
3.86* 1.11 
[0.0241] [0.3321] 
P-value in [] 
 
¹ Tests for the joint significance of the differenced lagged values 
of democracy on the first difference of military burden. 
² Tests for the joint significance of the differenced lagged values 
of military burden on the first difference of democracy. 
Null hypothesis: X does NOT Granger cause Y. * indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis. 
 
 
 
5.6.2 Structural Stability Tests 
 
In this section, I test for heterogeneity between the three regime types, democracy, semi-
democracy and autocracy, as well as between COW and SIPRI data sets (which essentially 
equates to the pre- and post-Cold War periods). The objective of such a test is to examine 
whether the standard determinants of military expenditure behave in the same way across 
these sub-groups and pooling is therefore justified.  
 
The test is based on Hsiao (1986)  and is conducted by comparing the BIC of the pooled model 
to a BIC based on the split model. The latter is calculated as follows. Let a, b, c denote three 
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subgroups. The BIC is calculated by running the model on each subgroup, obtaining the log-
likelihoods and substituting them into the following formula: 
 
             
      
      
                            (5.5) 
 
where k is the number of parameters estimated in each regression and n is the total number of 
observations. The model with the best fit is the one with the greatest BIC (Smith 2011).  
 
First, the baseline regression (5.1) is run on the whole sample and the BIC is obtained. 
Secondly, the regression is run on three sub-samples split by regime type, i.e. autocracy, semi-
democracy and democracy, and the BIC are obtained for each regression. The combined BIC is 
then calculated according to the method set out above. Thirdly, the regression is run on two 
sub-samples split by period, i.e. 1960-1988 and 1988-2000, the BIC is obtained for each 
regression, and the combined BIC is calculated. Finally, the same process is repeated, splitting 
the sample both regime type and time period, creating six sub-samples - one for each regime 
type in each period - and again the combined BICs is calculated. Table 5.5 shows the results of 
the BIC calculations. Comparing the BICs, it would appear that in both the one-way and two-
way models, the pooled model is the one with the worst fit. Splitting the model by regime type 
improves the fit, but splitting the model by time-period improves the model further. 
Moreover, splitting the model by both regime type and time-period gives the best fit. These 
results imply that there is heterogeneity in the parameters across both regime types and time- 
periods. The determinants of military expenditure behave differently in different types of 
regimes, as well as in different time periods.  
 
Table 5-5 BIC calculations 
  LLi ki BICi 
One-way 
   
Pooled -2731.73 109 -3175.63 
Split by PRC -2009.04 206 -2847.98 
Split by time period -1918.33 210 -2773.56 
Split by PRC and time period -1290.35 326 -2617.99 
Two-way 
   
Pooled -2528.84 148 -3131.57 
Split by PRC -1693.03 323 -3008.45 
Split by time period -1791.27 248 -2801.25 
Split by PRC and time period -1062.85 364 -2545.24 
n=3446; ln(3446)=8.145 
 
Jennifer Brauner 2014 
 
112 
 
Table 5.6 reports the one-way fixed effects regression results for the model broken down into 
six sub-groups by regime type and by time period. Interstate war has a negative, though 
insignificant effect on military spending in autocracies is omitted in semi-democracies and has 
a significant, positive effect on military spending in democracies. The omission in the middle 
regime-type category is likely due to the low number of observations. Intrastate war, on the 
other hand, is only significant in autocracies. This is likely because of the lack of intrastate wars 
in democracies (and semi-democracies). Log population is significant only in autocracies. 
During the Cold War, population has a positive effect on military spending, after 1988 it has a 
negative effect. Finally, log openness is significant only in democracies. This may be because 
democracies are generally more integrated in the world economy. Interestingly, like 
population, the effect of openness changes from positive to negative after the end of the Cold 
War. There are several possible explanations for this. Firstly, both variables are trended, so 
they may be picking up positive trends in military expenditure during the Cold War, and 
negative trends after. Secondly, there may be non-linearities, implying that the effect may be 
different at different levels. Thirdly, grouped by regime type and time period, the number of  
 
Table 5-6 Estimation results disaggregated by regime type and time period 
  Regression/Estimation Method 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Period 1960-1987 1960-1987 1960-1987 1988-2000 1988-2000 1988-2000 
Regime Type Autocracy Semi-democracy democracy Autocracy Semi-democracy democracy 
Interstate War 
-0.106 (omitted) 0.1372** -0.0843 (omitted) 0.0634*** 
(.156) 
 
(.0615) (.17147) 
 
(.0222) 
Intrastate War 
0.4075*** -0.3545 0.0812 0.3915** 0.1162 0.0612 
(.1025) (.2489) (.1313 ) (.1922) (.165 ) (.0777) 
Log GDP pc -0.4883* 1.1521 -.1493 -0.4392 0.0761 -0.2615 
 
(.2791) (.7085) (.1875) (.3294) (.7807) (.2113) 
Log population 
1.1869*** 0.2068 0.1173 -1.0861*** -0.7304 -0.058 
(.2211) (.8374) (.2917) (.2867) (.9259) (.6726) 
Log Openness 
0.1898 1.227*** 0.506*** 0.0705 -0.0002 -0.4262*** 
(.1531) (.4324) (.1886 ) (.3119) (.1713) (.1492) 
Constant 
-15.11*** -14.9913 -1.4835 21.6336 12.4189 5.9431 
(3.1764) (9.9752) (4.7566) (5.1723) (11.307) (10.5361) 
Year dummies No No No No No No 
N 1341 167 845 384 213 496 
Groups 71 23 49 59 37 57 
R-Sq within 0.1947 0.2967 0.0627 0.0998 0.0392 0.1869 
R-Sq between 0.0252 0.0168 0.038 0.025 0.011 0.0016 
R-Sq overall 0.082 0.0021 0.0032 0.0229 0.0147 0.0141 
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observations is in some subgroups is small (167 country-years for Cold War semi-democracies 
versus 3446 in the pooled regression). However, these explanations must be speculative. The 
results indicate a lot of heterogeneity which is worth further investigation. 
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the relationship between military expenditures and democracy. 
While papers on the determinants of military expenditures generally include democracy as a 
control variable, with a few exceptions, it is not the focus of their enquiry. Thus, aspects of this 
relationship, in particular, problems concerning data quality, the appropriate measurement of 
the key variables, and the question of causality have been overlooked. This paper investigates 
these issues in depth. It found that democracies spend less on the military as a percentage of 
GDP than autocracies do. The difference in spending is substantial: an absolute dictatorship 
spends around 40% more than a full democracy. Moreover, causality runs from democracy to 
military expenditure. 
 
The findings in this chapter have important implications for the results found in chapter 4. In 
chapter 4, I found that military burden is negatively associated with democracy. For lack of a 
better alternative, military burden was used as a proxy for political power of the military.  
However, the result from this chapter that democracy Granger causes military burden and not 
the other way around, suggests that the findings in chapter 4 need to be interpreted with the 
utmost caution. Democracy is endogenous to military burden, biasing the results.  
 
This chapter also tested whether the standard determinants of military expenditure are stable 
across regime types and time periods. Generally, I found that there is substantial 
heterogeneity amongst the parameters. While I suggested several possible explanations for 
this, it may be interesting to look into this in more detail. 
 
The finding that democracies spend less on the military than autocracies has interesting policy 
implications: they suggest that a successful move to democratic rule has a demilitarizing effect. 
This could prove interesting in the world of development aid, in which there is much debate 
about how prescriptive aid organizations should be. With evidence regarding the positive 
effect of democracy on growth being mixed, and dictatorships like China successfully forging 
their own paths towards economic development, democracy promotion has come to be seen 
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as Western-centric. The findings of this chapter suggest a different reason why democracy may 
still be worth pursuing: it leads to lower military expenditures. Not only will this free up 
resources for other areas of spending, such as health and education, it also has the potential to 
create a more peaceful environment, for example by reducing arms races. Both of these things 
are likely to be good for growth in the long-run.  
 
Finally, the arguments presented in this chapter do not distinguish between times of war and 
peace. Some studies have found that while democracies may be more averse to entering a 
war, once they do, they will commit to winning (see for example Lake 1994, Goldsmith 2007). 
This would make an interesting topic for further research. 
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5.8 Appendix to Chapter 5 
5.8.1 Figures and Tables 
 
Table 5-A1 Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Burden (SIPRI) 1341 4.160611 3.534496 0 50.24831 
Burden (COW) 4097 5.895802 10.23722 0 139.8255 
Burden (Mixed) 4134 5.86E+00 1.01E+01 0 1.40E+02 
Polity IV 5645 1.094774 7.447481 -10 10 
PRC 3877 .823317 .9293922 0 2 
Interstate war 4790 0.020042 0.140158 0 1 
Intrastate war 4791 0.08349 0.27665 0 1 
GDP per capita 4337 4.84E+03 7.15E+03 0.021254 4.65E+04 
Population 4797 3.29E+07 1.15E+08 41700 1.26E+09 
Openness 4595 65.97842 50.06869 4.262921 622.6263 
 
 
5.9 List of Countries Included in Sample 
 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, 
Bulgaria, Burki Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Republic, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, South, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor Leste, Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Turkmenistan, UK, USA, Uganda, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe. 
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6 Military Expenditure and Autocracy 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I found that democracies spend less on the military than autocracies 
do. Democracy was measured using the Polity IV index, which ranks countries on a scale from 
consolidated democracy to absolute autocracy. One issue the previous chapter did not address 
is that measures like the Polity IV index ignore the substantial differences between various 
forms of democracy and autocracy. According to Gleditsch and Ward (1997, p. 380), “vastly 
different temporal, spatial, and social contexts support the same autocracy scale value”. For 
example, as noted earlier, the Chinese communist regime, the Burmese military dictatorship, 
and the monarchy of the United Arab Emirates have all at some point in time held the same 
Polity IV score, yet the institutional differences between these three dictatorships could not be 
more pronounced.  
 
According to Geddes (1999, p. 6), “different kinds of authoritarianism differ from each other as 
much as they differ from democracy. They draw on different groups to staff government 
offices and different segments of society for support. They have different procedures for 
making decisions, different characteristic forms of intra-elite factionalism and competition, 
different ways of choosing leaders and handling succession, and different ways of responding 
to society and opposition”. Understanding these differences is crucial: research in comparative 
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politics has revealed that qualitative differences across autocracies help to explain variation on 
a wide variety of outcomes (e.g. Geddes 2003; Wright 2008; Weeks 2008; Aksoy et al, 2011). 
 
This chapter attempts to unpack one particular aspect of the differences between forms of 
autocracy: military expenditure. I view military expenditure as an instrument a dictator can 
exploit in order to stay in power. How he utilises this instrument depends on the institutional 
set up of his regime. In this chapter, I distinguish between military regimes, single-party states 
and personalist regimes and argue that military regimes should be expected to have the 
highest military spending. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: in section 2, I review the relevant literature; in section 3, I 
develop the theoretical argument as to why different types of dictatorships should spend 
different amounts on the military; I briefly describe the data and methodology in section 4, 
present the empirical results in section 5, and conclude in section 6. 
 
 
6.2 Literature Review 
 
Studying military expenditures in the context of different regime types is important because 
institutional setups affect the way military expenditures are determined. In the previous 
chapter, I argued that democracies spend less on the military than autocracies do. I explained 
that this may be because  democratic leaders are accountable to the broader public who 
generally tend to prioritize social spending (Rosh 1988; Hewitt 1992; Kimenyi and Mbaku 1995; 
Nordhaus et al 2012); because democratic leaders are more risk-averse towards war in general 
than dictators are (Bueno de Mesquita, et al 1999; Jackson and Morelli 2007); and because 
autocracies often lack popular legitimacy, relying instead on the military to maintain power 
(Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni 2010). I found empirical evidence to support this argument. 
 
A recent study by Albalate et al. (2012) explores the effects of government form, electoral 
rules, concentration of parliamentary parties, and ideology on military expenditure and finds 
that there are differences in military spending patterns between different types of 
democracies. This nuanced examination of different forms of democracy gives new insights 
into the determinants of military expenditure.  If differences between various forms of 
democracy are significant in explaining patterns in military expenditure, differences between 
various forms of autocracies may be even more pronounced: usually, in democracies, civil-
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military relations are relatively straightforward, characterized by what Huntington defines as 
"objective civilian control" (Huntington 1995, p. 10). In contrast, civil-military relations in 
autocracies vary substantially according to the type of authoritarian regime. For example, 
Huntington differentiates between i) military regimes, in which "no civilian control exists and 
military leaders and organisations often perform functions only distantly related to normal 
military mission"; ii) personal dictatorships, in which "the ruler does everything he can to 
ensure that the military is permeated by and controlled by his cronies and agents, that it is 
divided against itself, and that it serves his purpose of keeping a tight grip on power”; and iii) 
one-party states in which "the military is viewed as the instrument of the party, military 
officers have to be party members, political commissars and party cells parallel the normal 
military chain of command, and ultimate loyalty is to the party rather than the state”. 
 
Nevertheless, the differences in military spending between different types of autocracies 
remain under-examined. One paper by Kim et al (2013), examines whether military regimes 
spend more on the military than other political regimes. They distinguish between military, 
civilian and monarchic regimes, and find that military regimes do, in fact, spend more on the 
military. In this paper, I argue that the categories of civilian and monarchic regimes do not go 
far enough in dissecting institutional differences between autocracies. Both personalist 
regimes and single-party states may be considered civilian regimes, yet as Huntington pointed 
out, the differences between these regime types could not be more extreme. Moreover, as will 
become clear in the next paragraphs, my theoretical arguments and my empirical strategy 
stand in sharp contrast to their work. 
 
 
6.3 Theory 
 
Before I set out my argument as to why military expenditures should differ systematically 
between various forms of autocracy, it must be emphasised that the aim of this chapter is not 
to explain in full how dictators survive, but rather to explore in more detail the particular 
relationship between dictators and their militaries. Thus, I largely ignore the role of the masses 
in overthrowing dictators, though I acknowledge their (growing) importance. I argue that 
whether a revolution is successful or not depends on the dictator’s ability to command the 
loyalty of the military. This was most recently illustrated in Egypt, where Mubarak’s fate was 
determined by the military’s choice to side with the people in 2011, as was his successor 
Morsi’s fate, when the military ousted him in 2013. Given the importance of the military’s 
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loyalty for a dictator’s survival, I consider it paramount to explore this particular relationship. 
In fact, a recent paper by Svolik (2013), shows that the likelihood of military intervention in 
politics is non-monotonically linked to a dictator’s need to contract violence: “the likelihood of 
military intervention will be first increasing and then decreasing in the magnitude of threats 
from those excluded from power. This counterintuitive relationship emerges because at it is at 
intermediate levels of mass threats that the military commands resources that are large 
enough for it to be willing to risk intervention but not sufficiently large enough to completely 
deter the government from reneging its concessions to the military” (Svolik 2013, p. 767). 
 
I begin with the assumption, first proposed by Tullock (1987), that all dictators seek to stay in 
power, yet are at constant risk of being deposed. Tullock argues that most of the time the 
threat to a dictator’s power comes from officials of high rank. This argument was fleshed out 
by Bueno de Mesquita et al (2005) and Haber (2006), who identify the so-called “selectorate” 
or “launching organisations” as the key to a dictator’s survival. While other strands of the 
literature have focused on the role of the masses in overthrowing dictatorships31, Svolik (2009, 
p. 477-478) finds that “an overwhelming majority of authoritarian leaders lose power as a 
result of a successful coup rather than a popular uprising”. Examining “all 316 authoritarian 
leaders who held office for at least one day and lost power by non-constitutional means 
between 1945 and 2002”, he finds that 32 were removed by a popular uprising, 30 stepped 
down under public pressure to democratize, 20 lost power through an assassination that was 
not part of a coup or a popular uprising, and 16 were removed by foreign intervention. The 
remaining 205 dictators - more than two-thirds of the sample - were removed by government 
insiders, such as other government members or members of the military or the security forces. 
Thus, in order to stay in power, the dictator needs to control his elite.  
 
I continue my argument by suggesting, as Wintrobe (1998) did, that dictators have two 
instruments for staying in power: repression and co-option. Successful repression requires the 
loyalty of the military. Yet, as Acemoglu et al (2010, p. 2) argue, “creating a powerful military is 
a double-edged sword for the elite. On the one hand, a more powerful military is more 
effective in preventing transitions to democracy. On the other hand, a more powerful military 
                                                          
31
 Gandhi and Przeworski (2006), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), and Boix (2003) identify the possibility 
of a popular uprising as the central threat to a dictator’s power. The events sweeping the Arab World 
since December 2010 clearly demonstrate that the masses have the power to oust dictators. Their role 
is becoming increasingly important as social media enables citizens to overcome the coordination 
problem that has often been cited in the literature as a major hurdle to bringing about revolutions (for 
example Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). 
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necessitates either greater concessions to the military or raises the risk of a military takeover”. 
Thus, controlling the military is of paramount importance for a dictator’s survival. 
 
As laid out in chapter 2, there are various instruments a dictator can utilise to keep his military 
in check. These range from recruitment along family or tribal lines, as well as promotions, 
rotations, retirements, mass purges and executions, to ideological indoctrination, the creation 
of paramilitary forces and logistics control32. Another crucial tool is military expenditure. 
Nordlinger (1977), Collier and Hoeffler (2006), and Acemoglu et al (2010) suggest that paying 
soldiers an “efficiency wage” will prevent military takeovers. As noted in chapter 4, this is 
because when spending per soldier is above a certain level, soldiers are likely to prefer the 
status quo over democratisation. This idea is supported by empirical evidence from Leon 
(2012), who finds a negative monotonic relationship between a country’s military spending 
and the probability that it experiences a coup d’état. Powell (2012), using military spending per 
soldier, also finds that soldiers that are better funded (i.e. with higher military spending per 
capita) appear to be more content with the status quo and are thus less likely to attempt a 
coup. Finally, Collier and Hoeffler (2006) claim that the relationship between military spending 
and the risk of coups is actually non-monotonic or U-shaped: both low and high military 
spending may positively affect the likelihood of military takeovers, because high military 
spending affects the power and the influence of the armed forces. Despite some subtle 
differences in the choice of the appropriate measure of ‘buying off’ the military, they all 
generally point to a negative relationship between the risk of military takeovers and the level 
of defence spending.  
 
I argue that the precise instruments at a dictator’s disposal, as well as the choice of 
instrument, depend on the institutional set up of his regime, and in particular whether the 
regime is military, single-party or personalist. In the following sub-section, I define these 
regime types and outline the choices the dictator faces in each of them. 
 
 
6.3.1 Military Regimes 
 
According to Geddes (2003, p. 51), “in military regimes, a group of officers decides who will 
rule and exercises some influence on policy”. The elite comprises the officer corps of the 
                                                          
32
 “‘Logistics control’ refers to the oversight of and control over the garrison and movements of military 
units, access to ammunition and fuel, and supervision of field training exercises” (Hashim 2003, p. 21). 
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armed forces, over which it exercises full control. This puts the leader (i.e. the chairman of the 
junta) in a precarious position: Ezrow and Franz (2011) find that military regimes are the most 
likely to experience a military coup, while Fjelde (2010) finds that military regimes run the 
highest risk of civil conflict. Thus, in military regimes I expect large concessions to the military 
in the form of higher military spending in an attempt to buy its loyalty. 
 
Moreover, military regimes are more likely to resort to repression: on the one hand, they have 
a comparative advantage in repression – this being the expertise of the military (Davenport 
2007). Military regimes have full access to troops and weaponry, and can thus resort to force 
and repression more systematically than civilian regimes (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994). On 
the other hand they lack institutions for efficient co-option, such as political parties, and thus 
have few alternatives to repression. This increased reliance on repression as a means of 
staying in power, which necessitates a military that is in good shape, is another reason one 
might expect higher military spending in military regimes.  
 
 
6.3.2 Single-Party States 
 
Geddes (2003, p. 51) defines single-party states as “regimes, [in which] one party dominates 
access to political office and control over policy, though other parties may exist and compete 
as minor players in elections”. The existence of a party allows the regime to gather support 
among the civilian population (Wright and Escrib`a-Folch 2012) and incorporate a larger 
proportion of the population into the political process (Davenport 2007). Furthermore, the 
party organization is a strong and influential institutional structure which is able to monitor all 
groups in the society. Finally, single-party states possess the institutions (for example 
legislatures) to deal with demands from competing groups of power (including the military) 
without challenging the foundations of the regime (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). These 
features of single-party states decrease the need to resort to repression. 
 
As Huntington (1995) pointed out, in single-party states, the military is viewed as the 
instrument of the party and is completely subordinated to it. Various measures are taken to 
ensure its loyalty: military officers have to be party members and soldiers are promoted 
according to their loyalty to the party. Prospects for career advancement in the armed forces 
are dependent on the willingness of military officers to identify themselves with the party. 
Offers of selective benefits to reward support, combined with the credible threat that these 
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privileges depend on individuals’ loyalty, serve as a strong deterrent against challenges and 
defections (Wintrobe 1998). Furthermore, soldiers are indoctrinated with party ideology and 
often party functionaries are embedded in the armed forces to guard against subversive 
behaviour (Frantz and Ezrow 2011). For example, in Iran, “Islamic Commissars” were assigned 
to the joint staff down to the platoon level and were responsible for the ideological and 
political education of the troops. In China under Mao, party propaganda was an important 
aspect of training (Whitson 1969), and it remains an important means of controlling the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 2014 (Koh 2000). In addition, single-party regimes often have 
large non-military intelligence organizations which ensure a wide and pervasive control of the 
society at large, including the armed forces (Lai and Slater 2006).  
 
The interference of the party at all levels of the military structure makes it difficult for the 
armed forces to challenge the regime, while the single-party apparatus can easily suppress the 
opposition within the state apparatus itself (Slater 2003).  Because single-party states are able 
to subordinate the armed forces to the party apparatus, they have less of a need to buy its 
loyalty. Moreover, since the party allows the regime to gather support among the civilian 
population, there is less need to resort to state repression than in regimes without mass-based 
parties. Therefore, one should expect a lower level of military expenditure in single-party 
regimes than in military regimes. 
 
 
6.3.3 Personalist Regimes 
 
Geddes (2003, p. 51) characterizes personalist regimes by “the concentration of decision-
making and coercive power in the hands of one person, unfettered by a party central 
committee or institutionalized military decision-making process”. According to Geddes (2003, 
p. 51) “personalist regimes differ from both military and single-party in that access to office 
and the fruits of office depend much on the discretion of an individual leader”. A personalist 
dictator is able to surround himself with associates, friends and family members, as was the 
case in the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos or the Dominican Republic under Rafael 
Trujillo (Frantz and Ezrow 2011). He mobilises political support by bestowing some material 
rewards, private goods, to a narrow group of regime insiders (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994). 
 
Personalist regimes may have militaries and parties, but these institutions are not sufficiently 
autonomous. Often the military is kept weak intentionally through frequent rotations and 
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purges, preventing generals from building personal power bases with factions of the military. 
For example, in Iraq, a particularly interesting episode was the purging of war heroes in the 
aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war because Saddam Hussein feared that certain officers, by 
distinguishing themselves in the battlefield, had become too popular amongst the armed 
forces (Hashim 2003). In addition, militaries in personalist regimes are often ill equipped. 
Instead, personalist dictators tend to favour paramilitary forces, recruited from groups most 
loyal to him and heavily indoctrinated. In fact, some personalist regimes have multiple 
paramilitary forces – Gaddafi had no less that 11 - and the role of each is to check to others.  
 
This survival strategy has proven to be quite successful: the empirical evidence suggests that 
elites in personalist dictatorships have the greatest difficulty ousting dictators, and therefore 
personalist dictators face the lowest risk of being overthrown in any given year (Ezrow and 
Frantz 2011). In Chad, for example, effort to topple Idriss Deby failed due to lack of elite unity. 
Lukashenko in Belarus and Antonio Salazar in Portugal represent similar situations Ezrow and 
Frantz 2011). 
 
Because power in concentrated in the hands on one individual and because the military is 
institutionally weak and has little to no bargaining power in personalist dictatorships, I expect 
the lowest military spending in this regime time. 
 
 
6.4 Data and Methodology 
 
6.4.1 Data 
 
This chapter uses a panel of up to 65 dictatorships over the period 1960-2000. The sample 
comprises the dictatorships coded as military, single-party and personalist by Ezrow and Frantz 
(2011 - see discussion below). It must be noted that their dataset only contains observations 
on dictatorships, while non-autocratic countries are excluded. Countries which have 
transitioned to democracy or are experiencing a spell of democracy between years of 
dictatorship are not observed in those particular years. Thus, the panel is unbalanced. I 
considered balancing the panel by assuming that all county years not coded as a dictatorship 
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must be democracies. However, this approach seemed too simplistic and would have required 
a number of subjective judgements to be made on coding semi-democracies.33. 
 
Data on military spending is combined from the Correlates of War (COW) National Material 
Capabilities database and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) military 
expenditure database. Following Nordhaus, Oneal and Russet (2012), I use COW data from 
1960 to 1987 and SIPRI data from 1988 to 2000. To account for potential discrepancies 
between the two data sets, I include a dummy which equals 1 when the source is SIPRI and 
zero when the source is COW to capture the effect of using the different sources. I also run 
separate regression using only COW data (covering the period 1960 to 2000) and only SIPRI 
data (covering 1988 to 2000). I transform all data into percentages of GDP using GDP figures 
(in constant 2000 USD) from the World Bank World Development Indicators to get a measure 
of military burden. 
 
As noted in chapter 3, the Polity Score (Gurr et al 2009) measures the level of democracy in a 
country according to a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (fully institutionalized autocracy) to +10 
(consolidated democracy). It consists of six component measures that record key qualities of 
executive recruitment, constraints on executive authority, and political competition. I include 
Polity IV in my regressions because it has been found to be an important determinant of 
military spending. However, I argue that this measure does not go far enough in dissecting 
important institutional differences between types of dictatorships. As Geddes, Wright and 
Frantz (2012, p. 16) point out, “Polity scores measure regime characteristics, but they do not 
identify the group that selects leaders and implements policy changes”. As explained above, I 
hypothesize that it is precisely these differences that determine a dictator’s relationship with 
the military and hence military spending. 
 
Hence, in addition to Polity IV, I use a categorization provided by Ezrow and Frantz (2011) to 
measure the effect of regime type on military spending. The authors categorise dictatorships 
into personalist, dominant-party, military, monarchic, oligarchic, indirect military or hybrid 
regimes based on who controls policy, leadership selection and the security apparatus. My 
theory focuses on the three most prevalent regime types, military, single-party and 
personalist, and I drop the other regime types from my sample. Developing a theory that 
encompasses all regime categories may be interesting for further research. However, testing 
                                                          
33
 In an earlier version of this chapter, I did, in fact, attempt this, but was told journal referees to cut this 
section out. 
Jennifer Brauner 2014 
 
125 
 
hypothesis relating to regime types for which there are only a few observations may not make 
empirical sense34.  
 
As described in chapter 3, Ezrow and Frantz’s (2011) definitions are based on Geddes (2003), 
who categorizes autocracies according to whether “control over policy, leadership selection, 
and the security apparatus is in the hands of one-party (single-party dictatorships), […] the 
military (military dictatorships), or a narrower group centred around an individual dictator 
(personalist dictatorship)” (Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2012, p. 8). The emphasis is on the set 
of formal and informal rules for choosing leaders and policies. “These rules determine the 
group from which leaders can be drawn and who influence policy” (ibid, p. 2). 
 
Figure 6.1 shows the number of countries that fall into each of the three regime types by year. 
Single-party states are the most prevalent form of autocracy through the whole period, though 
the number declined following the end of the Cold War. Military regimes, though less 
frequent, also appear to have peaked in the 1970s at the height of the Cold War, then decline 
in its aftermath. The peak during the 70s can partially be explained by the frequent coups in 
Latin America. Moreover, as Geddes et al (2012, p. 8) point out, “these developments most  
 
 
Figure 6-1 Number of pure regimes by type (hybrid regimes are excluded) 
 
                                                          
34
 For example, only two countries, Egypt and Syria, fall into the hybrid category “triple threat”. While 
these countries make fascinating case studies, it does not make sense to test empirically any hypothesis 
regarding a triple threat from a single-party, strong military and dictator with personalist tendencies 
with only two observations. 
Jennifer Brauner 2014 
 
126 
 
likely reflect the strategic support of dictatorships in various regions of the world to advance 
US and Soviet geo-political agendas”. The number of personalist regimes, on the other hand, 
remains relatively constant and is even slightly higher towards the end of the sample 
compared with the beginning of the period. It should be noted that, given the above 
observations, the pre-1990s sample has a somewhat different balance of regime types than a 
post-1990s sample. 
 
As I stressed in the introduction, regime types and the polity IV tell a different story about the 
infrastructure of an autocracy. Figure 6.2 shows the substantial variations in the Polity score 
across regime types and within each of them. Single-party regimes receive the highest score, 
however they also display a substantial variation within this category, as evidenced by the size 
of the box and the position of the least and greatest values (-9 to + 9, excluding the outliers). 
Personalist dictatorships receive the lowest score, and display a smaller, but still important, 
degree of variation across the combined polity IV. Note that the fact that some countries 
classified as dictators by Ezrow and Frantz, but score 7 or above on Polity IV is due to the 
discrepancies in coding discussed in chapter 3. As Geddes et al (2012, p. 9) point out, “this 
probably says more about what the creators of Polity scores chose to measure than it does 
about anything else”. 
 
 
Figure 6-2 Autocratic Regime Types and Polity IV:  1 = Military, 2 = Party, 3 = Personal 
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It is worth mentioning in more detail the paper by Kim et al (2013), which makes use of a 
different dataset to explore a similar question. The authors use the dataset by Cheibub, Gandhi 
and Veerland (2010), which differentiate between monarchies, military regimes and a residual 
category, which they refer to as “civilian regimes”. However, it could be argued that grouping 
all non-monarchic and non-military regimes into one category conflates important differences 
between regimes. As set out above, single-party states and personalist regime have very 
different ways of dealing with the military.  
 
In addition, as mentioned in chapter 3, Geddes et al (2012) point out a number of problems 
with the Cheibub et al.’s dataset. For example, while Ezrow and Frantz (2011) code regimes as 
military when dictators govern in collaboration, Cheibub et al. code as military all autocracies 
led by men who have ever been officers. Why this may be problematic for our research is 
illustrated by an example cited by Geddes et al (2012): “This means that the Ugandan 
dictatorship led by Idi Amin from 1971 to 1979 is coded as military by Cheibub et al. but 
personalist in her data set because Amin marginalized the military from highest level decision 
making”35. Given that my theory specifically mentions the marginalisation of the military in 
personalist regimes, this example suggests that for the purpose of this research using the 
Chiebub et al.’s dataset could lead to inaccurate results. 
 
Finally, data on wars - internal and external - are from the Correlates of War Project. Data on 
GDP per capita (in 2000 constant US Dollars) and total population are collected from the World 
Bank World Development Indicators; and data on openness, defined as exports plus imports 
divided by GDP (in 2005 constant US Dollars) from the Penn World Table. I transform military 
burden, GDP per capita, population, and openness into logs to scale down the variance and 
reduce the effect of outliers. Table 6.A1 in the appendix outlines the summary statistics for 
these variables. 
 
 
6.4.2 Methodology 
 
Following a similar procedure to the previous chapter, the log of military burden is regressed 
on the regime type dummies, Polity IV, internal war, external war, log GDP per capita, log 
population and log openness.  
 
                                                          
35
 Ibid, 17-18. 
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           (6.1) 
 
As stated above, regime types include personalist dictatorships, one-party states and military 
regimes. As already explained in the previous chapter, intra- and interstate wars pick up 
immediate threats; GDP per capita is a measure of wealth, while population is a measure of 
size. Openness is a proxy for economic integration.  
 
The baseline model is a fixed effects model36 estimated with the combined data from SIPRI and 
COW. I control for differences in the datasets with a dummy that equals 1 from 1988 onwards 
when the data source is SIPRI. Moreover, I run separate regressions on the SIPRI and COW 
datasets alone as additional robustness checks. I control for group-wise heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation by reporting robust standard errors clustered on countries3738. 
 
 
6.5 Results 
 
Table 6.1 summarizes my results. Overall, the variables are consistent with recent studies on 
the determinants of military spending, although the selection of a sub-sample of autocratic 
regimes only and the combination of clusters at country level and fixed effects renders some 
of the control variable insignificant at conventional levels. 
 
Military regimes appear to spend more on the military than single-party states and personalist 
regimes. The difference between military regimes and single-party states is statistically 
                                                          
36
 I confirm the appropriateness of the fixed effects (FE) model over the random effects (RE) model by 
performing a Hausman test. RE impose the orthogonality condition that regressors are uncorrelated 
with the error. The Hausman test tests whether this condition is valid. Under the null, both RE and FE 
are consistent, but RE is efficient. Under the alternative, only FE is consistent. We obtain a p-value of 
0.000, suggesting that we must reject the null and FE is therefore the better model. 
37
 As already stated in chapter 4, the presence of serial correlation is likely because the model under 
consideration is static. The presence of heteroscedasticity can be explained by the fact that the 
variability of military expenditures differs between countries. 
38
 Note here another difference between my approach and that taken by Kim et al. (2013): the authors 
address the issue of serial correlation using the Prais-Winsten approach. This is not suitable for panel 
data. In particular, it imposes the restriction that the long-run effect of the variables is the same as the 
short-run effect, which is implausible. A large amount of the serial correlation may come from the fixed 
effects, which they exclude, and the rest from dynamics, and heterogeneity bias. The problem is 
indicated by their rho around 0.9. 
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significant (see table 6.2). Although the coefficient on single-party is positive it is not 
significant. Thus, it is not possible to determine whether single-party states spend more than 
personalist regimes. 
 
These patterns holds across all regressions, excepting the fixed effects model run on SIPRI data 
alone. In this model, the regime type dummies are subsumed in the fixed effects and dropped 
from the regression. This is easily explained by the fact that this regression uses a much 
smaller subsample (1988-2000) and thus features substantially less within variation. This 
illustrates the value added of bringing in the COW dataset: by looking at a longer period, it is 
possible to make use of the additional within variation. Moreover, the results using only COW 
data are very close to the model which uses combined sources, demonstrating that these 
results are robust. Thus, I find support for my hypothesis that military regimes spend more on 
the military than other forms of dictatorships. Moreover, I find evidence that single-party 
states spend more on the military than personalist regimes. This is consistent with my priors.  
 
In addition, I find that the effect of Polity IV, while of the expected sign, is, in fact, insignificant. 
Once the type of dictatorship is accounted for, the effect of the degree of democratization 
disappears. This suggests that the institutional setup within a regime is important in explaining 
military expenditures. Significant results are obtain for intrastate war (except in regression 3 
using only SIPRI data) and the log of population in regression 1. Reflecting the divergent views 
on whether and how trade influence military spending, the log of trade is consistently 
insignificant. Similarly, the log of GDP per capita fails to achieve significance, which is not 
entirely surprising given the exclusion of democratic (and thus more developed) countries 
from the sample.  
 
The results for interstate war are less intuitive: the coefficient is negative and insignificant in 
models (1), (2) and (4), but positive and significant in model (3). I suspect that this may be 
because model (3) uses only SIPRI data, which is only available from 1988 onwards, and my 
sample size is thus not only significantly smaller (374 observation versus 1415 observation in 
our baseline model), but also comprises only post-Cold War years. A closer look at the data 
reveals that there are only 37 countries in our dataset that experienced interwar, of which only 
one country fall into the post-1988 period (this country is Iran, which was involved in the Iran-
Iraq war from 1980-1988). Because this single observation represents an outlier, the OLS 
technique will treat it as a dummy, which explains why this variable is highly significant 
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Table 6-1 Estimation results: static model, various datasets 
 
Estimation Method 
Dependent  
variable is  
log military burden 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fixed Effects Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
Mixed Sources Mixed Sources SIPRI COW 
Military 0.651** 0.0694 omitted 0.728*** 
 
(3.01) (0.34) by STATA (3.62) 
Single-party 0.121 0.607 omitted 0.156 
 
(0.43) (1.62) by STATA (0.45) 
Polity IV -0.0108 -0.0165 -0.0107 -0.0167 
 
(-0.98) (-1.03) (-0.78) (-1.57) 
Interstate war 0.0611 0.549 -0.593*** 0.0495 
 
(0.19) (1.60) (-5.19) (0.14) 
Intrastate war 0.434*** 0.584* 0.066 0.577*** 
 
(4.45) (2.60) (0.57) (5.08) 
Log GDP  -0.416 -0.123 -0.712 -0.35 
per capita (-0.90) (-0.91) (-1.62) (-0.78) 
Log population 0.801*** 0.0241 -0.226 0.11 
 
(3.67) (0.18) (-0.37) (0.64) 
Log openness 0.0928 0.0650 0.364 0.0887 
 
(0.69) (0.24) (1.73) (0.64) 
Source dummy -0.673*** -0.443* 
  
 
(-4.73) (-2.45) 
  
Constant -9.415* 1.122 7.735 1.131 
  (-2.39) (0.52) (0.87) (0.33) 
N 1415 1415 374 1405 
Groups 64 N/A 46 64 
R-Sq within 0.1944 N/A 0.1049 0.1041 
R-Sq between 0 N/A 0.009 0.002 
R-Sq overall 0.0091 0.1041 0.0036 0.016 
AIC 2468.654 4619.96 198.1498 2501.162 
t statistics in parentheses *p<p.01, **p<p.05, ***p<p.001 
Notes: regressions on mixed sources (1-2) cover the years 1960-2000; regression on SIPRI data 
(3) covers the period 1988-2000; regression on COW data (4) covers the period 1960-2000. 
 
 
Table 6-2 F-tests for differences in regime type coefficients 
Model Test H0 HA P-value 
FE, mixed sources F-test military-single-party=0 military-single-party≠0 0.037 
Pooled, mixed sources F-test military-single-party=0 military-single-party≠0 0.163 
FE, COW F-test military-single-party=0 military-single-party≠0 0.039 
 
 
Jennifer Brauner 2014 
 
131 
 
Finally, the source dummy is highly significant in explaining military expenditures. As 
mentioned above, this dummy must be interpreted with caution: because the SIPRI data 
corresponds with the post-Cold War era, the dummy may, in fact, be picking up a "Cold War 
effect" rather than an inconsistency between datasets. In fact, given that the results using only 
COW data are very close to the model which uses combined sources, the former seems more 
likely. With the exception of model (3), where the fixed effects subsume the military regime 
dummy, the Akaike’s information criteria suggest that model (1) fits the data better than the 
models (2) and (4), with larger AIC39. 
 
The principal finding of this chapter is that military regimes are more likely to allocate 
resources to the military than other regime types. I argue that two simultaneous, yet 
interrelated mechanisms can elicit this pattern. On the one hand, the military dictator has a 
natural affinity towards the armed forces and is therefore more likely to redistribute private 
benefits to the member of his ‘club’. On the other hand, the military dictator must ensure the 
continued support of the military. The majority of military regimes are brought to power 
through military coups, and it is also the military that ensures their continuation. Military 
spending is an instrument in the ruler’s toolkit to reduce the incentives to stage a new coup. In 
addition, the dictator needs the active cooperation of the military to successfully repress 
attempts by the broader population to violently overthrow him. Military spending is an 
important tool that state leaders can use to get the necessary support from the armed forces. 
Put differently, dictators need to ensure the loyalty of the military though the optimal 
manipulation of military spending.  
 
The result that military regimes spend more on the military than single-party states may be 
surprising, given that countries like the Soviet Union, which spent vast resources on the 
military, tend to dominate the discussion around behaviour of single-party states. It is worth 
noting that China, another often discussed single-party state spends only a small share of GDP 
on the military (2.1% in 2010); instead it spends more on internal security forces. However 
important, analysis of these two countries alone represents no more than anecdotal evidence. 
Analysing a large sample of countries (which does not include the Soviet Union for lack of 
data), I find that single-party regimes spend less on the military than military regimes. I argue 
that this might be explain by the presence of a mass-based party, which characterises virtually 
                                                          
39 Additional robustness checks include regressions with a country-specific linear trends and a number 
of additional control variables, such as Militarized Interstate Disputes data on hostility levels. Results 
hold to the inclusion of these variables. The results are not presented here, as they do not add real 
value. 
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all single-party regimes and allows civil leaders to co-opt and target political opponents 
selectively, making them more resilient to internal as well as external challenges. Incumbents 
in single-party autocracies are better equipped than military regimes to co-opt and 
subordinate potential threats to political control, including the armed forces.  
 
It is important to emphasise that I am not claiming a casual impact of regime type on military 
spending. A positive relation between defence spending and (in particular) military regimes 
can also arise from causality running in the opposite direction. A military coup, and therefore 
the installation of a military regime, can be decided by expectations on future military 
spending growth prospects. However, note that this particular instance of reverse causality is 
far from obvious: if anything, one should expect a negative impact of military spending on 
coups d’état. Empirical studies tend to find a negative relationship between a country’s 
military spending and the probability that it experiences a coup. If this is the case, the bias is 
negative. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge this issue. My claim is that, conditional 
on regime type, military regimes are the biggest spenders on the military, followed by single-
party regimes. While there is a possibility that the OLS estimator is biased (although the 
direction of the bias is not clear-cut), my results provide the best linear unbiased predictor of 
military spending conditional on having a certain type of regime. 
 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
 The Arab Spring highlighted the importance of the military plays in helping or hindering a 
dictator’s survival. Whether the military stands by a dictator or not may be down to a number 
of factors. This chapter developed an argument around the role of military spending, 
highlighting its importance as an instrument of co-option. Moreover, it argued that how 
military spending is used as an instrument of co-option may vary with the institutional 
arrangements of the regime. In particular, the importance of the military in the institutional 
infrastructure is found to increase the military’s chances for acquiring more resources and to 
cause more generous allocations to the armed forces. 
 
Following on from this, it explores empirically whether there are differences in military 
expenditures between different forms of dictatorship: military regimes, one-party states and 
personalist dictatorships. This chapter contributes to the literature on the demand for military 
spending. In particular, in builds on the ideas developed in the previous chapter, which 
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hypothesises that democracies spend less on the military than dictatorships. This chapter 
unpacks the category of dictatorships and studies it more detail. 
 
This chapter yields the insight that military regimes have the highest level military spending, 
while personalist regimes exhibit the lowest. This is consistent with the theory developed, 
which suggests that one-party states and personalist dictators have alternative ways of 
checking the military and therefore need not buy the support of the military to the extent that 
military regimes   do.  
 
A study of military spending in different forms of autocracy yields some interesting insights 
about the nature of the civil-military relations and may have a number of relevant policy 
implications. In developing countries, the armed forces can play two important roles: they are 
pivotal in bringing about institutional change, and they may be involved in the policy-setting 
after a successful coup. Without an understanding of the importance of the military apparatus 
in autocratic regimes, it is difficult to understand how institutions and economic outcomes 
interact. Many governments of developing countries face considerable risk of a coup d’état 
perpetrated by their own military. The phenomenon was acute in South America in the 70s 
and it has been a recurrent phenomenon in Africa and in part of the South-East Asia since the 
end of the Cold War. Despite several scholarly attempts to disentangle the nexus military 
allocations- risk of coups, the question of whether and how military spending is responsible for 
the rising of autocratic regimes - brought into power through military coups - remains open. 
Therefore, this study has important implications for coup-proofing.  
 
Civil-military relations are also crucial with regard to military effectiveness (Pilster and 
Bohmelt, 2011). Military spending is one possible dimension along which one can measure the 
civilian control of the military organization. The analysis presented in this paper, albeit 
tentative, demonstrates that studies of the impact of regime type on military spending must 
work from a more sophisticated conception of authoritarianism. 
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6.7 Appendix to Chapter 6 
6.7.1 Figures and Tables 
 
Table 6-A1 Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Burden (SIPRI) 376 4.233419 4.383934 0.001858 50.24831 
Burden (COW) 1461 7.215286 13.82617 0 139.8255 
Burden (Mixed Sources) 1471 7.102561 13.81389 0 139.8255 
Polity IV 1647 -4.44202 4.486663 -9 10 
Military 1648 0.164442 0.370789 0 1 
Single-party 1648 0.51699 0.499863 0 1 
Personalist 1648 0.318568 0.466063 0 1 
Interstate war 1647 0.022465 0.148236 0 1 
Intrastate war 1647 0.099575 0.299523 0 1 
GDP per capita 1485 1404.765 2337.105 72.32493 23018.66 
Population, total 1648 4.05E+07 1.53E+08 612851 1.26E+09 
Openness 1591 62.8 51.10219 4.262921 398.9536 
 
 
 
6.8  List of Countries Included in Sample 
 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Republic of Congo, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, South Korea, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 
Uruguay, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
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7 Military Expenditures and Natural Resources in the MENA Region 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
While world military spending in 2013 was falling, due to reductions in the US and western and 
central Europe, in many parts of the world the trend in spending is still firmly upwards; most 
notably in the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Asia and Latin America. This upward trend has 
been long-standing, but became pronounced in particular during the 2000s. 
 
There are many economic, political and security factors behind increasing military spending in 
much of the world, but one notable tendency is particularly rapid rates of increase in countries 
with substantial natural resource revenues, especially oil and gas, and in particular countries 
that have experienced new discovery and development of such resources in recent years. 
While this may be expected given the increases in GDP resulting from such new resources40, 
the rates of military expenditure increase have sometimes been dramatic, often outpacing 
GDP growth and leading to a rising military burden – the share of military spending in GDP. 
Examples come from all regions and include both countries with major security issues (armed 
conflict or severe tension with neighbours), and those without such direct motivations. 
Countries with substantial natural resource revenues that saw a more than 90% increase 
                                                          
40 In fact, the literature on natural resources and GDP is inconclusive (in addition to numerous large N 
studies, see, for example, Mohaddes and Pesaran (2014), who discuss the impact of oil on the Iranian 
economy from 1908-2010 and find that oil has at times been a blessing and at other times been a curse).  
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between 2001 and 2010 include Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Chad, DRC, Ecuador, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Viet Nam.  In most of these 
cases, the resources in question have been oil and/or gas.  
 
The Middle East has long been a region featuring both unusually high military burdens (see 
figures A1 and A2 in the appendix) and massive oil wealth, as well as one of high regional 
tension and conflict. But there are many grounds to suspect a direct or indirect link between 
oil and military spending and arms acquisition. Firstly, the desire to protect oil resources has 
motivated spending, and indeed control of resources has been a cause of war in the region 
(Iran-Iraq, Iraq-Kuwait), as well as of foreign military intervention. Secondly, there have been 
several examples of ‘oil for arms’ deals, such as the £20 billion Al Yamamah arms deal between 
the UK and Saudi Arabia beginning in the 1980s, where payment for the arms was made in 
kind in the form of oil. It is widely believed that many arms acquisitions especially in the Gulf 
sub-region are funded directly from oil and gas revenues. As such payments would not show 
up in the official defence budget, implying that military spending in these countries is even 
higher than is shown by available data.  
 
The use of oil and other natural resource revenues to fund arms purchases is also seen in other 
regions. Both Chile and Peru have official mechanisms for funding arms purchases using 
copper and gas revenues respectively. Venezuela and Viet Nam are also countries that have 
used oil and/or gas revenues to make off-budget arms purchases. 
 
While there is abundant anecdotal evidence on the connection between natural resource 
wealth and military expenditure, there are only few papers that test this relationship 
systematically (see literature review below). This chapter studies the MENA region. The region 
is particularly interesting for the purposes of this study because it comprises not only countries 
with some of the highest military burdens in the world, but also those with a long history of oil 
production. Extensive research in the SIPRI archives has enabled us to put together a longer 
panel for the MENA region spanning the period 1960-2010, thus allowing for more robust 
panel and time series analysis. This is the first time this data is being presented and used for 
analysis.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows: section 2 reviews the relevant literature; section 3 outlines 
the reasons why natural resource revenues might be expected to influence military 
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expenditures; in section 4 briefly introduces the data; section 5 summarises the methodology, 
section 6 discusses the results; section 6 concludes. 
 
 
7.2 Literature Review 
 
There are only a handful of papers that examine empirically the direct link between military 
expenditures and natural resources rents. Perlo-Freeman and Brauner (2012) find that oil 
revenues have a positive and significant effect on military expenditures in Algeria. Ali and 
Abdellatif (2013) explore the effects of a range on natural resources from oil and gas to coal, 
forests and minerals on military expenditure in the MENA region from 1987-2012. They find 
that only oil and forests have a significant positive effect. Cotet and Tsui (2013) examine the 
relationship between military expenditure and oil as a robustness check to their bigger study 
of the oil and conflict: looking over the period 1988-2003, they find that oil-rich non-
democratic countries have larger defence burdens.  
 
This chapter draws largely on the literature on the so-called natural resource curse. A thorough 
review of this literature can be found in Rosser (2006). Rosser notes that this literature consists 
of three sub-literatures: (1) on the relationship between natural resource abundance and 
economic performance; (2) on the relationship between natural resource abundance and civil 
war; and (3) on the relationship between natural resource abundance and political regimes. 
This chapter focuses particularly on the second and third strands of literature. It should be 
noted that this literature refers largely to developing countries. The effect of natural resource 
wealth has been quite different for Norway than for Nigeria41. 
 
Natural resources have been linked to the onset, duration and intensity of civil war (see, for 
example, Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004). Ross (2004) outlines the different ways in which 
natural resources are associated with conflict, directly or indirectly: natural resources are 
linked to conflict through poor economic performance, poor governance, secessionist 
movements and rebel financing. The following paragraphs review each of these aspects in 
turn. 
 
                                                          
41
 Collier (2011) argues that this is because Norway has a high capital to labour ratio.  
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Natural resources have been linked to poor economic performance (see Rosser 2006, who 
cites Sachs and Warner 1995; Leite and Weidemann 1999; Gylfason et al. 1999; Auty 2001; and 
Neumayer 2004 as examples of papers which find empirical evidence from large N studies). 
Poverty, in turn, is associated with civil war (see, for example, Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; 
Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) reason that when there are fewer 
opportunities to engage in productive economic activity, the opportunity cost of joining a 
rebellion is lower. 
 
Natural resource wealth is also associated with poor governance. Studies have found that 
resource dependent countries tend to have corrupt governments (Ross (2003) cites Khan, 
1994; Leite and Weideman 1999; Marshall 2001; Schloss 2002; Global Witness, 2002). Leite 
and Weideman (1999) explain that this is due to increased rent-seeking activities that are the 
result of wind-fall gains provided by natural resources. Schloss (2002, p.5) cites “discretionary 
powers in the public sector” as a major factor in creating conditions for corruption. 
 
Moreover, researchers have found that natural resource wealth is closely associated with 
autocratic forms of government (see for example, Beblwai 1990; Wantchekon 1999; Ross 
2001; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004). Beblawi (1990, pp. 87-88) explains that natural resource 
wealth leads to the creation of so-called “rentier states”, in which the government receives 
rents from natural resources, rendering it unnecessary for it to levy taxes on, and reducing its 
need for accountability towards the population. “With virtually no taxes, citizens are far less 
demanding in terms of political participation”. Put differently, freed from the need to levy 
domestic taxes, government become less accountable to the citizens they govern. 
Furthermore, Wantchekon (1999) theorises that inside knowledge of the details pertaining to 
rents gives an informational advantage to the incumbent which allows him to entrench 
himself, so that even when elections are held, he would remain in power. Finally, Ross (2003, 
p.25) adds that another reason why natural resources are associated with autocratic forms of 
government is that “when governments have an abundance of revenues they tend to use them 
to quell dissent – both by dispensing patronage and by building up their security forces”. Here 
Ross actually suggests a direct link between resource revenues and military expenditures – one 
I shall elaborate on below.  
 
Other studies link natural resource wealth to weak government. The reasoning is two-fold. On 
the one hand, natural resource wealth can weaken the state’s territorial control. According to 
Ross (2003, p. 25), “if a country has a resource that is highly valuable and can be mined with 
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little training or investment [...] it will be difficult for the government to provide law and order 
in the extractive region. This opens the door for criminal gangs, warlords and rogue military 
officers, who may eventually grow strong enough to challenge the government”. On the other 
hand, resource dependence can result in a weak state bureaucracy (see, for example, Beblawi 
1987; Fearon and Laitin 2002; Karl, 1997; Mahdavy 1970). 
 
Natural resources are linked with secessionist movements because they give people living in 
resource-rich areas an economic incentive to separate. Ross (2003) finds that resource inspired 
insurrections have several common elements: People in these regions have a distinct ethnic, 
religious or linguistic identity, believe that the central government was unfairly appropriating 
the wealth that belonged to them, while they themselves bore many of the costs of the 
extraction process (due to land expropriation, environmental damage, and immigration of 
labour from other parts of the country), and therefore believed that they would be better off if 
they were a separate state. Bannon and Collier (2003) find empirical evidence that the 
discovery of oil greatly increases the risk of a secessionist war. 
 
Finally, natural resources play a major role in financing civil wars. Ross (2003) explains that 
natural resources provide a good source of rebel financing because they are extremely 
profitable, and because (unlike manufacturing) their production is tied to a specific location 
and cannot be easily moved.  He describes that “rebels raise money from resources in three 
main ways: through the direct looting and sale of resources, through the sale of resource 
futures, and through extortion and kidnapping” (Ross, 2003: 31).  
 
In spite of ample empirical evidence linking natural resources to civil war, it must be noted that 
this literature is not free from controversy. Rosser (2006) highlights several problems. First, 
empirical results appear to be sensitive to the choice of measure used to quantify natural 
resources. “In general, researchers have measured natural resource abundance in terms of 
either the ratio of countries’ natural resource exports to GDP or the ratio of countries’ natural 
resource exports to total exports. When they have used different measures of natural resource 
abundance, their results have been less clearly supportive of the notion of a resource curse” 
(Rosser 2006, p. 10).  Moreover, it is not clear which resources matter. The literature 
distinguishes between ‘point source’ natural resources (oil, minerals and plantation crops), 
‘diffuse’ natural resources (wheat, rice, cocoa, coffee, etc) and ‘lootable’ resources (e.g. 
diamonds, drugs) with very different results. Third, there is also some empirical evidence that 
natural resources may be a blessing not a curse. Cavalcanti et al (2009), studying 53 oil-
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exporting countries between 1980-2006 find that once they control for heterogeneity in their 
sample and adjust their estimation techniques accordingly, oil abundance is in fact a blessing 
not a curse. Finally, Collier and Hoeffler’s (1998) findings have been questioned by other 
researchers, who have attempted to replicate their findings using an alternative list of civil 
wars and arrived at different conclusions (see Ross 2004).  
 
This chapter addresses some, but not all, of these issues. It focuses on oil and gas, as these are 
the most prevalent resources in the MENA region. Moreover, it measures natural resource 
wealth in the form of rents, which given the mechanisms through which resources affect a 
countries politics (outlined in the literature above and explained in more detail below), makes 
the most sense. 
 
 
7.3 Theory 
 
Drawing on the above literature, it is possible to develop theoretical reasons why natural 
resources and military expenditure might be directly linked. In Perlo-Freeman and Brauner’s 
(2012), I argue that there are three main channels through which resource wealth affects 
military spending: conflict, nature of the state and lack of transparency. I shall discuss each in 
turn. 
 
7.3.1 Conflict 
 
The most obvious link between natural resources and military expenditures is through conflict. 
The literature review above documents the link between natural resources and conflict. 
Conflict, in turn, is an important determinant of military expenditures (see, for example, 
Hewitt, 1993; Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2003). 
 
I have already explained how natural resources can be used to finance rebellions. Hence, 
natural resources are often the object of conflict itself. Protecting and maintaining their hold 
on them can become a government priority. Thus, even where conflict does not actually occur, 
the desire to protect e.g. oilfields from actual or potential threats, internal or external, may 
provide a motive for military expenditure. For example, Brazil justified their recent purchase of 
submarines partly by the need to protect newly-discovered oilfields (see Perlo-Freeman, 
Perdomo and Stålenheim, 2009). Likewise, much of Nigeria’s recent arms purchases have been 
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related to protecting oil production in the Niger Delta from insurgents. (Perlo-Freeman, S., 
Ismail, O. and Solmirano, C., 2010). 
 
 
7.3.2 Nature of the State 
 
As discussed above, natural resource abundance is associated with poor governance. This can 
lead to higher military expenditure for several reasons. Natural resource revenues provide a 
direct source of government revenue that do not require taxing of the general population, 
which in turn reduces the government’s accountability towards the population. Perlo-Freeman 
and Brauner (2012) argue that this may make it easier for governments to engage in major 
arms purchases, which if funded through taxation would be extremely unpopular. 
 
Moreover, a state that is highly dependent on resource revenues may lead to regimes whose 
hold on power – and thus on the flow of resource revenues – depends more on maintaining 
control of the revenue-generating infrastructure than on promoting the general economic 
development of the nation. Thus, the military may acquire greater significance as the 
guarantor of regime survival, whereas governments dependent on general taxation have more 
need to maintain the consent of the governed. 
 
Resource wealth is frequently associated with authoritarian forms of government. Ross (2003) 
suggests that when governments have large amounts of revenues they tend to use them to 
suppress dissent - not only by providing patronage, but also by building up their security 
forces. Moreover, in chapter 5, it has been shown empirically that autocracies spend more on 
the military than democracies do. 
 
 
7.3.3 Transparency 
 
Finally, resource wealth is associated with corruption. Low transparency and corruption 
potential that can accompany resource revenues may facilitate higher military spending. 
Resource revenues may be a source of “off-budget” military spending. Resource revenues are 
in particular used to directly – and often non-transparently – fund major arms purchases; such 
revenues provide a direct source of foreign currency, but arms procurement contracts 
frequently offer some of the most lucrative potential for bribes. While off-budget purchases 
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may not always find their way into published military expenditure figures, the acquired 
weapons will generate additional operations and maintenance costs. 
 
 
7.4 Data and Methodology 
 
7.4.1 Data 
 
My sample covers the 18 countries of the MENA region as defined by SIPRI42. The MENA region 
lends itself to this study because it includes both oil-rich economies and countries that are 
resource-scarce - eight of the regions countries are OPEC members43, while ten are not - 
resulting in sufficient variation in the explanatory variable of interest. My sample covers two 
time periods: 1988-2010 for which SIRPI data on military expenditure is generally available; as 
well as 1960-2010, for which I was able to unearth data on military expenditure from the SIPRI 
archives.  
 
While different measures of natural resource wealth are available (Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
use the ratio of primary commodities exports to GDP) , rents are used here because the best 
reflect income accruing to the leaders of a country. Rents account for production costs, as well 
as price. I use three measures of natural resource rents, taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators: total natural resource rents, oil rents and natural gas rents. The 
World Bank defines oil rents as “the difference between the value of crude oil production at 
world prices and total costs of production”; natural gas rents are “the difference between the 
value of natural gas production at world prices and total costs of production”; and total natural 
resources rents are “the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral 
rents, and forest rents”. All figures are expressed in percentages of GDP. 
 
I control for wealth and size using GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US$) and total population 
figures taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators. I control for the effect that 
wars have on military expenditure using a dummy variable which equals one in years in which 
the country in question experienced a war (internal or external). Data for this variable are 
compiled from the Correlates of War interstate and intrastate war datasets for the years 1960 
                                                          
42
 Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the UAE and Yemen, although Iraq and Yemen are excluded from my sample.  
43
 Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
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to 2007, and enhanced using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme for years after 
2007.  
 
Apart from outbreaks of actual armed conflict, the Middle East and North Africa have been 
home to major ongoing international tensions that have created challenging security 
environments for states in the region, and have been a strong potential motivator of military 
expenditure. Outbreaks of war have frequently led to long-running rivalries, cold wars, and 
states of high tension long after the shooting has finished, while on other occasions peace 
treaties have led to major reductions in tensions and improvements in the security 
environments of the states involved. Conflicts in one country or between countries have often 
created ‘spillovers’, or fears of spillovers, in neighboring countries. Thus, I control for 
“tension”, using the variable constructed specifically for this analysis. A detailed description of 
how this tension variable is contracted is given in chapter 3. Note that a higher tension score 
indicated a higher level of tension. Wars a coded separately. 
 
Table 7.A1 in the appendix outlines summary statistics for each time period. Furthermore, 
table 7.1 below shows mean military expenditure for OPEC and non-OPEC members for each 
time period. It is evident from these descriptive statistics that the oil rich countries spend 
substantially more – up to three times as much – on the military. 
 
Table 7-1 Military expenditure in OPEC and non-OPEC countries 
 
1988-2010 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
OPEC 123 9141.472 10284.78 414 45245 
non-OPEC 206 3135.825 3981.26 243 15982 
 
1960-2010 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
OPEC 226 5174.975 7243.144 183.1012 35245.36 
non-OPEC 373 2571.371 2964.568 35.12379 11590.52 
 
 
 
7.4.2 Methodology 
 
I use three main panel data models to estimate the demand for military expenditure in the 
MENA region, using the various independent variables listed above. First, as a baseline, a 
simple pooled OLS model, but this is generally regarded as flawed as it ignores all potential 
Jennifer Brauner 2014 
 
144 
 
heterogeneities in the relationship between the variables. Therefore, for the second model, I 
use the standard fixed effects ‘within’ model (FEM) that allows for variable intercepts in the 
regression equation for each country. 
 
The FEM is the most common panel data used for this type of question, as it is the simplest 
way of capturing the ‘’average’ within variation across the sample of countries, the effects of 
changes in the independent variables over time on the dependent. Moreover, in the case of 
the extended time series I am using, where most countries in the sample have at least 30 
observations, the ‘large T’ properties of the FEM begin to apply, allowing the consistent use of 
a lagged dependent variable. 
 
However, the FEM model still suffers from potential heterogeneity bias, in that it does not 
allow for the coefficients of each independent variable, to vary between countries, only the 
intercepts. Moreover, as there are only 16 countries in the sample (and only 13 with T>=30), 
the large ‘N’ consistency properties of the FEM do not apply, leading to large standars errors. 
I therefore also use, for comparison, the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations (SURE) 
model, which is more appropriate for small-N large-T samples such as ours. This is a two-stage 
GLS estimation, which first estimates individual regression equations for each country, but 
then tests for contemporaneous correlations between the residuals for each country. This 
residual matrix is then used to run a second set of country equations that corrects the 
regression equations for the correlations between the residuals. The SURE model, while 
allowing each country to exhibit differing relationships between the variables, takes into 
account the possibility that the dependent variable may be correlated between countries.  
 
However, SURE estimators are biased and inconsistent if there is cross-country dependence 
due to common omitted variables correlated with the country-specific regressors. This is highly 
likely in a region such as MENA, in which the countries are highly connected, sociologically and 
economically (see Cavartorta 2010 for and in depth discussion of cross-country dependence in 
MENA).  
 
I estimate three separate equations, one for each of the natural resource rent measures. I 
regress the log of military expenditure44 on the natural resource variables, the log of GDP per 
                                                          
44
 It should be noted that while the level of military expenditure rather than the defense burden is 
analysed here for ease of interpretation, the model presented here is simply a reparameterisation of the 
models presented in previous chapters (see chapter 5, page 98 for an in depth discussion of 
reparameterisation).  
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capita, the log of population, a war dummy which equals one in years in which the country in 
question experienced a war (internal or external), and a variable I call “tension”, explained in 
chapter 3. GDP per capita is a measure of wealth, while population is an absolute measure of 
size. The former is generally expected to have a positive effect on military expenditure: 
countries with greater income can afford to allocate more resources to the military. My 
purpose is to examine whether natural resources have an effect on military expenditure 
beyond a mere wealth effect. By holding wealth constant, it is possible to separate the direct 
effect natural resource revenues may have on military expenditures. The war dummy picks up 
immediate security threats, while tension picks up latent threat. One would expect the effect 
of both to be positive: involvement in a war will require a country to allocate more financial 
resources to the military as a matter of urgency, while a latent threat might cause a country to 
mobilise in preparation for war. Note that unlike in previous chapters, I do not control for 
democracy or regime type. This is because the sample consists entirely of dictatorships. 
Moreover, because the sample is small, it does not make sense to control for type of 
dictatorship. 
 
Military expenditures, GDP per capita, and population are transformed into logs to scale down 
the variance and reduce the effect of outliers. I control for group-wise heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation by reporting cluster robust standard errors. I run the model on two time 
periods: 1988-2010 and 1960 (or from date of independence if this was later)-2010. 
 
 
7.5 Results 
 
7.5.1 Fixed Effects Estimation 
 
Table 7.2 reports the estimation results for the period 1988-2010. While overall natural 
resource rents, as well as gas rents appear to be statistically insignificant in the fixed effects 
model, the log of oil rents has a significant positive effect on military expenditures: a 10% 
increase in the oil rents is associated with a 1.9% increase in military expenditure. It is perhaps 
not surprising that oil rents are significant, while other natural resource rents are not, as oil is 
the MENA regions most prevalent resource. It is noteworthy that the pooled OLS model, which 
uses both between and within variation, yields very different results from the fixed effects 
model, which uses only within variation, for all natural resource variables.  
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Table 7-2 Estimation results: static FE model using overall natural resource rents, oil rents and gas rents, 1988-
2010 
 
Estimation method 
Dependent  
variable is 
log milex 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pooled OLS 
Fixed  
Effects 
Pooled OLS 
Fixed  
Effects 
Pooled OLS 
Fixed  
Effects 
Log NRR 
 
0.00309 0.0126 - - - - 
(0.00841) (0.0274) - - - - 
Log oil rents 
 
- - -0.0100 0.190* - - 
- - (0.00653) (0.0742) - - 
Log gas rents 
 
- - - - -0.0331*** 0.0144 
- - - - (0.00919) (0.0155) 
Log GDP per capita 
1.128*** 0.716** 1.145*** 0.733** 1.131*** 0.673** 
(0.0434) (0.219) (0.0479) (0.213) (0.0440) (0.196) 
Log population  0.966*** 0.833** 0.973*** 0.888*** 0.959*** 0.802*** 
 
(0.0329) (0.216) (0.0347) (0.206) (0.0327) (0.191) 
Tension 0.111*** 0.0565* 0.115*** 0.0419* 0.116*** 0.0732** 
 
(0.0186) (0.0243) (0.0189) (0.0162) (0.0186) (0.0212) 
War 0.311* 0.176 0.315 0.141 0.331* 0.217 
 
(0.157) (0.0926) (0.165) (0.0953) (0.157) (0.112) 
Constant -17.38*** -11.66** -17.62*** -12.81** -17.29*** -10.82** 
 
(0.815) -3.389 -0.881 -3.425 -0.821 -3.081 
Obs 317 317 288 288 295 295 
Groups 
 
17 
 
16 
 
16 
R Sq within 
 
0.5134 
 
0.6029 
 
0.5612 
R Sq between 0.6939 
 
0.3472 
 
0.6847 
R Sq overall 0.7898 0.7049 0.7858 0.4089 0.7962 0.6966 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
The coefficients of log GDP per capita and log population are positive and significant though 
outall regressions: tension is positive and significant throughout, whereas war is insignificant, 
with the exception of models (1) and (5). 
 
Table 7.3 outlines the estimation results for the extended time period, 1960-2010. The results 
confirm the relationship between natural resource rents and military expenditure: only oil has 
a significant (positive) effect on military expenditures in the fixed effects model (gas rents are 
significant in the pooled model, but insignificant in the fixed effects model). In the extended 
time period regressions, the effect of oil is smaller: a 10% increase in oil rents is associated 
with a 0.7% increase in military expenditures. 
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Table 7-3 Estimation results: static FE model using overall natural resource rents, oil rents and gas rents, 1960-
2010 
 
Estimation method 
Dependent  
Variable is 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log milex Pooled OLS 
Fixed  
Effects 
Pooled OLS 
Fixed  
Effects 
Pooled OLS 
Fixed  
Effects 
log natural resource 0.0348** 0.0417 - - - - 
Rents (0.0116) (0.0286) - - - - 
log oil rents - - 0.0250** 0.0698* - - 
 
- - (0.00825) (0.0355) - - 
log gas rents - - - - -0.0782*** -0.0403 
 
- - - - (0.0144) (0.0641) 
log GDP per capita 0.830*** 0.428 0.833*** 0.418 0.970*** 0.414 
 
(0.0534) (0.336) (0.0618) (0.354) (0.0536) (0.347) 
log population  0.789*** 0.612* 0.796*** 0.729** 0.858*** 0.768* 
 
(0.0382) (0.268) (0.0429) (0.296) (0.0370) (0.270) 
Tension 0.137*** 0.0616 0.146*** 0.0826** 0.100*** 0.0941* 
 
(0.0198) (0.0313) (0.0200) (0.0314) (0.0183) (0.0327) 
War 1.048*** 0.578* 1.006*** 0.607** 0.875*** 0.620* 
 
(0.168) (0.208) (0.175) (0.204) (0.162) (0.222) 
constant -12.34*** -6.043 -12.46*** -7.815 -14.45*** -8.403 
  (0.966) (4.424) (1.119) (5.355) (0.975) (4.845) 
observations 467 467 421 421 421 421 
Groups 
 
16 
 
15 
 
16 
R Sq within 
 
0.3478 
 
0.3707 
 
0.3690 
R Sq between 0.5996 
 
0.4945 
 
0.4736 
R Sq overall 0.5883 0.5200 0.5694 0.4254 0.6205 0.4381 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
    
 
 
GDP per capita and population are positive and significant in most specifications. However, 
GDP per capita is no longer significant in the fixed effects models. This is interesting 
particularly in model 4 in which oil does impact military expenditures, but GDP per capita does 
not, suggesting a direct link between military expenditures and oil. 
 
Tension is positive throughout, but significant only in the pooled OLS models. In contrast, war 
is positive and significant throughout. This may be because over the longer time period wars 
occur more frequently. A closer look at the data reveals that, of the 816 country-years of war 
that occurred between 1960-2010, 57% occured before 1988. 
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7.5.2 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Estimation 
 
For the SURE estimation, log military expenditure was regressed on its lagged value, current 
and lagged log GDP, current and lagged log of oil rents, war and tension. In alternate models, 
log of all natural resource rents was used. First-stage regressions were carried out for 12 
countries where at least 20 observations were available: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Tunisia. 
 
The results for the two sets of regressions are qualitatively similar, but with some noticeable 
differences in terms of which variables are significant. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 summarize the results 
for the two models. The regressions display, unsurprisingly, a highly heterogeneous set of 
results, with virtually no consistency between countries, except that the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable is almost always positive and highly significant. GDP is significant 
and positive in some way for most countries in at least one model, although the nature and 
significance of the relationship varies. For the 9 countries that had at least one war, the War 
variable is significant and positive in 4, but significant and negative in 1 and insignificant in the 
other 4. Tension is significant and positive in 4 countries, but significant and negative in one in 
the oil model. 
 
In terms of the key resource rents variables, in the model for total rents the joint effect of 
resource rents (current and lagged) is significant and positive at the 5% level or more for 
Algeria, Iran, Oman, Syria and Tunisia, but insignificant for the rest. In the model using only oil 
rents, the effect of these rents is significant and positive at at least the 10% level also for 
Bahrain, Israel and Jordan, but not for Iran as in the rents model. While this shows at least 
some (albeit sometimes weak) evidence of an impact of resource revenues for 8 of the 12 
countries, the pattern is rather surprising in that some countries with rather limited oil 
resources (Israel, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia) show a positive effect, while others with large oil 
resources (Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) show no such effect. 
 
Overall, the results of all the regression models provides some, albeit ambiguous, support for 
the hypothesis that natural resource rents lead to higher military expenditure in the Middle 
East and North Africa. The fact that the regression results in some countries fail to provide any 
clear pattern perhaps emphasizes the poor transparency of military expenditure data in many 
cases, and/or the lack of any consistency or strategy in budgetary decision-making in the 
region. 
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Table 7-4 SURE model using current and lagged log natural resource rents 
 Variables      
Country Lag d.v. GDP Rents War Tension Adj. R2 
Algeria + *** n/s + ** + ** n/s .98 
Bahrain n/s + j** n/s n/a n/s .92 
Egypt +*** n/s n/s n/s n/s .67 
Iran +*** +∆* +** +*** n/s .84 
Israel +*** -∆* n/s n/s n/s .44 
Jordan +*** n/s n/s n/a n/s .57 
Kuwait +** +*** n/s +*** +*** .85 
Morocco +*** + j*** n/s +** +** .84 
Oman +*** +* +*** - *** n/s .95 
Saudi Arabia +*** + j* n/s n/s +* .96 
Syria +*** n/s +*** n/s +** .81 
Tunisia +*** n/s +** n/a n/a .63 
Notes: The adjusted R2 values are from the 1st stage equation 
(+/-)*** = level or lag is positive/negative and significant at 1% level ** = 5% level *** = 10% level.  
+j * = level and lag are jointly significant at the 10% level with a sum that is significantly positive. +j ** +j *** similar 
for 5%, 1%. 
(+/-)∆* = The level and lag are jointly significant at the 10% level, with opposite signs, and sum not significantly 
different from 0. + = current positive lag negative, and vice versa for -. 
n/s = level and lag not individually or jointly significant. n/a = variable omitted for colinearity (i.e. no war or tension 
in country) 
 
 
Table 7-5 SURE model using current and lagged log oil rents 
 Variables      
Country Lag d.v. GDP Oil rents War Tension Adj. R2 
Algeria + *** + j* + * + * n/s .97 
Bahrain n/s + * +* n/a n/s .92 
Egypt +*** n/s n/s n/s n/s .67 
Iran +*** +** n/s +*** n/s .82 
Israel +*** spec. +*** n/s -* .36 
Jordan +*** spec. +** n/a n/s .85 
Kuwait +** +*** n/s +*** +*** .85 
Morocco +*** +j*** n/s n/s +** .82 
Oman +*** +** +*** - *** n/s .95 
Saudi Arabia +*** + j** n/s n/s +* .96 
Syria +*** n/s +*** + * +** .77 
Tunisia +*** n/s +* n/a n/a .61 
For Israel, the coefficient of ly is -.11 and significant at the 10% level; the coefficient of lylag is +0.12 and significant 
at the 10% level; the two are jointly significant and do not sum to zero, suggesting a negative effect of change in 
GDP but a positive effect of lagged GDP. 
For Jordan, the coefficient of ly is -.12 and significant at the 5% level; the coefficient of lylag is +0.19 and significant 
at the 1% level. The coefficients do not sum to zero, suggesting a negative coefficient of change in GDP but a 
positive effect of lagged GDP. 
Other symbols have same meaning as the previous table. 
 
 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter explores empirically the effect of natural resources on military expenditure in the 
MENA region. This chapter represents one of the first systematic explorations of this 
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relationship. In particular, this chapter explored the effect of oil, gas, and overall natural 
resource rents on military expenditure. It finds that that oil rents have a significant, positive 
effect on military expenditures. 
 
Moreover, this chapter uses a longer panel for the MENA region spanning the period 1960-
2010, put together through extensive research in the SIPRI archives. This allows for more 
robust panel and time series analysis. This is the first time this data has been presented and 
used for analysis. The results hold across both time periods. 
 
These results have several potential policy implications. Firstly, they give new insights into the 
relationship between natural resources and conflict. In particular, they suggest that where 
natural resources are present in a country but conflict does not arise, this may be because 
governments, anticipating conflict, increase military expenditure to protect them. This is in line 
with Cotet and Tsui (2013, p. 56) finding that “oil wealth increases the defence burden rather 
than causing more violent challenges to the state”. Oil wealth countries are less likely to 
experience violent challenges to the state not only because they have lower taxes and higher 
welfare spending, but also because they raise military expenditures. 
 
Secondly, these results shed new light on authoritarian survival strategies. It is often assumed 
that oil-rich dictatorships survive because they redistribute rents to their citizens. My findings 
highlight that the repressive capacities of rentier states should not be underestimated.  
 
Thirdly, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, arms acquisitions especially in the 
Gulf sub-region are often funded directly from oil and gas revenues and such payments would 
not show up in the official defence budget. Thus, the impact of natural resource revenues on 
military expenditure may, in fact, be bigger than what my model can predict. This research 
highlights the need for more transparency in the natural resource sector. 
 
Finally, an interesting extension of the research presented here would be to study a larger 
sample of countries. The MENA region is special in that it consists only of autocracies (with one 
or two exceptions depending on how the region is defined). A larger sample of countries would 
allow for the inclusion of regime type measures to distinguish between the effect of natural 
resource rents on military spending in democracies and dictatorships (the Norway versus 
Nigeria question mentioned above). Another interesting extension may be to look into other 
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sources of government revenue that circumvent taxation. These may include official 
development assistance and US military aid.  
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7.7 Appendix to Chapter 7 
 
7.7.1 Additional Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 7-A1 Military expenditure by region 
 
 
 
Figure 7-A2 Military expenditure for selected MENA countries 
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Table 7-A1 Summary statistics 
 
1988-2010 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Log military expenditures 329 7.83021 1.244873 5.493062 10.71985 
Log natural resource rents 357 1.734227 2.767402 -6.08708 4.254943 
Log oil 327 1.237738 3.612119 -8.06997 4.166281 
Log gas 334 0.135918 2.406216 -7.76099 3.267215 
Log GDP per capita 328 8.405831 1.108378 6.817831 10.48417 
Log population 365 15.77093 1.414123 12.99891 18.21145 
Tension 368 2.880435 1.996413 0 10 
War 368 0.059783 0.237406 0 1 
 
1960-2010 
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Log military expenditures 599 7.625034 1.893042 3.558879 16.25089 
Log natural resource rents 591 1.910108 2.561712 -6.08708 4.754028 
Log oil 537 1.541303 3.332469 -8.06997 4.730893 
Log gas 530 -0.22965 2.315581 -7.76099 3.267215 
Log GDP per capita 596 8.107288 1.209857 6.082219 10.79426 
Log population 797 15.309 1.613752 10.8414 18.21145 
Tension 792 2.671717 2.21552 0 12 
War 816 0.090686 0.287339 0 1 
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8 Conclusion 
 
8.1 Insights  
 
In 1992, Francis Fukuyama predicted the “end of history”. After the fall of the iron curtain, it 
seemed inevitable that all countries would eventually embrace democracy as the only form of 
government that is sustainable in the long-run. More than 20 years later, over half the world's 
countries are still classified as autocratic by the Polity IV Project. The Arab Spring, initially 
perceived with great optimism, appears to be nothing more than a blip. 
 
Why did the Arab Spring fail to bring about democratic change in the MENA region? While this 
thesis does not assume to know the ultimate answer to this question, it contributes some 
insights. Chapter 2 discussed in detail the coup-proofing strategies adopted by various 
dictators of the MENA region. Although chapter 2 was a qualitative study, certain patterns 
emerged. For example, the ideological indoctrination of militaries is more commonly found 
amongst one-party states, whereas personalist regimes often pursue divide-and-conquer 
strategies, exploiting ethnic and tribal differences where they exist and pitting multiple 
paramilitary forces against each other. Another pattern that emerged was that in countries 
where the military played a pivotal role in bringing the current government to power, through 
a military coup, as in Syria, or an independence struggle, as in Algeria or Egypt, it is more likely 
to assume a political role. These observations were then tested more systematically in later 
chapters. 
 
The study of coup-proofing is important because although coup-proofing focuses on 
preventing regime change by the military, it can have consequences for societies as a whole. 
For example, in Libya, Gaddafi coup-proofed his regime by creating overlapping networks that 
constantly shifted, causing constant confusion and making it impossible to organise any 
serious opposition. It can be argued that Gaddafi created a state of such extreme chaos that 
the country is still struggling in 2014 to fill the power vacuum left by his death in 2011.  
 
In Egypt, Mubarak (and his predecessors) coup-proofed his regime by elevating the military to 
a privileged position in society and ensuring that it had a stake in the continuation of his rule. 
Although he ultimately failed to secure the military’s loyalty, he created a military so attached 
to its privileges that it end up opposing democracy.  
Jennifer Brauner 2014 
 
155 
 
In chapter 4, this observation was converted into a hypothesis and tested systematically. 
Chapter 4 yields the general insight that countries in which the military is politically powerful 
before transition to democracy occurs are more prone to revert back to autocracy. This insight 
offers important lessons for policy makers:  not infrequently it is militaries that form 
transitional governments after revolutions because they are the only group organised enough 
to do the job. Yet as Huntington (1957) suggests, objective civilian control of the military is 
likely to be better for democracy in the long run. Politicians must “resist the temptation to 
bring the military into the domestic political arena” (Desch, 1996, p. 14). 
 
Some of the above discussion implicitly agrees with Fukuyama that democracy is somehow a 
more desirable form of government. While this thesis does not state this explicitly, chapter 5 
suggested one reason why this may, in fact, be true: democracies spend less on the military 
than autocracies. This is beneficial for several reasons. Firstly, it implies that democracy has a 
demilitarising effect. High military spending can be perceived as a threat by enemies and can 
lead to arms races and conflict. Democracy then implies a more peaceful world. According to 
the Institute of Economics and Peace, who publish the Global Peace Index, there are 
quantifiable benefits to be reaped from peace. It estimates that “the economic cost of violence 
to the global economy is equivalent to around US$1,350 per person, or twice the size of 
Africa’s economy” (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014). 
 
Secondly, in a world of limited resources, governments must trade-off military spending and 
social spending, the so-called guns-versus-butter trade-off. Citizens generally prioritise social 
spending. Thus, in democracies, government spending is better aligned with citizens’ 
preferences, resulting in higher social welfare.  
 
Chapter 6 studied differences between military, single-party and personalist regimes that 
emerged from chapter 2. It expanded the sample under study from the MENA region to 
dictatorships in general. It theorised that there are commonalities within typologies of 
dictatorships – military, single-party and personalist – regarding how dictators ensure their 
survival: military regimes are more likely to rely on force, single-party states use the party 
apparatus, and personalist regime tend to rule by a means of a divide-and-conquer strategy. 
Chapter 6 predicted that this should result in discernible differences in military spending 
amongst the three types of regimes. In keeping with the theory, it found that military regimes 
allocate the greatest resources to the military.  
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Another interesting finding was that, contrary to what anecdotal evidence might suggest, 
single-party states do not spend the most on the military. Discussions around behaviour of 
single-party states tend to be dominated by the two giants, China and the Soviet Union, 
eclipsing all else. This finding highlights one of the strengths of econometric analysis: the 
ability to push beyond subjective findings based on single case studies. While every 
dictatorship is unique in some way, understanding these general patterns can be useful, 
especially for actors wishing to encourage regime change and democratisation.  
 
An interesting question for further research may be whether certain types of regimes are more 
likely to emerge because certain characteristics and conditions existing in a country predispose 
it to one type of dictatorship or another. For example, personalist dictatorships might be more 
likely to emerge in ethnically heterogeneous countries where divide-and-conquer tactics can 
be more easily exploited.  
 
Finally, chapter 7 looked at countries in which resources are not quite so limited, i.e. countries 
with natural resource wealth, and finds that in the MENA region natural resource rents are 
associated with higher military expenditures. To understand the full welfare implications of 
natural resource wealth it would also be necessary to study the linkages between resources 
and social spending, and whether there is a trade-off with military spending. Unfortunately, 
this is complicated by the fact that it is difficult to get disaggregated data on government 
spending that is comparable across countries. Chapter 7 highlighted the need for more 
transparency around natural resources. An interesting development in this area has been the 
creation in 2004 of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a global coalition of 
governments, companies and civil society working together to improve openness and 
accountable management of revenues from natural resources. At the time of writing it has 45 
countries signed on to their mission. As more countries sign on, the hope is that transparency 
around natural resources will improve.  
 
 
8.2 Problems 
 
As with most research, this thesis encountered many problems, not all of which were possible 
to resolve. The most obvious problem was the availability of data with which to capture key 
variables. As discussed extensively in chapter 3, military spending data is notoriously 
unreliable. Moreover, the profusion of datasets measuring democracy and regime type 
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suggest a certain difficulty in quantifying such complex concepts. Capturing the political power 
of the military, on the other hand, is so complicated that hardly any data exists at all. This 
thesis has done the best it can by using what data is available and by checking that results hold 
across different measures. For chapter 7, additional data on military spending in the MENA 
region was collected, enabling more robust analysis for this subset of countries. Extending the 
entire military expenditure database back to 1949 remains an important ongoing project at 
SIPRI, and if completed will enable more robust research. It would also enable the extension of 
chapter 7 to a wider sample of countries. The MENA region is special in that it consists almost 
exclusively of autocracies. A larger sample of countries would allow for the inclusion of regime 
type measures.  
 
Another problem encountered in this thesis was that of endogeneity. The findings in chapter 5 
directly contradict the findings in chapter 4. Ultimately, this is tied to the data question. While 
chapter 5 was motivated by a question directly pertaining to the determinants military 
expenditures, chapter 4 was motivated by a desire to explore the effect of political power of 
the military, and military burden was used as a proxy for lack of a better alternative. Given the 
relevance and literature on both topics, it seemed interesting to explore both questions. 
Importantly, chapter 4 makes no causal claims. It would be difficult to extend the ICRG dataset 
backwards; however as more data becomes available more robust research will become 
possible in time. 
 
 
8.3 Interdisciplinary Research 
 
This thesis has attempted to study issues traditionally confined to the political science arena 
through an economic lens. The strength of this approach is that it is able to discern patterns 
across countries and make predictions about the future. Statistical pattern are useful in that 
they can suggest policies that might typically work in particular situations. They can also 
defend us from the temptation to over-generalise from particular examples and from the 
tendency to pick out from the multiplicity of possible causes that which conforms with the 
beliefs of the researcher. 
 
The weakness of this approach is that it is greatly simplified and risks making over-
generalisations about highly specific situations. On their own, economic models should not 
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inform policy. But they may serve as a good starting point or structure to more detailed, 
qualitative, studies.  
 
Finally, the quality of this approach depends on data. As mentioned above, probably the 
greatest difficulty encountered in this thesis was finding data that adequately capture the 
concepts being studied. Chapter 3 discussed in detail the many problems associated with the 
data. However, thanks to the efforts of researchers at thinks tanks and academic departments, 
data collection is improving.  
 
This thesis has attempted to combine both qualitative and quantitative methods. Chapter 2 
presented a collection of qualitative case studies. These case studies were used to identify 
patterns in civil-military relations across different regime types. These patterns informed the 
theory that lead to a series of hypothesis that were tested empirically. The picture that 
emerged is richer than if only qualitative or quantitative methods had been used. As 
economists and political scientists increasingly exchange ideas, a deeper understanding of 
what drives development can be gained. 
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